The Rhetoric of Transitional Justice: Negotiating the Years of Lead in Morocco by Loudiy, Fadoua
Duquesne University
Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Fall 2010
The Rhetoric of Transitional Justice: Negotiating
the Years of Lead in Morocco
Fadoua Loudiy
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd
This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact
phillipsg@duq.edu.
Recommended Citation
Loudiy, F. (2010). The Rhetoric of Transitional Justice: Negotiating the Years of Lead in Morocco (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne
University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/835
  
THE RHETORIC OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: 
NEGOTIATING THE YEARS OF LEAD IN MOROCCO 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts 
 
 
 
Duquesne University 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
By 
Fadoua Loudiy 
 
December 2010 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Fadoua Loudiy 
 
2010 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
THE RHETORIC OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: 
NEGOTIATING THE YEARS OF LEAD IN MOROCCO 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
Fadoua Loudiy 
 
Approved October 29, 2010 
 
 
________________________________ 
Calvin Troup 
Professor of Communication  
(Committee Chair) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Jane H. Fritz 
Professor of Communication  
 (Committee Member) 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Kathleen G. Roberts 
Professor of Communication 
(Committee Member) 
 
 
________________________________ 
Ronald C. Arnett 
Professor of Communication  
(Committee Member) 
 
 
________________________________ 
Christopher M. Duncan 
Dean, McAnulty Graduate   
School of Liberal Arts 
Professor of Chemistry and  
Biochemistry 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Ronald Arnett, Chair 
Department of Communication and 
Rhetorical Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professor of Mathematics 
 
 iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
THE RHETORIC OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: 
NEGOTIATING THE YEARS OF LEAD IN MOROCCO 
 
By 
Fadoua Loudiy 
December 2010 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Calvin Troup 
Transitional justice refers to the variety of rhetorical practices and discourses 
(restorative and retributive) that nations engage in during the aftermath of state 
criminality.  While examples of mass political violence abound, this inquiry focuses on 
the Moroccan experience of coming to terms with the Years of Lead where financial 
reparations have been the primary mode of redress for victims. The philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur contributes to a praxis-oriented understanding of transitional justice. This work 
advances a rhetoric of symbolic justice that privileges the public memory of victims. 
Symbolic justice offers hope for the renewal of the community‟s ethos through public 
discourse and practices that seek to restore the capacity of citizens within their society.  
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Chapter One:  The Urgency of the Past 
We cannot change it at will, but we can 
work on it until we have a past that leads to 
a future we can be proud of. 
--Joshua Foa Dienstag 
 
History is riddled with violent events involving millions of innocent victims, 
including the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, Hiroshima, the Rwandan genocide, 
Apartheid, the Darfur massacres, to mention just a few. Even for those of us who have 
not lived through any these events, these names are etched in our memories as historical 
markers that evoke injustice, grief and suffering.  One cannot help but wonder how 
fellow human beings can be capable of such evil, and how do their victims recover from 
these experiences of victimhood and injustice.  More specifically, how do persons and 
communities work through experiences of violence and injustice that strip them of their 
humanity and capacity to act as citizens?  
This process of negotiating (or working on) the past is commonly referred to as 
transitional justice. As I explain in chapter two, this metaphor and associated practices 
emerged (or re-emerged) after World War II but it is truly the South African experience 
of transitional justice after the end of the Apartheid regime that popularized it. Such 
popularity was due primarily to the leadership involved (Nelson Mandela and Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu) as well as the restorative approach adopted (truth and reconciliation 
commissions). There are other ways to engage mass criminality at a national level, such 
as retribution (Nuremberg trials) or even choosing not to engage it at all, like the 
Spaniards decided after the death of Franco in the early 1970s (the Pact of Oblivion).  
However, for those who lost family and friends during the civil war in Spain, the decision 
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not to engage the past at that time did not mean to forget what happened to their loved 
ones. Recent developments in Spain suggest that there is now a strong social movement 
to re-open the files of the Francoist past and serve justice to its victims.
1
  
 It should be clear that while historical experiences of transitional justice differ in 
terms of their context, scope and path chosen, they all constitute a response to evil. Evil is 
an important philosophical and theological metaphor for discussions of justice in general; 
however its treatment is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice to say that evil is 
universal, no community is immune to its manifestations and deleterious consequences.  
Paul Ricoeur states that the problem of evil is “a provocation to think more and 
otherwise” (Le Mal 57).  Although it cannot be explained phenomenologically nor 
empirically, evil actions need to be confronted, and their consequences on victims 
addressed. This chapter begins with an overview of the Moroccan context that serves as 
the basis for engaging the rhetoric of transitional justice. The discussion then moves to 
the metaphor of public memory and the relevance of Paul Ricoeur‟s philosophy to this 
work. 
The Moroccan Context
2
 
 Examples of transitional justice abound. But the focus in this project is on the 
Moroccan experience of coming to terms with Years of Lead, which refer to the period 
from the early 1960s through the end of the 1990s—under the reign of King Hassan II. 
During these years, officials acting on behalf of the Moroccan monarchy tortured, 
kidnapped, arrested and murdered without a trace thousands of victims.  In a literal sense, 
the Years of Lead refer to the bullets that security forces fired at unarmed citizens during 
demonstrations and uprisings; figuratively it has come to designate a time of fear, state 
 3 
terror, and the victimization of thousands of innocent people—men, women and children.  
Details provided in many testimonials are gruesome and depict a cruel, evil and ruthless 
period of Moroccan history.   
In the early 1990s, due primarily to international pressure, the monarch (Hassan 
II) in throne since1961, was forced o make changes. These changes included an 
acknowledgment of the existence of secret prisons, the release of s political prisoners 
(those who had international connections), and a loosening of constraints on public 
discourse. The other notable change was the introduction of concepts of human rights and 
democracy into the rhetoric of the State.  After King Hassan II‟s death in 1999, his son 
Mohamed VI took over and ordered the creation of an indemnification commission to 
compensate victims of crimes perpetrated by officials acting in the name of the state. The 
impact of this commission proved limited; so he ordered for the creation of the 
Commission for Equity and Reconciliation (IER), established by royal decree in late 
2003.  The IER‟s mandate was to establish the truth about the violations that occurred 
during the years of lead, compensate victims, initiate a process of national reconciliation 
and, most importantly, promote a culture of human rights and respect for human dignity 
and life to contribute to the associated project of democratic transition. However, far 
from meeting with unanimity, the Moroccan project of transitional justice has started a 
conversation about the meaning of reparations, equity and reconciliation. The 
International Center for Transitional Justice states: 
Despite many notable accomplishments, the work of the Commission has 
not been without its critics who have pointed to its limited investigative 
powers and the lack of an accountability mechanism for perpetrators of 
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human rights violations. Groups like the Moroccan Association for Human 
Rights (AMDH) have organized their own versions of public hearings-
though without the benefit of national television coverage—in which 
victims were allowed to name perpetrators. Perhaps the most significant 
complaints involved the limited information made publicly available by 
the Commission regarding its investigations into the fate of the missing 
and burial sites of the deceased.
3
   
A recent report by Amnesty International also points to the limited impact of the IER‟s 
work, despite the great deal of archival material gathered by the commission.   
The stories presented talk about the suffering and grief victims were subjected to 
and the loss of friends and family, but also of the friendships developed with others, the 
solidarity amongst victims‟ families, and the remarkable struggle to survive. The stories 
are important in that they constitute this nation‟s collective memory of the recent past, the 
consciousness of that people, and reminders of what happened so that it does not happen 
again. In addition to published narratives of the Years of Lead, there has been a variety of 
events and forums where victims have had the opportunity to talk publicly about their 
ordeals. These include symbolic mock trials of perpetrators, events that commemorate the 
passing of victims or, for example, the state-sponsored kidnapping of the charismatic 
political leader Mehdi Ben Barka.  These events have showcased the stories of victims as 
part of the legacy of the Years of Lead, and as such constitute an important part of 
Moroccan public memory.  Storytelling of state-sponsored violence has been efficacious 
in compelling a moral response from both local and international audiences. Because of 
the link established between testifying (telling one‟s story of victim-hood) and obtaining 
 5 
reparations (for one‟s suffering or a family member‟s death), human life and worth was 
inevitably put in dollar terms. Slyomovics argues that with Moroccan narratives of 
suffering, as with other such narratives, “the value and worth of a man or a woman can be 
provisionally quantified” (“Reparations” 28).  Such an argument, however, with its focus 
on money as a symbol of recognition of a person‟s unjust treatment, distracts from the 
more significant contribution of witnesses and their narratives, a contribution that cannot 
and should not be measured in financial terms. It also detracts from making accountable 
those state actors responsible for carrying out atrocities against their fellow citizens, as I 
further elaborate in chapter three, which provides a rhetorical history of Morocco‟s 
experience of transitional justice. 
Be that as it may, the project of transitional justice has energized public discourse 
about the past, the present and the future of Morocco and thus can potentially contribute 
to a true (grassroots) political transition. The past has been a “foreign land” for most 
Moroccans for a long time, either because of a blackout on information or because of 
fear. Prior to the creation of the IER, to speak of the past meant to be political and to be 
political meant that one could be victim of state violence. Abdellah Maghraoui argues 
that through a policy of violence and strategic political moves, the Moroccan monarchy 
had managed to actually depoliticize its citizenry (“Depoliticization” 70).  If this is true, 
then the potential for the rhetoric of transitional justice is immense as it may contribute to 
a re-politicization of citizens. Driss Benzekri, the late president of the IER, stated:  “It 
[the process of transitional justice] is not only a matter of sharing knowledge and 
appropriation of the past but also to create in the present (through debate) norms and 
rules for living together and build a future.”4 In other words, discourses and practices of 
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transitional justice contribute to understanding of the past as well as preparing for the 
future. 
As the opening quote by Joshua Foa Dienstag suggests, the past that is at stake in 
experiences of transitional justice is past to the extent that we cannot rewrite or 
whitewash it but we can be responsible inheritors by being accountable for it. History is 
not only an ontological condition as Martin Heidegger argued but also “as a moral debt to 
be paid off,” in Nietzsche‟s terms. In other words, “anyone who truly dares to meddle 
with the past accepts the onus in doing so for what is there, accepts that the past lives on 
in one, and that one may be accountable for it. For if this were not so, there would be no 
need to revisit the past at all” (Dienstag 191). In addition, the past is part of the 
hermeneutic of the human narrative so to understand the whole (history), one needs to 
understand the parts, as the following section on public memory explains. 
Public Memory as Engagement with the Past 
The notion of collective memory was introduced in the early 20
th
 century by 
French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs whose argument originated from Emile 
Durkheim‟s idea of collective conscience and consisted in showing how all acts of 
memory or remembrance are necessarily social—that is, when one remembers an event, 
one does it as part of a collectivity. In other words, to speak about public memory is to 
speak about acts performed in the public realm that rely on remembering. Public memory 
is constituted at various levels and through different mediums or “realms,” as Pierre Nora 
calls them, and should be distinguished from both collective and social types of memory.  
“Realms of public memory” are revealed in geographical places, historical monuments, 
buildings, literary works, art works, commemorations, symbols and other genres and 
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practices that suggest an audience.
5
 Public memory implies a dual temporal configuration 
because, as Edward Casey argues, the phrase includes two time frames, possibly three:  
Public memory is both attached to a past (typically an originating event of 
some sort) and acts to ensure a future of further remembering of that same 
event. Public monuments embody this Janusian trait: their very 
massiveness and solidity almost literally enforce this futurity, while 
inscriptions and certain easily identifiable features (for example, the giant 
seated Abraham Lincoln of the Lincoln Memorial) pull the same physical 
object toward the past it honors. (17) 
This view of public memory reveals the ambiguous and complex character of any attempt 
to capture the past. The past is not only elusive, fragmentary and disputatious, as Matt 
Matsuda suggests, but it is also prone to all kinds of appropriations and 
misappropriations.
6
 
 Public memory is above all a rhetorical and political phenomenon; it is a struggle 
for power between official and vernacular cultures to assign meaning to the past and, 
ultimately, to shape the present (Bodnar, Remaking14). There are strong connections 
between the drive to make sense of the past and a community‟s identity as evidenced by 
the salience of memory in identity politics.  Booth states that: “…it [memory] is at once a 
defensive struggle to preserve a connection with the absent and the dense soil of habit 
and institutional memory, that almost effortless infusion of the past into the present” (xi). 
The kinship between memory and identity is evident for both individuals and groups.  
The identity of larger communities relies on citizens‟ narratives for both continuity and 
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change and, most importantly, to ensure that (some kind of) justice is served. According 
to Booth:  
Memory-identity matters because, among other things, it is the ground of 
imputation, of the society (or person) as owner of its past and responsible 
for it, as well as identical to, and thus capable of, making commitments to 
a future, of binding its future by a present promise. And because we are 
members of a persisting and accountable community, we bear witness. 
That is, we seek to ensure through acts of memory a certain persistence of 
the crime, the victim, and the perpetrator (xiii).   
Testimonies spoken in communities with a past of injustice and suffering are  realms of 
memories but thus  constitute a significant aspect of a people‟s public memory. These 
testimonies assign meaning to the past, reshape a people‟s identity, and serve justice by 
recognizing an injustice, the perpetrator of the injustice and, most important, the victim. 
But what does it mean to be a victim in this context?  Casey makes the argument that:  
A victim is a public person—if not yet explicitly so, then potentially so 
(that is, as someone who can be recognized as such, present a case in 
court, complain in public, etc.). Precisely because a victim cannot argue 
for himself—because he is dead or lacks the knowledge or resources to 
become a plaintiff—public testimonial is the more requisite if that person 
(however unknown to the public initially, however much stranger) is to 
reclaim recognition or vindication. Without the testimonial, verbal and/or 
pictorial, the victim recedes into oblivion, remembered only by his or her 
family and friends—and thus part of individual and social memory—but 
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not belonging expressly to public memory, at most a cipher or empty 
number in that memory (that is, as just one among the many dead as 
currently counted) (20). 
To qualify as a victim one must lack the capacity to speak for oneself and be reduced to a 
number or a cipher. In Morocco for example, during the Years of Lead, political 
prisoners were given numbers that were used to refer to them in lieu of their actual 
names, and women prisoners were given male names to deny them their gendered 
identity. In such cases, publicly communicating these experiences contributes to the 
preservation of a people‟s public memory as well as victims‟ regaining of the status of 
human being, a person worthy of respect and dignity. As Casey insists,  “Without the 
memory, verbal and/or pictorial, the victim recedes into oblivion, remembered only by 
his or her family and friends—and thus part of individual and social memory—but not 
belonging expressly to public memory” (20).  The living have a duty of memory to those 
who have been victimized, to humanity‟s victims: 
The testament, telling the heir what will rightfully be his, wills past 
possessions for a future. Without a testament or, to resolve the metaphor, 
without tradition—which selects names, which hands down and preserves, 
which indicates where the treasures are and what their worth is—there 
seems to be no willed continuity in time and hence, humanly speaking, 
neither past nor future, only sempiternal change of the world and the 
biological cycle of living creatures in it. (Between 6) 
To be sure, for either an individual or a nation to dream of a future, they need a past that 
serves as exemplar, testament and inspiration. 
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Testimonies put a human face onto the past and they ensure that the past does not 
fall into oblivion. They can provide, as Priscilla Hayner recommends, the opportunity for 
a nation to remember in order to forget (xi).  In the aftermath of a state‟s violence against 
its own people, testimonies can serve as the opportunity for deliberation not just about 
past actions (responsibility, accountability and justice) but also about possibilities for the 
future of that people (identity, allegiance, affiliation).  As Kay Schaffer and Sidonie 
Smith put it: 
These acts of remembering test the values that nations profess to live by 
against the actual experiences and perceptions of the storyteller as witness. 
They issue an ethical call to listeners both within and beyond national 
borders to recognize the disjunction between the values espoused by the 
community and the actual practices that occur. They issue a call…to 
respond to the story; to recognize the humanity of the teller and the justice 
of the claim; to take responsibility for that recognition; and to find means 
of redress. (3) 
Through their stories, victims of state violence appeal to audiences‟ sense of 
justice through pathos and ethos, demanding both a listener and a response.  First, for 
many victims and their families, the purpose for this laborious undertaking is to uncover 
the truth so that their stories are recorded as part of the country‟s history.  Ricoeur argues 
that testimonies are part of the process of making history: “[. . .] testimony opens an 
epistemological process that departs from declared memory, passes through the archive 
and documents, and finds its fulfillment in documentary proof” (Memory 161). In other 
words, testimony is the lynchpin between memory and history.  
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Discussions of transitional justice have typically focused on legal rhetoric or 
psychological explanations of victims. While legal and psychological considerations are 
important, they often do not fully take into account the rhetorical and ethical implications 
of these events. Schaffer and Smith argue that the psychoanalytical model has been the 
dominant framework in the West for thinking about and explaining stories that speak of 
political violence (22).  While the psychological aspects of experiences of abuse and 
trauma are certainly important, they remain personal.  When one presents his or her 
experience of being a victim of state violence in a public forum, one‟s narrative moves 
from the private to the public realm. Thus to testify is an ethico-political act with 
implications for the individual citizen as well as for society at large.  
Paul Ricoeur’s Contribution to Transitional Justice 
The past is a narrative, a rhetorical form that informs and is informed by 
temporality. Every national community relies on rhetorical practices for the purpose of 
making sense of the past, constructing the present, and imagining the future. Gerard 
Hauser explains that there exists a symbiotic relationship between a society‟s “self-
production” and rhetoric (114). Ricoeur‟s approach to narrative hermeneutics privileges 
an understanding of transitional justice as a rhetorical metaphor and practice, and is an 
attempt to move beyond the psychoanalytical and therapeutic framework (closure) that is 
often implicit, if not explicit, in discussions of a community‟s negotiation of its past. 
Ricoeur‟s approach to narrative identity, temporality, and issues of justice is thus 
particularly relevant to this study. 
 Ricoeur‟s hermeneutic approach provides the theoretical grounding for 
understanding the problem of transitional justice as both rhetorical and philosophical 
 12 
phenomenon. While therapeutic and legalistic models of (political) transitional justice are 
important for understanding collective trauma and political transitions in the aftermath of 
state violence, Ricoeur‟ narrative theory provides the philosophical framing necessary for 
understanding how citizens, especially victims, negotiate their victimhood and attempt to 
reconstruct a civic identity as part of their national community. The future of a nation 
cannot be built on the negation or selective remembering of its past, however atrocious it 
is; the past is the site of people‟s historical consciousness and ethos. Thus, it is necessary 
for nations to engage their past, especially traumatic ones. The idea of a nation is inspired 
by Homi Bhabha when he states that:  
A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of 
the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is 
prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, 
however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely consent, the clearly 
expressed desire to continue a common life (19).  
In other words, the legacy of the past, with its sacrifices and injustices, is the thread that 
makes people part of a given nation, a community that shares a common burden for the 
past and the uncertainty of the future. To be willing to share the burden is also be willing 
to listen to those who suffered, those whose voices have been silenced and without 
whom, there is no nation to speak of. 
The overarching goal of this project is to highlight the experiences of victims of 
state violence, all-too-often the forgotten voices of transitional justice.  The voices of 
victims as told in testimonies and narratives usually stand in sharp contrast with official 
history.  Although the hard facts presented by these vernacular voices might not be exact, 
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their narratives present the phenomenological truth of their experiences, in contrast to the 
forensic truth sought by professional historians. Transitional justice in the aftermath of 
national political disaster is not only a difficult (psychological) process of mutual healing, 
it is first and foremost an occasion for civic deliberation about the meaning of justice, 
national identity, and public (collective, national) memory. The memory of tragic events 
often becomes the foundation of a nation‟s new identity:   
I have in mind those events that a historical community holds to be 
significant because it sees in them an origin, a return to its beginnings. 
These [epoch-making] events draw their specific meaning from their 
capacity to found or reinforce the community‟s consciousness of identity, 
its narrative identity, as well as the identity of its members. These events 
generate feelings of considerable ethical intensity, whether this be fervent 
commemoration or some manifestation of loathing, or indignation, or of 
regret or compassion, or even the call for forgiveness. (Time and 
Narrative 3, 187)  
These tragic events are rhetorical interruptions in a community‟s history, and their 
aftermath provides an opportunity for renewed self-understanding. It is a hermeneutical 
effort, a creative act aimed at redefining a people‟s ethical aim, invigorating citizens‟ 
political capacity to act, and giving “an indispensable way of giving a future to the past” 
(Kearney 8).  
Narratives about the past are important in light of Ricoeur‟s argument that the 
identity of individuals as well as communities is constituted narratively, and that the 
(historical) present we inhabit is always constituted within a dialectic between a space of 
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experience (ideology, past) and a horizon of expectation (utopia, future). To keep this 
dialectic alive is tantamount maintaining a healthy political community. Along with 
Ricoeur, Richard Kearney argues that the tension between belonging (past) and distance 
(future) is helpful. Because, “cut off from one another, they run the risk of pathological 
extremes: ideology imprisoning us in reactionary conservatism, utopia sacrificing us to a 
schizophrenic image of an abstract future without the conditions for its realization” (7).  
The present offers the opportunity for mediation between happiness and suffering, 
between past and future. It is at this junction that memory, understood as the thread that 
links a person or a community to the past, becomes significant. Ricoeur distinguishes 
three levels of memory: (1) the pathological-therapeutic, (2) the practical, and (3) the 
ethico-political. 
  First, the pathological-therapeutic level of memory refers to “blocked memory,” 
and is best understood at the individual level because each person lives or feels her 
emotions and deals with her memories differently. Commemorations can be cathartic, a 
kind of mourning, which Ricoeur argues is a necessary component of remembering. 
When members of a group come together after a traumatic event, they experience the 
commonality of their loss and plurality of their pain. Ricoeur argues further that “we can 
say that such mourning behaviours constitute a privileged example of the intersecting 
relations between private and public expression [of memory].  It is in this way that our 
concept of a sick historical memory finds justification a posteriori in this bipolar 
structure of mourning behaviors” (Memory 79).  Collective mourning that takes place in 
funerals and commemorations can provide individuals with solace in the fact that they 
recognize that they are not alone in their respective feelings of pain and loss.  But pain 
 15 
and loss can also inhibit remembrance for fear of re-stimulating the horrors one has lived 
and witnessed, leading to pathologies of memory. One example is what Ricoeur calls 
“blocked memory” where memories are frozen or, in Freudian language, repressed. 
Frozen or repressed memories are common at both the individual and collective level. 
Many communities make a concerted effort to not remember (or at least, not celebrate or 
commemorate) shameful events in their past. The outcome of collective amnesia is a 
wounded national memory. The act of remembering is rarely a spontaneous occurrence; it 
is a travail, a work that can be difficult and painful, which leads to consideration of the 
practical aspects of memory (Ricoeur, Memory 79).  
The practical aspect of remembering is about “manipulated memory” and 
concerns the active side of memory where remembering becomes an instrument to 
achieve something. Ricoeur notes that abuses of memory occur when there is “a 
concerted manipulation of memory and of forgetting by those who hold power” (Memory 
80), as the relationship between collective memory and political identity illustrates.  
Following John Locke, Ricoeur argues that memory is the heart of identity, both 
collective and individual, which makes memory vulnerable to all kinds of appropriations 
and misappropriations. It is the elusive and fragile nature of identity and the temporal 
difficulty in locating and fixing its essence that “justifies the recourse to memory as the 
temporal component of identity, in conjunction with the evaluation of the present and the 
projection of the future” (Memory 81). In addition, to have an identity as an individual or 
a nation is to claim difference from another or a group of others, suggesting another 
reason for the fragility of identity—that is the threat of the other and the potential for 
humiliation and exclusion that comes with claiming difference. The threat of the other 
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with respect to the fragility of identity can be exacerbated by what Ricoeur refers to as 
“the heritage of founding violence” (Memory 82). Since historical memory is a collection 
of violent events where there is glory and pride for some and shame, death and 
humiliation for others, it follows that political and collective identities are always 
constructed against a backdrop of violence or the threat of violence.  As such, memory is 
vulnerable to abuse and manipulation because of the demands that ideology puts on the 
construction of political identity. Ricoeur suggests three levels to understand the 
workings of such ideology: “distortions of reality, the legitimation of the system of 
power, and the integration of the common world by means of symbolic systems 
immanent in action” (Memory 82). In addition, “the symbolic mediation of action” is 
important to understand, because:  
…It is through the narrative function that memory is incorporated into the 
formation of identity…. It is, more precisely, the selective function of the 
narrative that opens to manipulation the opportunity and the means of a 
clever strategy, consisting from the outset in a strategy of forgetting as 
much as in a strategy of remembering (Memory 85).   
The official narrative of history is the best example of the triangular relationship where 
memory is put at the service of identity-making in the name of a particular ideology. It is 
perhaps worth mentioning here that Ricoeur views memory as “the womb of history, 
inasmuch as memory remains the guardian of the entire problem of the representative 
relation of the present to the past” (Memory 87).  History is then a “forced 
memorization,” but it is not only memorized, it is also taught and celebrated (Memory 
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85). The obsession with the past that excesses of memory and official histories produce is 
not only a political problem to be reckoned with, it is primarily an ethical problem.   
Finally, the ethico-political level refers to “obligated memory” and the telos of 
practices of memory, especially in the political realm. What is the aim of remembering, 
beyond the practical aspects discussed above? More specifically, what does a duty of 
memory entail for individuals and communities? When one speaks of an ethics of 
memory, one is necessarily speaking about justice, a duty to serve justice for the past, for 
those who passed.  Ricoeur defines this duty in the following terms: “The duty of 
memory is the duty to do justice, through memories, to another than the self” (Memory 
89).  Indeed, is it not a sense of justice, or more accurately, a sense of injustice, that 
compels one to tell a story of a relative or a friend, have their side of the story heard and 
made public, lest their suffering and accounts of it fall into oblivion? An obligated 
memory is an impassioned memory that forces itself upon the living, it is an attempt to 
pay a debt to those who can no longer tell their story, it is a debt to victims of the past, 
echoing Nietzsche‟s commitment to history. This is exactly the kind of memory that is 
compelling this project. 
While drawing upon the Moroccan experience as a primary exemplar, this 
dissertation is not about Morocco per se.  Rather, the focus is on understanding how the 
unfolding of a tragic and violent past shapes the present and the future of a nation 
generally and thus, the necessity and urgency of addressing injustices of the past. From 
the particularity of the Moroccan case, one can gain insight into the inherently 
communicative and rhetorical nature of the practices involved in a community‟s 
negotiation of its past.  In sum, the purpose of this inquiry is to offer a rhetorical account 
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of transitional justice in Morocco that moves beyond legalistic and therapeutic 
approaches and that is grounded in an ethical philosophy of justice. Public discourse 
about the legacy of the Years of Lead is a political and civic opportunity for renewing the 
nation‟s ethos and identity, an identity that should be inclusive of all citizens. This 
opportunity should be seized as what Ricoeur refers to as the “time of initiative,” a 
transformative moment where past (the space of experience) and future (horizon of 
expectation) become a productive unity of contraries.  
In sum, this project is compelled by the urgency and necessity for communities to 
engage their past, however atrocious it may be. It is based on the belief that any nation‟s 
future cannot be built on the negation or selective remembering of its past. The past is the 
site of people‟s historical consciousness and ethos. The Moroccan experience of 
transitional justice provides the phenomenological grounding for this engagement but, as 
previously stated, practices of transitional justice have a long history, which will be 
further discussed in chapter two. Chapter three provides a rhetorical account of 
Morocco‟s experience of transitional justice. The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur in chapter 
four sheds light on understanding transitional justice through the lens of the philosophy 
of communication and communication ethics. Finally, chapter five offers the metaphor of 
symbolic justice as a framework for negotiating atrocities of the past.  
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Chapter Two:  The Rhetoric of Transitional Justice 
We were haunted by this idea of disappearing forever, 
vanishing into thin air, reduced to a mound of earth without 
being officially declared dead. Lost and never found. Lost 
and never buried.  
(Tahar Benjelloun, 9)
7
 
The metaphor of transitional justice has emerged only recently but practices and 
discourses that are implied in this approach to intra-national conflict have a long 
tradition. In Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, Jon Elster 
notes that neither the idea nor the practices of transitional justice are new, as they can be 
traced back to the Athenians in the early development of deliberative democracy.  In 
recent history (after the Nuremberg trials), practices associated with retributive models of 
justice seem to be waning to the benefit of restorative practices of justice.  That is, more 
nations are choosing to face their traumatic pasts and address issues of responsibility and 
accountability primarily through practices of truth commissions, reparation programs, 
and memorialization. Although appealing, the increase of restorative programs and 
practices raises the question as to whether justice can actually be achieved through non-
legalistic means even in situations of mass atrocity.  Whether the approach is retributive 
or restorative, rhetorical practices that seek to do justice to victims through negotiations 
of the legacy of a horrific past do so with the hope that those whose lives were damaged 
and in fact wronged can recover a sense of normalcy.  This question leads to a more 
general one, concerning how a new national ethos can and will emerge and play a 
significant role in preventing such atrocities from repetition. 
Most scholarly discussions of transitional justice focus on legalistic and 
psychological aspects of such lived experiences. While some scholars in communication 
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studies such as Erik Doxtader, John Hatch, Bradford Vivian, Mark McPhail, Lane 
Bruner, Stephen H. Browne, and Barbie Zelizer, among others, highlight the rhetorical 
dimensions of transitional justice, these scholars amplify democratization and 
constitution building, or the deliberative aspect of the political process; public and visual 
memory, and the epideictic rhetoric at the heart of commemorative activities; or, issues of 
grace, atonement and redemption, which epitomize the theological undertones of 
discourses of reconciliation. All of these accounts make significant contributions, but 
they largely ignore the forensic dimension of transitional justice, and associated ethical 
tensions and implications.  Forensic rhetoric concerns discourses and practices that seek 
to make a judgment, pronounce a sentence that renders justice, whether they occur in a 
courtroom, tribunal, or other public domain, including the media.  The emphasis in this 
rhetorical genre is praise and blame, moral and ethical judgment and, assigning 
responsibilities.  Aristotle articulated this species of rhetoric around issues of wrongs, 
judgment and justice/injustice, which are indeed the focal point of all experiences of 
transitional justice.   
Emphasis on the forensic needs to be considered within the realm of civic 
rhetoric, public discourse, and political actions that are guided by citizens‟ active 
involvements with the city or polity they live in. A polis without a concern for justice is 
not a just city. It is worth noting that this Aristotelian perspective was challenged by 
Augustine, for whom justice should not constitute the foundation of a society. Put 
differently, justice should be a byproduct not the condition of a commonwealth. Jean 
Bethke Elshtain argues that Augustine‟s conception of (earthly) justice is rather 
minimalist. She notes: “There is rough and ready justice, to be sure, even in robber bands, 
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but earthly justice is often little more than a principle of retribution as well as an 
imperfect sign of our sociality—it doesn‟t touch on the really important stuff” (22). 
Contrary to Cicero who passionately argued for the triumph of justice, Augustine 
preached that love instead of justice and law, should be the guiding telos of a 
commonwealth. In The City of God, he explains:  
In that City, both the individual just man and the community and people of 
the just live by faith, which works by love: by that love with which a man 
loves God as God ought to be loved, and his neighbour as himself. But 
where there is not this justice, there certainly is no association of men 
united by a common agreement as to what is right and by a community of 
interest. And so there is no commonwealth; for where there is no „people,‟ 
there is no „property of people‟(Book XIX, Ch. 26). 
It is love first and foremost that should bring a community together, the commonwealth; 
and this is what, for Augustine, constitutes (or naturally leads to) authentic justice. This 
understanding of justice and its connection to love is important if we consider the fact 
that it is often easier to agree on what constitutes injustice than what constitutes justice or 
just action—whether retribution or restoration—especially in cases of genocide and mass 
atrocities.  
How might the rhetoric of transitional justice serve as the remedy to experiences 
of injustice and impunity?  How might retribution on the one hand, and truth, reparation 
and reconciliation on the other hand, contribute to moving from suffering, grief and 
enmity to a sense of peace after national trauma?  In addressing these questions, I provide 
an overview of the history of transitional justice, followed by a discussion of the different 
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approaches to transitional justice, with particular focus on three practices of restorative 
transitional justice: 1) truth and reconciliation commissions 2) reparations and 3) 
memorialization.   
A Historical and Theoretical Framework 
Legal scholar Martha Minow has written extensively on the issue of forgiveness. 
She states: “Vengeance and forgiveness are marks along the spectrum of human 
responses to atrocity. Yet they stand in opposition: to forgive is to let go of vengeance; to 
avenge is to resist forgiving. Perhaps justice itself „partakes of both revenge and 
forgiveness” (21). This suggests that responses to the many instances of genocide and 
other atrocities committed by human beings against fellow human beings during the 20
th
 
century have ranged from the most noble to the most vindictive. The ideal of justice 
might be found in the continuum between these two poles. The massacre of the Armenian 
population by the Turks is assumed to be historically the first genocide of the 20th 
century, but the magnitude of the Holocaust caught the world‟s collective consciousness 
as “the emblematic limit case of human rights abuse” (Schaffer and Smith , Human 20). 
The Holocaust has marked humanity‟s memory because of the incommensurability of its 
horror as well as the failure of world leaders and citizens to take responsibility for the fate 
of the victims.  This sense of guilt and responsibility, bewilderment at the “banality of 
evil,” as Hannah Arendt puts it in Eichmann in Jerusalem, coupled with the massive 
archival and mnemonic work done to remember that which should never have 
happened—innocent children, men, women being killed in the most atrocious and 
inhumane way so that there are little or no remains, no traces left—launched a 
conversation about evil, responsibility, guilt, memory, and forgiveness that continues 
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fervently today.  While this conversation might be fallible, it remains a must, a difficult 
but necessary attempt to come to terms and comprehend that which is beyond 
comprehension but still demands accountability and justice.  
For experts, the Holocaust and the end of World War II constitute the beginning 
of what is commonly referred to as the first wave of transitional justice in modern history. 
The establishment of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and other tribunals set up to 
prosecute Nazi collaborators in Israel, France and other European countries are the most 
significant consequences of this trend.
8
 The second wave took transitional justice and 
democratization to the Southern part of Europe, with countries such as Greece, Portugal 
and Spain undergoing major political shifts in the mid to late 1970s. While these 
experiences have first been geographically limited to Western Europe, their impact has 
been felt worldwide. In addition, the flourishing of human rights discourse worldwide 
and end of the Cold War gave a boost to these political phenomena and contributed to a 
domino effect of transitional initiatives in Latin America and Eastern Europe, beginning 
in the mid-1980s. By the end of the century, the African and Asian continents were no 
longer immune to these upheavals as citizens in countries like South Africa, Burundi, 
Morocco in Africa, and the Philippines and Sri Lanka in Asia began to call for 
accountability and justice for crimes committed by states against their own people and for 
a change in political practices and institutions to safeguard against similar future 
massacres.  These developments point to the emergence of a new global moral barometer 
evident in the international institutionalization of human rights discourses and practices, 
an ongoing effort with setbacks as well as accomplishments.
9
 With this paradigm shift 
came an implicit universal understanding that democratic forms of governance are the 
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most conducive to the actualization of these ideals, leading to calls for democratization in 
several parts of the globe.  
These political upheavals have prompted the development of democratization 
studies as a field of study.  For Guillermo O‟Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, two 
political scientists who are credited with inaugurating the field of democratization 
studies, a transition is the period that marks “the interval between one political regime 
and another” (6). Typically, transitional justice implies a transition from an authoritarian 
or repressive political regime to a more democratic arrangement or, in some cases, from a 
state of war to an enduring peace, or more generally from a violence, terror, and 
repression to a more dialogic state of affairs characteristic of deliberative democracy 
where inclusion of citizens‟ voices is integral to the political game.10  It is in this critical 
transitional period that new practices of rendering justice are formed.  Because justice 
plays a central role in the political and moral foundation of any society, understanding the 
relative success or failure of these practices can provide valuable insight into how the 
political future of any particular national community will likely unfold. 
There is an additional approach to transitional justice that is beyond the scope of 
this work: distributive justice, where the focus is more on the structural and institutional 
circumstances that led to the crime(s) or political violence. In this approach, to deal with 
the past and prevent it from happening again, one has to look at the material conditions 
that allowed the abuses to happen in the first place and change them. Some observers 
who are critical of the South African experience of transitional justice point out that this 
is the approach that needed to be followed because the restorative approach did nothing 
to change the political and socio-economic cultural of the country.  The so-called 
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distributive approach is often neglected because of its lack of popularity, difficulty of 
execution, and effective demand that the root structures of a society be revolutionized.  
But it also brings to the forefront of discussion the actual conditions of those who survive 
atrocity, which also highlights the variety of ethical and political practices, historical and 
national contexts, and particular cases that coalesce in determining retributive, 
distributive or restorative approaches, or some hybrid thereof, that is most appropriate. It 
should be clear here that these approaches are not mutually exclusive and that, in some 
cases, societies have chosen to adopt either one, a combination or all of them, as the 
discussion that follows shows. 
Some nations, like Germany after the fall of Nazism, chose to prosecute the guilty 
and compensate victims, a combination of retribution (making perpetrators accountable 
through the judicial system) and restoration (repairing some of the harm done to victims 
through monetary compensation).  Other societies, such as the Spanish after the death of 
Franco in the mid 1970s, chose collective amnesia (the pact of oblivion) and focused on 
the future with an interest in rapid democratization, to the detriment of accountability and 
justice.  Transitional justice, in post-Franco Spain, was a transition with neither punitive 
nor reparatory justice. Still, others like Argentina and Chile, decided that both retributive 
and restorative approaches to transitional justice with official trials, amnesty laws, and 
truth commissions were necessary to settle past accounts and build a better political 
future.  Justice in these and other Latin American countries was meaningful only to the 
extent that those proven to be part of the killing squads were held accountable for their 
criminal actions.  More recently, countries like South Africa and Morocco chose to forgo 
prosecutions and deal with their criminal political past primarily through truth 
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commissions and reparation programs, which may signal a new shift in favor of 
restorative processes. This shift needs further examination, especially since it is not 
always clear why a country chooses a particular path to achieve transitional justice. 
Oftentimes, it is a negotiated deal between the outgoing regime and incoming 
government or, in some cases, the result of international pressure, like in Germany and 
Yugoslavia, or simply a matter determined by those in power.  Be that as it may, the 
differences between retributive and restorative genres are especially important to ponder. 
The following sections shed light on the distinctions between the philosophical and 
practical distinctions between retributive and restorative approaches to transitional 
justice. 
Retribution: A Just Punishment? 
 Retributive justice connotes punishment or penalizing of the person found guilty 
of the crime and is based on the principle of an eye-for-an-eye. The focus of the entire 
retributive process is on the criminal act itself and the presumed perpetrator of the crime 
who needs to pay for breaking the law; victims are rarely involved, except for monetary 
damages. The argument in favor of retribution is based on justice and accountability, 
which first begins with forensic truth. While the exposition and recording of truth are of 
utmost importance in a transition, there is disagreement among scholars about what 
constitutes the best course of action to expose or ascertain the truth and manage it. Mark 
Osiel argues that, in the aftermath of mass atrocities committed by a brutal state, it is best 
to take the retributive approach and address issues of truth in criminal trials where such 
an exposition can also have a pedagogical purpose. “This is because,” he argues, “such 
trials, when effective as public spectacle, stimulate public discussion in ways that foster 
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the liberal virtues of toleration, moderation, and civil respect” (2). Public prosecution of 
those responsible can open up a space for a conversation about the moral and political 
foundations of the nation, thus contributing to the emergence and fostering of the 
deliberative space necessary for the flourishing of democracy. The metaphor of space 
should not be easily dismissed, especially in relation to discussions of the past. Following 
Ricoeur, Hauser points out that  “the term space is important because it suggests both that 
our past always contains something foreign to us to be overcome and that how we 
overcome it—how we traverse its space—depends on the itineraries we choose for our 
journey” (emphasis in original, 111).  Public trials create a space for negotiating the past; 
they become the space, that is the route or path that a nation chooses to take or reestablish 
its moral foundation. In other words:  
[b]y highlighting official brutality and public complicity, these trials often 
make people willing to reassess their foundational beliefs and constitutive 
commitments, as few events in political life can do. […]They are 
„moments of truth,‟ in several senses. Specifically, they present moments 
of transformative opportunity on the lives of individuals and societies 
(Osiel 2). 
Public trials often become the Event that marks the transition of a nation from a 
past of violence to a future free of injustice, and where questions about public memory 
and national identity are engaged.  Osiel refers to such public prosecutions as “refounding 
myths” of a nation, as they mark “a decisive break from their own pasts, celebrating the 
courage and imagination of those who effected this rupture” (4). It is perhaps difficult for 
the victims or their families to accept that a genuine transition is in effect if those 
 28 
responsible for suffering have not accounted for their actions and paid a debt to society. 
Juan E. Mendez, a legal scholar who has written extensively on transitional justice in 
Latin America and a proponent of prosecutions in situations of crimes against humanity, 
readily recognizes that prosecutions are a tough choice to make and need to “be 
thoroughly justified in moral terms” (274).  In these cases, retribution is not to be equated 
with vengeance but as the just consequence or punishment for actions that society 
recognizes as unlawful.  Mendez states that: “An enlightened theory of punishment, 
therefore, puts the victim at the center of the need to redress wrongs: societies punish 
because they wish to signify to the victim that his or her plight will not go unheeded” 
(275). In other words, to not punish the person or people responsible for the victim‟s 
plight is to fail both the victims and society. 
The argument for prosecution has to do with impunity and accountability and the 
need to signify a genuine rupture with a past that needs to be known, evaluated and 
judged according to universally established rules of justice.  Turning the page on a 
bloody past without establishing the record in terms of individual and institutional 
responsibilities for crimes against humanity can be risky for a “re-born” nation, as it sets 
a bad precedent of impunity for a newly established government and may leave victims 
with a bad aftertaste of justice not being served.  Conversely, as Mendez argues:  
Both the need to consolidate a shaky democracy and the need to stop the 
fighting in a conflict situation undoubtedly condition the possibilities of 
redressing past wrongs, placing limits on what a policy of accountability 
can achieve. Those urgent demands, however, by no means diminish the 
objectives of truth and justice. On the contrary, it is increasingly 
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recognized that making state criminals accountable says something about 
the democracy they are trying to establish, and that preserving memory 
and settling human rights accounts can be part of the formula for a lasting 
peace, as opposed to a lull in the fighting (257).  
Prosecutions constitute an opportunity to distinguish collective from individual guilt by 
preventing or removing “the stigma of historic misdeeds from the innocent members of 
communities that are collectively blamed for the atrocities committed on other 
communities” (276). In other words, trials establish a moral distance between those 
whose actions have destroyed social harmony and created victimage, and innocent 
victims whose lives were shattered by those actions; it is a moral statement, a judgment, 
about the society in which these violent crimes take place. 
  Despite its merits, it appears that criminal law is no longer a first choice for 
transitioning societies primarily; it is not always easy for new leaders to make the case 
for retribution in the midst of political shuffling and embryonic institutions.  It is a 
difficult decision that poses political as well as ethical challenges for societies trying to 
turn the page on a traumatic past. The political price for trials is not always clear, but, of 
course, neither is the moral price for resisting justice and condoning violence and 
impunity, especially when committed by state officials.  One argument against retribution 
is that it rarely allows for the moral complexities of tragic situations to emerge and 
instead regards most criminal instances in rigid, black and white terms—that is, as 
perpetrator and victim.  If reconciliation is part of the horizon of a society that is 
transitioning, then this rigid categorization can make it difficult, if not impossible to 
achieve. For instance, criminal law puts the burden on the wrongdoer alone while the 
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dialogic framework of reconciliation demands that both parties (victim and wrongdoer) 
engage one another and find common ground to move beyond the hatred, anger, and pain. 
For Wole Soyinka, this common ground should be framed as “a need for a purgation of 
the past, the creation of a new sense of being . . . after the collapse of a discredited and 
criminal order” (19).  
A new sense of social belonging and political harmony, which may have never 
existed in that society previously, cannot easily be achieved within an exclusive legalistic 
framework, especially when it is difficult to assign blame and responsibility due to 
bureaucratic or logistical obstacles, or because bringing people to courts will unleash a 
new wave of violence, anger, and vindictiveness.  Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Iraq come to 
mind as primary exemplars of such vindictiveness, as many observers and citizens were 
dubious that justice was served through trials, or whether it was simply revenge, or a 
political ploy to close the can of worms that transitions tend to open. The fear of further 
violence creating a vicious cycle of revenge is often cited as a justification, and 
sometimes pretext, for avoiding retribution for perpetrators.  The Spanish experience is a 
good example of this, as I discuss further on.  
Retributive justice, in short, presupposes “that even [. . .] massive horrors can and 
should be treated as punishable criminal offenses perpetrated by identifiable individuals,” 
and that fairness can never be achieved otherwise (Minow 26). Fairness is rarely the 
outcome. For instance: “the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were condemned by many as 
travesties of justice, the spoils of the victors of war, and the selective prosecution of 
individuals for acts more properly attributable to governments themselves” (Minow 27). 
If these trials were meant to set the tone and be a warning for would-be murderous 
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regimes to deter future mass atrocities and genocides, they failed.  In Rwanda, where 
genocide claimed the lives of 800,000 people, several problems were pointed our within 
the courts that sought to do justice.  These included the lack of legal representation for 
several defendants and the public execution of at least 22 people, despite calls from 
several international organizations and the Pope to halt the executions.  It was perceived 
as another round of ethnic revenge, rather than an attempt to serve justice for the victims 
of the genocide.  Still, Mendez argues that deterrence should never be the motivation for 
retribution or the sole argument in favor of prosecution:  “Societies can only hope that 
punishment will deter the transgressor as well as other potential offenders, but can never 
assume deterrence” (275). Retribution is an attractive option for societies seeking to 
establish a clean break with a shameful and unjust past by recognizing the suffering 
incurred by victims and making those found responsible accountable for their criminal 
actions. Just punishment contributes to renewed civic trust in institutions, especially the 
institution of justice, whose mission is to protect citizens against violence and criminal 
acts. If it is difficult to achieve reconciliation between perpetrators and victims in an 
environment characterized by a sense of victor‟s justice and revenge, the same is true for 
a society that fails to achieve justice for innocent victims, and thus condones impunity by 
putting victims and perpetrators on a same footing. Still, to seek retributive justice does 
not preclude the possibility for restoration. 
Restorative Justice: Repairing the Communal Bond 
The appeal of restorative justice is that it is an approach inclusive of all parties to 
the criminal event: perpetrators and victim or survivors.
11
  The rationale is that 
perpetrators and victims are part of the same community and the outcome of any justice 
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served must involve all. More important than the crime committed and the law broken are 
the consequences of the criminal act(s) on victims.  We should keep in mind that 
restorative approaches to crime emerged first in small scale individual contexts, where 
bringing the offender and the victim together to face each other and seek apology, 
gaining forgiveness (respectfully) and ultimately reconciliation, seemed a better 
alternative than retributive justice in some cases, especially within small communities 
where there is a threat that retributive justice will bring more harm than good to the 
community as a whole. Through symbolic gestures such as apology and financial 
incentives such as monetary compensations, restorative justice typically provides for 
repairing the relationship between the person(s) who committed the harmful acts and 
those who were affected directly by it. Conversely, Minow argues: 
Restorative justice emphasizes the humanity of both offenders and 
victims. It seeks repair of social connections and peace rather than 
retribution against the offenders. Building connections and enhancing 
communication between perpetrators and those they victimized, and 
forging ties across the community, takes precedence over punishment or 
law enforcement. (92) 
In short, the restorative approach is less procedural and more relational and dialogic than 
its retributive counterpart. Hugo Van Der Merwe insists that it is “a more inclusive 
process, involving participation by both victim and perpetrator” (119).   
Inclusiveness and dialogism may explain why the restorative approach has 
become the dominant trend in dealing with mass intra-national human rights violations, 
when traditional approaches to justice do not seem like a realistic option either because of 
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logistic issues or the fear that retribution would seem too much like vengeance or victors‟ 
justice.  In addition, jurists and scholars have long agonized about the difficulty of 
establishing responsibilities in large-scale crimes. The dynamics of collective decision-
making are so complex that it is difficult to assign responsibility for crimes, and pointing 
a finger at ostensibly responsible individuals becomes a very thorny issue.  Instead, the 
state typically assigns institutional responsibility to commissions whose members are 
appointed by the president, king, or other ruling authority.  One of the logistical and legal 
challenges faced by many courts after the fall of a discredited and murderous regime is 
that no viable state exists yet to assign responsibility or investigate the alleged violations.  
The prosecutions are then moved elsewhere, as witnessed in the Nuremberg trials, the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and other similar situations. 
 Restorative justice merits more intensive scrutiny because countries emerging 
from decades of conflict and political violence often choose this approach not so much 
because of moral or ethical imperatives, or the need to establish political and legal 
legitimacy, but as an expedient way to turn the page on the past.  Truth-seeking and 
reconciliation commissions, forums for redress and compensations, and the development 
of venues for remembrance of past victims are not as costly, nor as politically risky, as 
legal prosecutions, which perhaps explains their global use. But restorative justice might 
not always be as ethically unambiguous as retributive justice.  If restorative justice can be 
an acceptable model for seeking justice in small scale offenses where parties involved are 
easily identified and show clear willingness to be part of the project, can the same be said 
about more complex situations, such as mass violations where the state that oversees the 
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process is implicated in the atrocities, and where the outcome largely determines the 
future of society as a whole? 
Transitional states have embraced truth commissions as a politically safe and 
socially acceptable means of coming to terms with their past.  There is an ethical as well 
as political dimension implicit in the phrase transitional justice. The transition is the goal 
of these efforts as new leaders and society want to start fresh and build a better political 
future, free of the demons of the past.  Still, transitions cannot happen without addressing 
the ethical, unethical, and perhaps quasi-ethical features of the past; that is, serving 
justice for those innocent citizens who had been arbitrarily jailed, tortured, disappeared, 
or murdered. There are exceptions, of course, like Spain, a nation that made a (seemingly 
successful) wild bid to turn the page and never look back at its violent past; but even the 
Spanish experience has recently shown that an indigested past will always come back to 
haunt its people. The Spanish people are now on a quest to revisit their Francoist past and 
make amends with its victims because, clearly, despite the political success of their 
transition, issues of justice are still looming in Spanish collective memory. 
12
 
The process of burying a bloody past is not simply one of moving on but also 
developing strategies that can adequately serve justice and rebuild a national political 
identity based on trust and a sense of belonging. Reforms that seek to redistribute shares 
of political power more equally within the system and establish safeguards to prevent 
political abuse and corruption are part of the democratization (and consolidation) 
package. The connection between transitional justice processes and democratization has 
clearly been established and is important, but a full explication of this relationship is 
beyond the scope of this writing.
13
  Still, it is worth restating that the rhetoric of 
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transitional justice has borrowed much from the liberal ideals of democracy and human 
rights discourse. While this heritage does exist, one should not necessarily assume that 
countries that develop truth and reconciliation commission, and adopt juridical and 
rhetorical practices to deal with past political violence, automatically transition to 
democracy. In fact, some scholars such as Thomas Carothers have pointed out that only a 
small percentage of countries that are called transitional do in fact become democratic.  
Instead of relying on these processes as a sign or an index of democratization, perhaps the 
pertinent question to ask is how do rhetorical practices of transitional justice such as truth 
commissions, reparation programs, and memorialization contribute to the larger and more 
challenging task of transforming the political culture of a country from a rule of violence 
and terror to the rule of law, a just law?  
There is no recipe or blueprint to follow in any given case of transitional justice. 
But it is safe to say that restorative transitional processes seek to serve some kind of 
justice after the end of a violent political era, an era marked by authoritarian rule and civil 
strife, and they do so by, a) devising means to repair damages incurred by victims, and b) 
making sure that similar abuses and violence do not happen again. Through civic 
engagement with the past and the drive to build a just society where citizens are free from 
coercion, fear and violence, a societal and political transformation takes place ipso facto.  
Historical and contemporary experiences of transitional justice show that the rhetoric of 
transitional justice seeks to reintroduce the idea of the just within the polis and within 
civic discourse, at the very least. Citizens who are the driving force behind experiences of 
transitional justice are rhetors who present arguments to advance the idea of the just by 
pointing out injustices in their country and in humanity generally. Thus it seems clear 
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that, while discourses and practices of transitional justice do not always guarantee a 
genuine or lasting democratization, or justice for that matter, they are necessarily 
transformative for the societies in which they take place. 
 The national experiences noted thus far reveal that transitional justice 
incorporates a variety of trends and practices that seek answers to questions such as those 
posed by Priscilla Hayner:  
What should be done with a recent history full of victims, perpetrators, 
secretly buried bodies, pervasive fear, and official denial? Should this past 
be exhumed, preserved, acknowledged, apologized for? How can a nation 
of enemies be reunited, former opponents reconciled, in the context of 
such a violent history and often bitter, festering wounds? What should be 
done with hundreds or thousands of perpetrators still walking free? And 
how can a new government prevent such atrocities from being repeated in 
the future? (4) 
 In the attempt to address these daunting questions, I elaborate in the following 
pages on the three major non-legalistic trends that have emerged in response to 
widespread violence perpetrated by individuals acting in the name of the State.  The first 
is the establishment and recording of truth and, sometimes, mending of rifts and enmity, 
through what has come to be known as truth and reconciliation commissions.  Here 
victims and perpetrators come to narrate their suffering and guilt, respectively, and 
confront their common past and, sometimes, attempt to reconcile. The second is the 
development of initiatives aimed at dealing with and repairing the physical, financial as 
well as the psychological harm suffered by victims and their families, a process referred 
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to as reparations.  Third is the creation of programs for memorialization purposes, such as 
the building of museums, the establishment of commemorative ceremonies and other 
such events and spaces to document and remember the past.  Beyond the political capital 
these processes provide the incoming or continuing leaders, I am interested in how the 
rhetoric of truth, justice and memory invoked during transitions shape the past, and most 
importantly, contribute to the development of a new ethical sensibility within a polity hit 
by the evil of state‟s violence against its own people.  
Truth Commissions, Reconciliation and the Aporia of Forgiveness 
In recent years, truth commissions (also called truth and reconciliation 
commissions or TRCs) have emerged as a new instrument in efforts to address crimes 
committed by a state against its own people. As previously suggested, the restorative 
approach has become popular because of logistical, political, and ethical issues that might 
arise from retribution. TRCs have gained momentum because transitional states face the 
moral imperative to address the injustices done to victims and their families by officials 
acting in the name of the state; addressing the past is also a political necessity for the new 
leaders to establish their legitimacy and institute a clear rupture with past politics. Hayner 
defines truth commissions as: 
[B]odies that share the following characteristics: (1) truth commissions 
focus on the past; (2) they investigate a pattern of abuses over a period of 
time, rather than a specific event; (3) a truth commission is a temporary 
body, typically in operation for six months to two years, and completing 
its work with the submission of a report; and (4) these commissions are 
officially sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by the state (14).   
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In other words, truth commissions are officially sanctioned bodies that conduct 
investigations and collect testimonies for the purpose of compiling a comprehensive story 
about the past: narratives of survivors, perpetrators and, sometimes, bystanders. The work 
of TRCs has implications for the past but also for the present and future, because by 
opening up the past for review and judgment, issues of accountability and impunity are 
addressed and norms for the future are established.  In the exposition of facts about the 
past, responsibilities are assigned and wrongdoers identified, so these commissions have 
forensic value as well. It is a rhetorical effort to assign meaning and evaluate a nation‟s 
collective narrative.  
Uncovering what happened in a country‟s bloody past is necessary, but not 
sufficient. Of equal importance is the necessity to “disseminate the truth about past 
atrocities” (Crocker 3). It is important to emphasize the dissemination of information 
about the past because in most countries with a history of political violence, while the 
repressive practices of the state are usually widely known, few people dare to speak 
publicly about them.  As Arendt argues in The Human Condition, fear is one the first 
consequences of the rule of terror in a totalitarian, and by extension, authoritarian state.  
Fear is a strong political ally of the state that is terrorizing its people and serves to silence 
and keep most citizens in line.  The fear that a friend or a family member could be the 
next victim of arbitrary repression and violence serves as a strong motivation for silence.  
While most people are typically aware that some of their fellow citizens or neighbors are 
being unjustly detained, tortured, and executed, the gritty details escape their knowledge 
because of the secrecy that is central to such political formations.  Lack of information 
and dissemination of it contributes to keeping citizens in a state of continuous fear 
 39 
because no one knows for sure what happens and why, and even those who do have some 
knowledge or understanding of what is going on can only speak in muffled voices. Thus, 
after the fall of a criminal regime, it becomes crucial that information about the past be 
widely disseminated; by making the “hard facts” public, “the moral significance of 
individual accountability, the identity of individual perpetrators is brought to light” 
(Crocker 3).  Listening to victims‟ testimonies during public hearings is only the first 
stage in acknowledging their story; publicizing it provides greater acknowledgment and 
serves to symbolically repair the harm and humiliation that victims endured. But 
testimonies and public hearings have other objectives beyond appeasing victims by 
providing them with a forum to share their bleak stories. Mark Freeman argues that the 
fact that victims are the main focus of truth commissions does not mean that “a truth 
commission is always self-consciously victim-centered (because some are not), nor does 
it mean that a truth commission is concerned only with victims (because they are not)” 
(17).  Besides the ethical horizon of redeeming victims and recognizing the injustice they 
have been subjected to, truth commissions have a political value. As a significant part of 
truth commissions, public hearings provide legitimacy to the entire restorative process. 
By showcasing victims and their stories during public hearings, national and international 
audiences are invited to see for themselves that silencing victims is no longer accepted 
and that some form of justice is being served. Public hearings showcase a “society in 
transition” and are meant to be an indicator of change and transformation because in this 
historical moment, they necessarily suggest an affinity with the South African experience 
of transitional justice, one that many societies try to emulate.                                             
  The purpose of TRCs is two-fold.  First, they seek to reconstruct a narrative of 
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the past, primarily from the victims‟ perspective. This reconstruction is embedded in a 
historical (educational) horizon, but, as previously suggested, also serves a political goal.  
By knowing what happened, it may be possible institutionally to prevent it from 
happening again by putting in place reforms that safeguard against horrific practices 
reproducing themselves.  Second, and just as important, TRCs provide victims with a 
voice.  Suddenly, after many years of repression, having an official and safe forum to 
speak and share their past with their fellow citizens does grant citizen status again and 
welcomes citizens/survivors back into the political community.  The information 
gathered during the hearings of the commissions typically serves as the basis for 
determining eligibility for reparations and for determining the type and amount of 
reparation necessary in each case. More importantly, truth commissions provide victims 
and society with hope, which might be faint and myopic, but after years of silence, 
violence and horror, to be able to participate in public life constitutes a hopeful moment.
 The best contemporary illustration of the pursuit of such lofty goals and hope is, 
almost unanimously, to be found in the South African experience of truth and 
reconciliation, prompting some observers to refer to it as the African Athens.  The 
creation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the mid-1990s did 
indeed popularize the idea of truth commissions and political reconciliation as legitimate 
and appropriate means to address past violence and oppression.  But, as intimated in the 
introduction, transitional justice did not begin with South Africa, as it can be traced (in 
the West at least) to the Greeks.
14
 Millennia ago, like South Africa and many 
contemporary national communities, the Athenians had to find ways to come together as 
citizens of the same polis after two political transitions, resulting from civil war (Elster 
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3).  Athenian citizens were faced with civil strife several times, and had to devise means 
to deal with the aftermath of these difficult moments in their history. Andrew Wolpert 
argues that amnesty and reconciliation were at the center of Athens‟ recovery, deemed 
the best course of action due to the urgent political need to restore peace and harmony 
within the polis.  But reconciliation for the Athenians did not mean that people forgot the 
violence that preceded the amnesty, nor the betrayal of some of their fellow citizens.  
They did not simply start a new page of their history.  These events served as an 
opportunity to think and deliberate about the causes, consequences of and means to 
address political disruptions that cause harm to the polis. This historian‟s discussion of 
the Athenian experience of reconciliation after the War of the Thirty suggests that 
reconciliation is not only an ancient approach to conflict resolution but also one that 
cannot be explained in purely political terms. Wolpert states: 
Historians have advanced many explanations for the success of the 
reconciliation:  the terms of the agreement, the political condition of the 
Greek world, the social and economic problems of Athens. They have 
shown that revenge and retribution were not viable options, but the 
Athenians could have simply dismissed pragmatic considerations in order 
to obtain private satisfaction for past grievances. Causal explanations 
present the reconciliation as a fait accompli, as if there were only one 
possible outcome to the civil war. But as Corcyra shows, pragmatic 
considerations do not always lead a people to choose the course of action 
that best serves its interests. (xii)                       
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In other words, although political considerations—or negotiated deals—certainly 
contribute to the making or re-making of a nation, as the Athenian situation has shown, 
moral and ethical considerations do as well, or in any case should. The quest for truth 
within a national context foreshadows a rhetorical process that is ethically charged 
because the outcome has consequences for the past, the present, and the future for 
generations to come. Although truth and reconciliation have pragmatic consequences 
with respect to the way a nation or community reinvents itself after a period of violence, 
mistrust and injustice, they are fundamentally rhetorical metaphors with serious ethical 
implications.  For a national community whose socio-political identity and sense of 
morality have been shattered by violence and injustice, establishing and listening to the 
truth and finding the words to come together as part of the same nation are indeed 
important goals.  But so is ethical judgment, as public discourse about the atrocities 
establishes a new teleological orientation, one marked most significantly by the metaphor 
of reconciliation.         
 The process of burying the past in such circumstances is not simply one of 
moving on but also developing strategies that can adequately serve justice and rebuild a 
national political identity based on trust and a sense of belonging. Hence the rhetorical 
significance of the reconciliation metaphor, which has captured the imagination of global 
citizens and scholars alike, especially in relation to the South African experience. The 
leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela in South Africa has 
provided legitimacy and confirmation to the practice of reconciliation. Although the term 
has several possible referents, it should be clear that, in the context of this discussion, 
reconciliation is an attempt to move beyond enmity and reach a modicum of normalcy in 
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socio-political relationships. One cannot expect that victims/survivors and perpetrators 
will become friends or convivial colleagues, or even speak to each other if they happen to 
meet in the street, but hope typically is that reconciliation can achieve a minimal level of 
civility that is conducive to peaceful political cohabitation. The question remains:  How is 
reconciliation achieved? Or, as Marc Howard Ross asks: “How do we know it when we 
see it?” (198)  The potential of reconciliation lies in its rhetorical power. Doxtader argues 
that reconciliation is a rhetorical exercise in recollecting the past for the purpose of 
making the future; it is very much “a call for rhetoric” that parties engaged in conflict use 
to move beyond the violence of the past:  “With a middle voice, reconciliation both 
enacts and opens the potential for rhetorical invention. It is a constitutive faith in the 
work of those words that strive to open, make and sustain a beginning” (268).  
Reconciliation is an attempt to transform an event into something that is acceptable to the 
parties involved; it is a rhetorical framing of the past for the purpose of a present that 
moves beyond the violence and enmity of the past. In short, reconciliation serves to re-
join the community and construct a narrative about the past that parties to the conflict 
accept as part of their common legacy.       
 As rhetorical praxis, the mission of reconciliation is to attempt to communicate 
even when speechless because at that very moment, the “saying” matters more than the 
“said” (in the sense articulated by Levinas). One trusts that the saying of the words, not 
only their referents, have the power or force to change enmity into trust.  Trust in these 
circumstances, and thus the significance of the words spoke, can only be reached through 
forgiveness, which is often considered either a condition for, or an outcome of, 
reconciliation. Elder argues:  
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When collectivities are involved, the issue of forgiveness becomes much 
more complicated than in the one-to-one model of an injured person and a 
wrongdoer sharing a moral community. The increased complexity of the 
situation need not lead us to abandon efforts to encourage “forgiveness” or 
the attitudes that accompany forgiveness. If, ultimately, one is interested 
in processes of reconciliation, the study of forgiveness as a potential 
contributor to reconciliation becomes of prime importance (161). 
The relationship between reconciliation and forgiveness that Elder is pointing to has been 
widely debated.  In No Future Without Forgiveness, Desmond Tutu argues that 
forgiveness is a necessity, even a pre-requisite for peace and reconciliation. If 
perpetrators recognize their guilt and confess it, which should indeed be the goal of every 
TRC, then victims should be able to forgive them—but not be asked to forget. Joanna 
North argues that forgiveness should not mean forgetting and that an accurate 
understanding of forgiveness should not “require that we forgo punishment altogether or 
that we should, in forgiving, attempt to annul the existence of the wrong done. 
Forgiveness does not remove the fact or the event of wrongdoing but instead relies upon 
the recognition of wrong having been committed in order for the process of forgiveness 
to be made possible” (17). 
North is correct to note that forgiveness does not preclude punishment; 
forgiveness is an interpersonal (private) practice while punishment is an institutional 
(public) act. But to suggest that forgiveness is a process is to miss its unconditional and, 
often, unilateral character. Reconciliation, on the other hand, in South Africa or other 
similar contexts, is a politically motivated practice and in the context of TRCs, it is 
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institutionalized. Forgiveness, however, escapes such realm and when forced into it, it 
becomes a commodity and loses its gift-like quality. Forgiveness does not require 
reciprocity, nor can it demand it.  It follows, then, that forgiveness and reconciliation in 
the context of transitional justice are not mutually exclusive but they should not 
necessarily be linked.  Jacques Derrida argues against the use of forgiveness in the 
context of a nation attempting to deal with a traumatic past: “Forgiveness does not, it 
should never, amount to a therapy of reconciliation” (41). They belong to different realms 
of action. Derrida‟s insights on this are noteworthy as he asks in his essay on forgiveness:   
In order for there to be forgiveness, must one not on the contrary forgive 
both the fault and the guilty as such, where the one and the other remain as 
irreversible as the evil, as evil itself, and being capable of repeating itself, 
unforgivably, without transformation, without amelioration, without 
repentance or promise? Must one not maintain that an act of forgiveness 
worthy of its name, if there ever is such a thing, must forgive the 
unforgivable, and without condition? (39) 
 Acts of forgiveness exist only to the extent that they forgive that which cannot be 
forgiven, or at least conceived as such, hence the aporia. Forgiveness is an unconditional 
act that is not to be used strategically or politically. It is a gift that does not ask for 
exchange, reward or reciprocity. Derrida insists: 
Each time forgiveness is at the service of a finality, be it noble and 
spiritual (atonement or redemption, reconciliation, salvation), each time 
that it aims to re-establish a normality (social, national, political, 
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psychological) by a work of mourning, by some therapy or ecology of 
memory, then the „forgiveness‟ is not pure—nor is its concept (32). 
When persons or groups use forgiveness to normalize relations or to reconcile, the act of 
forgiveness loses its essence because it is no longer the end but the means to an end. 
Conversely, Ricoeur argues that “[…] forgiveness can find refuge only in gestures 
incapable of being transformed into institutions. These gestures, which would constitute 
the incognito of forgiveness, designate the ineluctable space of consideration due to every 
human being, in particular to the guilty” (Memory 458). If reconciliation requires a 
mediator or a mediating institution, forgiveness does not and cannot be institutionalized, 
otherwise it becomes something other.  
In the event of forgiveness, “as soon as a third party intervenes, one can again 
speak of amnesty, reconciliation, reparation, etc., but certainly not of pure forgiveness in 
the strict sense” (Derrida, Cosmopolitanism 42). For authentic forgiveness to take place, 
it must be between the people who are directly concerned and without the intervention or 
mediation of another party. No state or institution has the right to grant forgiveness in the 
name of a victim (especially one who cannot speak for himself or herself). Arendt goes 
further and argues that forgiveness “unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which 
provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and 
the one who is forgiven” (The Human 241).  Again, this is not to say that the quest for 
reconciliation and forgiveness are mutually exclusive; they simply belong to different 
registers.  That said, the South African example needs to be considered an exception, not 
the rule, and the particulars of that case—regaining control of the nation, conditions of 
negotiation, etc. that allowed the victims not to punish those responsible for the 
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victimage—should perhaps be more fully considered. Each example of transitional 
justice needs to be considered on its own merit because the historicity and context for 
each experience are unique and attempt to either compare or import these practices are 
problematical. 
Reconciliation and retribution also belong to different registers—one practice 
cannot be substituted for the other, or translated into one another, but in some instances 
they are intimately connected.  As I hope to have shown thus far, national political 
reconciliation is a project to re-invent the community after a bloody past and create a 
space of dialogue and deliberation that is free from violence and coercion and includes all 
political actors—victims, perpetrators, and bystanders.  Reconciliation as such is a 
rhetorical and civic effort to find words to frame the past and negotiate the terms of the 
transition into the future.  Along these lines, John Hatch argues that reconciliation should 
be conceived within a “tragicomic framing” that does indeed include symbolic acts such 
as apology and forgiveness (753). To reconcile is then to take atrocities seriously and 
assign blame, but also to transform tragedy into comedy such that the focus is on the 
offense rather than the offenders or offended.  This switch of focus produces the opposite 
of what a retributive framework is likely to produce, as previously indicated.  For Kirt 
Wilson, the model that Hatch refers to does nothing to address the real problem that led 
to the crisis and violence in the first place.  
For instance, if South Africa is the model to emulate for reconciliation, one has 
first to acknowledge that reconciliation did nothing much in changing the structural 
injustices that were present during the Apartheid government.  Searching for truth and 
bringing victims and perpetrators together to practice reconciliation might have ended the 
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bloodshed and squelched the enmity and hatred but these practices have not affected the 
political and socio-economic make-up of the country, as white South Africans did not 
lose the privileges bestowed upon them during Apartheid, and the masses of black South 
Africans still live in poverty and despair. Mark McPhail argues that, while Hatch‟s call 
for reconciliation could contribute to a genuine dialogue about race in the United States, 
“it [reconciliation] will require coming to grips with the past in order to construct a new 
vision for the future” (398).  For McPhail, this engagement with the past must include a 
collective effort of atonement and apology from whites, in the case of both South Africa 
and the United States.   
Although such a collective apology does not seem to be forthcoming, 
reconciliation still may occur if there is a moral or theological drive on the part of the 
antagonists to change the present and build a harmonious and interdependent future.  
Moreover, reconciliation demands an acknowledgment of unjust and criminal actions and 
expressions of remorse for the horrific consequences of those actions on innocent people. 
Reconciliation is not justice but an acknowledgment of injustice; this is why issues of 
apology, atonement and forgiveness are almost always invoked. As an acknowledgment 
of guilt and expression of remorse, apologies are often a pre-requisite for reconciliation; 
otherwise how would a victim accept to reconcile with her victimizer?  Reconciliation 
cannot be authentic if the victims do not have a feeling that some kind of justice has been 
served, not necessarily retributive justice but justice nevertheless—we might call it 
symbolic justice. Symbolic justice, then, should be at the heart of reconciliation and 
begins with the unveiling of the truth that takes place during public hearings.  
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As a political process, TRCs have limitations, and that is why, as previously 
suggested, victims often do expect more from these experiences that they can possibly 
deliver.
15
 When victims or their families expect a sense of closure as an outcome of 
testifying and sometimes meeting with those who committed crimes against them or their 
family members, this goal can rarely be achieved. If the act of testifying and 
remembering the past can, in the long run, bring a sense of closure, it probably does not 
do so in the immediate aftermath of a public testimony where the witness (victim) must 
recall his or her torturous experience. Surely, the act of testifying and reliving the ordeal 
of being tortured, or witnessing one‟s sister or daughter being raped, tortured or murdered 
must be an excruciating experience.  Still, the hope is that the pain that such an 
experience brings about is somewhat matched by feelings of acknowledgment and relief 
that the duty of memory has been accomplished. In terms of bringing the nation closer to 
a genuine political transition or democracy, TRCs can both contribute and hinder such a 
goal.  
Truth commissions expose some truths about the past, provide victims with a 
political voice, contribute to the acknowledgment of the wrongs they have been subjected 
to, and establishing responsibilities.   All of these contributions are positive achievements 
for a nation that desires to reinvent itself but there are not sufficient to achieve justice. 
Truth commissions alone are never enough to move a society beyond a past of violence 
amidst calls for justice. They constitute only the first step in engaging the past, one part 
of the puzzle. It is in their investigative work that the next step for serving justice is 
identified: reparations. The issue of reparations is a rhetorical battle about 1) what 
constitutes a legitimate claim for reparations or, in other words, who is a worthy recipient 
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of reparation, 2) how to assess the worth of human suffering and loss, and, once all of 
these issues have been settled, 3) what is the appropriate type of reparation required for 
the particular case: official apology, restitution, or monetary compensation?  
The Rhetoric of Reparations, Restitutions and Compensations 
 Demands for reparations have become common place, and so have public 
apologies for past injustices. One scholar has noted that claims for restitution or 
compensation for past injustice have reached epidemic proportions.
16
 Some see in this 
new phenomenon the emergence of a new global morality, others the festering of a 
culture of victimhood. While this trend is recent, the experiences it attempts to address 
are not; political and historical injustices are as old as humanity itself. What has changed 
is the increasing legitimacy and righteousness of these claims, especially in the aftermath 
of World War II and the legacy of the Nuremberg trials. As a case in point, Barkan 
argues that: 
In this context [post-Cold War] public awareness of crimes against 
humanity committed by governments is increasingly translated into a 
political force.  The abhorrence of such violations of such human rights 
has even become an acceptable motive for national and international 
intervention in „domestic‟ politics and a rationale for war waged by 
regional and international organizations. (…) opposition to genocide, 
support for human rights, and the fear of being implicated in crimes 
against humanity (even by inaction) have become practical, not even lofty, 
ideals. (xi) 
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Victims have become more assertive about their right to restitution and compensation, 
and it also seems that perpetrators no longer resist the call for reparations from their 
victims, due to feelings of guilt, perhaps shame and, most likely, the stigma associated 
with being a perpetrator of violence.  We should keep in mind that there is an important 
distinction between reparation and restitution. To repair is to restore something to its 
prior state but to restitute is to give back what was taken from the victim, whether it is 
something with monetary value like property or something more symbolic, someone‟s 
reputation or name is the community. This is why Barkan insists that “restitution 
traverses the legal boundaries between actual restitution, reparation, compensation, and 
even apologies for wrongdoing and acquires cultural and political significance” (xix).   
With this increasing legitimacy of the human rights discourse within the 
international political community, and its acceptance by public opinion as a legitimate 
framework for dealing with injustice, reparations have become linked to political 
morality and justice. These ideas of justice and morality are actually at the heart of 
discussions about reparations, and can be traced back to the Enlightenment ideals of 
liberty, equality and the pursuit of happiness, which, Barkan argues, have “become the 
predominant global ideology” (310). Barkan explains how, despite their widespread 
critique in academic circles over the last few decades, Enlightenment ideals have heavily 
impacted political claims for justice worldwide, so it is true that any discourse about 
restitution or reparation for lost of life and liberties under a tyrannical regime would 
simply be impossible otherwise.  Still, he argues that “demands for political and 
economic justice, which go beyond the traditional liberal principles, inform [a] neo-
Enlightenment that increasingly includes compensation for past deprivations and 
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historical injustices” (311-312).  In short, enlightenment ideals alone cannot explain the 
redress or reparations movement; especially in the face of the incoherence that 
characterizes global responses to reparation claims.  
For instance, many nations, like Japan and Turkey, still refuse to accept their 
responsibility in past genocide and other mass human rights violations.  Although it has 
acknowledged the facts of the Nanking massacre in China, for example, and expressed 
regret for the consequences of the “incident” and “deeply reproaches itself,” Japan has 
yet to present an official apology to China (Brooks, The Age 109).  Similarly, Turkey 
continues to refer to the politically motivated killing of two million Armenians as the 
unfortunate consequence of civil war during the reign of the Ottoman Empire, and still 
resists calls for acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide.  It would be a moral victory 
for victims and descendants of the Nanking massacre and the Armenian genocide, to 
mention just these two, if their proper names were used in reference to them, and if they 
received public apologies from leaders of Japan and Turkey, respectively. Their claims 
for reparations are symbolic; giving the massacre of thousands of people its proper name 
and apologizing for the harm inflicted on victims will not bring back the dead but simply 
honor their memory.   
Given the previous discussion of the supremacy of the human rights discourse in 
global politics, one would infer that Turkey and Japan, two democratic countries with 
excellent relationships with their Western counterparts, would be either pressed to give in 
to these moral demands (as respectable  national actors in the international community), 
or become political pariahs.  But other issues complicate this, including geopolitical 
concerns. For instance, U. S. Senate Resolution 106 is a bill that sought to have the 
 53 
Armenian genocide publicly recognized by the President of the United States, but it was 
shelved in 2007 because of concerns that such a rhetorical act might alienate our Turkish 
allies during challenging times. Ultimately, the United States (in the person of its leader) 
surrendered to purely strategic needs and did not sign the bill, so as not to embarrass our 
allies in the war against terror.  These historical examples are a testament to the power of 
rhetorical acts such as apologies; their utterance literally changes the moral landscape for 
victims and perpetrators, which explains the Turkish and Japanese resistance. As 
Nicholas Tavuchis nicely puts it: “Apology speaks to something larger than any 
particular offense and works its magic by a kind of speech that cannot be contained or 
understood merely in terms of expediency or the desire to achieve reconciliation” (91). 
In the context of pervasive violence that shatters people‟s lives and strips them from their 
most basic rights, it is perhaps difficult to grasp what is truly meant by reparations, or to 
come up with anything that can repair such loss and mitigate the pain. Reparations clearly 
have a symbolic aspect but there must also be a tangible gain for victims who lost loved 
ones and whose livelihood was compromised as a result of state violence and criminal 
acts. Ingrid De Kok, a South African poet, sees reparations as “The action of restoring 
something to a proper or former state; spiritual restoration; the action of making amends 
for a wrong or loss; compensation for war damage by a defeated state” (139, italics in 
original). This definition suggests, first, that reparations are about restoration, which can 
include restitution (of lost property, for example), compensation or indemnification (a 
lump sum of money to help with medical expenses or scholarship funds), and apology (a 
symbolic gesture). Reparations about making good again, and they are often the result of 
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defeat, whether political or moral.  But despite the simple definition she provides above, 
for De Kok, reparations resist definition, as her powerful poem suggests: 
What is cost no one is telling. 
  Can‟t subtract what might have been. 
  Can‟t add up to a sum we understand. 
Can‟t subdivide what once was seen 
 
Can carve a tombstone for the dead, 
memorialize with flowers and crosses, 
exhume a body, clear a name, 
issue receipts for wrongs and losses. 
 
But can‟t repair, and can‟t restore,  
an uncut arm, unbruised genital, 
untroubled sleep, unscarred face,  
unweeping mother, children, faith 
or wide unwatching private space. 
      (Seasoned 139) 
In South Africa during the Apartheid regime and in similar contexts, reparations are more 
symbolic than material. Physical and psychological scars cannot be repaired but symbolic 
gestures like burying a friend, restoring a relative‟s name, finding a neighbor‟s body have 
a restorative potential. 
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Alfred Brophy‟s discussion of reparations about the impact of slavery on the 
African American community in the United States clearly highlights these nuances. There 
are two types of reparations:  Backward-looking and forward-looking.  Backward-
looking reparations include efforts that seek to evaluate the damage that occurred in the 
past and repair it though financial means such as restitution of lost property or wages, 
payment of medical expenses for physical or psychological harm, as well as public 
apologies or calls for forgiveness. Forward looking efforts, on the other hand, focus more 
on the future as their goal is to improve the livelihood of those impacted by past harm as 
well as consider and implement institutional reforms to ensure that similar violations 
never happen again.  Building better houses and schools, offering scholarships and other 
such measures seek to augment the quality of life of those who were victimized by 
previous circumstances. Reparations, in this case, are equated with the improvement of 
victims‟ future lives, injustices of the past can be expunged and perpetrators are able to 
atone for past deeds.  
The most significant reparations package in modern history is the compensatory 
efforts towards German Jews after the fall of Nazi Germany, which have been widely 
documented because, as previously suggested, postwar trials established the legal 
precedent and historical foundation for an international legal system that not only 
recognized and defined genocide and human rights but also established a framework for 
dealing with the consequences of what is now commonly referred to as crimes against 
humanity.  While it was clear that no money can ever resurrect the deceased nor make up 
for the suffering of millions of innocent people, the Jewish population had lost so much 
(in terms of human life as well as financial assets) because of Nazi persecution that 
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compensatory efforts were necessary to “make good” again (Kritz 47).  In a speech meant 
for German and international audiences, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who is credited 
with starting the reparation program for victims of Nazi Germany, explained the 
necessity for repairing the harm incurred by Jews: 
unspeakable crimes were perpetrated in the name of the German people 
which impose upon them the obligation to make moral and material 
amends, both with regard to the material damage which Jews have 
suffered and with regard to Jewish property for which they are no longer 
individual claimants (in Kritz 48). 
These reparations were not only a political necessity but also a moral obligation for 
Germany to regain its status of a respectable nation in the world. To clear their 
conscience and their name, Germans developed two types of reparation programs:  
Restitution and indemnification.  In addition, persons who had been stripped of their 
citizenship or professional degrees because of political motives were rehabilitated (Kritz, 
Transitional 48).  In terms of indemnification, under the Federal Restitution Law, the 
Federal Compensation Law, and the Luxembourg Agreement with Israel, Germany 
provided victims of the Holocaust with over 80 DM billion and some claims for 
reparations are still pending. Thus, some observers note that although these billions can 
never match the suffering of the Jews during the Holocaust, the scope of reparations they 
benefited from has “facilitated demands for reparations by other groups that have 
suffered tragic histories” (Torpey 41). In other words, they serve as precedent for groups 
and communities who have been victimized. 
 57 
 In the United States, calls for reparations come from many directions but most 
vocal are members of the African-American community asking for an apology and 
compensation (backward and forward looking) for the suffering and trauma their 
forefathers and mothers were subjected to as slaves, a traumatic experience that, they 
argue, continues to have an impact on them and their children despite the passing of time. 
These efforts have thus far been met with silence and even rejection. President Clinton 
refused to apologize to African Americans for historical injustices suffered because of 
slavery and Jim Crow laws, a refusal that Brooks attributes to the lack of strong internal 
support.  This stance is in sharp contrast to the most recent case of reparations in U. S. 
history, resulting from the internment of entire communities of Japanese Americans after 
Japan‟s bombing of Pearl Harbor.  It appears that, despite some internal noise, this case 
has been settled with an official apology from President Reagan (and the passing of the 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988) to families affected by the internment, along with a sum of 
$20,000 per person to compensate for incurred damages and harm.
17
 It is not clear then 
what accounts for the seemingly double-standard applied to these claims for reparations 
for historical injustices against entire communities based on their ethnicity or race. 
Perhaps in the case of the United States, apologizing and compensating for the internment 
of people of Japanese decent was a much smaller project than addressing the long 
overdue demands of atonement, apology and reparations from the African-American 
community.  
Claims for reparations range from very modest and symbolic demands, like a 
decent burial or clearing of one‟s name, to more substantial ones like large sums of 
money.  In South Africa, victims‟ requests for a proper burial for their relatives, a death 
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certificate, or removal of bullets from private parts suggests that they  have no illusion 
about the potential for “external repair” (Minow).  A primary difference between the 
redress movement in the United States and other places like South Africa, Morocco or 
even Rwanda, is that reparatory efforts have not been the genuine result of civil society 
efforts. I do not want to suggest that civil society has not been vocal or efficacious in 
these countries but simply that despite all of their efforts and good will, victims‟ 
organizations in Morocco, for example, have not been involved or consulted in the 
decision-making process of developing a framework for reparations. In Morocco, for 
example, reparations have been linked to cash. But symbolic reparations such as official 
apologies and expressions of remorse and regret (to survivors and their families) are just 
as important, if not more important, than material compensation.  Soyinka points out: 
“And even as justice is not served by punishing the accused before the establishment of 
guilt, neither is it served by discharging the guilty without evidence of mitigation—or 
remorse”  (3). Money can fix physical damages but it cannot erase the trauma and loss 
suffered by victims, nor can it restore trust in state institutions and officials.  That would 
require that perpetrators acting in the name of these institutions account for their actions, 
at the very least. In addition, when reparations are not part of a larger project of 
institutional reforms that seek to safeguard against repetition of abuses, they do not 
advance the bigger goal of changing the political culture.  
The rhetoric of reparations highlights the moral and political necessity that states 
(and their official) be held accountable for criminal actions against their own citizens. 
After all, states that aspire to be democratic should be for and by the people, and when 
trust between the state and citizens becomes frail or, worse, disappears, it is symptomatic 
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of the failure of the state to protect its citizens. In South Africa and Morocco, for 
instance, that state-citizen bond was never there to begin with, so it is not a matter of 
fixing a weak link but developing trust in government institutions and agents of the state, 
and nurturing that trust through symbolic gestures. Reparations can be part of the effort to 
repair political relationships and ensure that measures are put in place to safeguard 
against such happenings in the future.  Crocker argues: “To reckon fully with past 
wrongs, an emerging democracy must identify the causes of past abuses and take steps to 
reform the law and basic institutions to reduce the possibility that such violations will be 
repeated” (3). Thus institutional reforms must to be part of reparatory or compensatory 
efforts.  If backward looking reparations serve to acknowledge that harm was done and 
offer some symbolic and material compensation for it, forward looking types of 
reparation have a broader horizon as they seek to prevent recurrence of similar 
experiences and enshrine the memory of those who perished.  In both cases, the burden of 
proof is upon victims, who are expected to make a public case to explain how they have 
been wrongly and unjustly victimized and why and how their injustice needs to be 
rectified. Whether their case is heard and heeded is a rhetorical process that is negotiated 
between victims, perpetrators, public opinion, and the political leadership.  Slyomovics 
explains that victims‟ narratives of suffering are often used as a measure for determining 
the hierarchy of victimhood or victimization and the type and amount of reparations that 
the victims‟ suffering (and story) warrants. The outcome of reparations contributes to and 
in fact is inseparable from other practices of transitional justice, such as reconciliation 
and memorialization (and even the political process of democratic transition) but to think 
of reparations as primarily monetary is problematic. It is then important to stress, as 
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Minow does, that “[s]ocial and religious meanings rather than economic values lie at the 
heart of reparations” (110). Money does not heal scars nor repair relationship.  
But to assume or expect that reparations are the end of the road for transitional 
justice is dangerous. In fact, the expectation that victims will forgive and forget after 
symbolic gestures of apology and repentance or monetary compensation is tantamount to 
buying them off to clear one‟s conscience and wipe out the guilt.  In some experiences of 
transitional justice and historical injustice, some victims refuse to accept compensations 
either because they consider it to be “blood money” or because there is no other 
rhetorical or symbolic effort to acknowledge their suffering and make amends.  The 
money is not accompanied by expressions of regret and remorse and public attempt to 
“make good again.” Some victims and their families in Morocco, for example, have put 
uncompromising conditions on the entire process of reparations before they can accept 
any financial reparations, such as the state revealing the whole truth about the fate of their 
loved ones who have disappeared or been murdered.  Otherwise, they see it as soiling the 
memory of the deceased.  Along these lines, the International Center for Transitional 
Justice warns: 
Reparations that are not linked to prosecutions or truth-telling may be 
perceived as „blood money‟—an attempt to buy the silence or 
acquiescence of victims. Similarly, reforming institutions without any 
attempt to satisfy victims' legitimate expectations of justice, truth and 
reparation, is not only ineffective from the standpoint of accountability, 
but unlikely to succeed in its own terms.
18
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As will be further explained in chapter three, this has been the main criticism directed at 
the Moroccan program of reparations.  Minow argues:  
The core idea behind reparations stems from the compensatory theory of 
justice. Injuries can and must be compensated. Wrongdoers should pay 
victims for losses. Afterwards, the slate can be wiped clean. Or at least a 
kind of justice has been done. [. . .] Extending this idea to victims of mass 
violence substitutes money or other material benefits—such as insurance, 
or scholarships—for the devastation inflicted by wrongful incarcerations, 
or tortures, or murders. This means crossing over differing lexicons of 
value (104).   
Serving some kind of justice should be the moral horizon of reparations and when that 
horizon is lost, reparations become all about counting; it is indeed „blood money.‟  
Reparations that seek to “make good” again can contribute to the dialogue 
between victims/survivors and perpetrators, a collective act of accounting that begins 
with the truth commission.  Barkan points out that “[t]his interaction between perpetrator 
and victim is a new form of political negotiation that enables the rewriting of memory 
and historical identity in ways that both can share” (xviii). In other words, one can 
suggest that reparations in the context of mass violence subverts the relationship between 
perpetrators and victims/survivors not necessarily because of the financial exchange but 
because they constitute in themselves an acknowledgment of responsibility and an effort 
at being accountable for one‟s actions. As an effort towards accountability, reparations 
programs can greatly contribute towards democratization by setting the tone for future 
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regimes and restoring trust in political life but they can only do so if they include a 
symbolic component: acknowledgment of responsibility and apology.   
For instance, Brooks argues that for many Holocaust survivors and their 
descendants, as well as Japanese Americans who were interned and racially stigmatized 
in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, there is a real fear that the past might be revisited upon 
them or their children. That is why apologies as rhetorical affirmations of guilt and 
remorse are so important for these victims and the society they dream to build for future 
generations.  For them, apologies and compensations act as a deterrent for the future, as a 
promise that their children will not suffer like they did. In addition, Brooks makes an 
interesting point when he states that: “Remorse improves the national spirit and health. It 
raises the moral threshold of a society” (3). Apologies and expressions of remorse have a 
symbolic value in that those who offer them recognize that their actions were wrong and 
produced innocent victims; repentance is a step in the right direction of becoming a 
decent human being again. Another important ethical implication of reparations is that 
they greatly contribute to efforts to preserve the memory of victims and survivors of 
political injustices.  As such, the following section opens up discussion about practices of 
memorization within transitional justice.  
Between Remembrance and Oblivion: The Praxis of Memory 
Memorialization is one of the hallmarks of the 20
th
 century. The fear that no trace 
will be left of those who perished in wars, genocide, civil wars and other catastrophes, or 
that their memory will be distorted, has led to a compulsive drive to remember and record 
all details of life.  This trend has been aided by the explosion of technology and evident 
in the immense array of artifacts, practices and places that seek to record and 
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memorialize involve many media—the internet, films, cameras, recorders, biographies, 
books museums, commemorative events, and witnessing.  As previously noted, 
Halbwachs‟ claim in the early 1900s that memory is a social phenomenon and that 
remembering is a collective process opened up the field of memory studies to many 
disciplines, resulting in an important body of scholarship that focuses on issues of 
identity, collective/public memory and nationalism. Hauser states: 
Although public memories may serve as a source of conflict and 
domination, we should not forget that, as rhetorical achievements, their 
life is in performance. If they can be a resource for subjugation, their 
indeterminacy as rhetorical inventions means they may equally open 
spaces for mediating difference. Every rhetorical transaction, as Aristotle 
taught, is a praxis created for the given case. Each rhetorical situation is 
marked by elements of novelty and possibility for refiguring the meaning 
of experience and human relations (115).  
Public memories are revealed in their performance and praxis. Public memories are 
rhetorical in that they create a public space where their meaning is assigned and 
negotiated.  For instance: “the question of public memory carries the questions of power 
into public life in at least two ways. Most obviously it raises concerns over how people 
find resources from their past to shape an account of their present and future. More 
vexingly it raises the problem of discovering the means to resist the subversive power of 
someone else‟s story to distort our own memories and appropriate our own experiences” 
(Hauser, Vernacular 115).  Scholarship that focuses on historical narratives and public 
memory has energized the field of rhetorical studies and infused the metaphor of memory 
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with new overtones. 
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 The connection between memory and rhetoric has shifted with the 
understanding that memory not only serves as the foundation for the construction of 
historical narratives but greatly contributes to shaping national symbols and identities.  In 
an essay published in the Quarterly Journal of Speech almost fifteen years ago, Stephen 
H. Browne sheds light on this:  
As a form of cultural practice, public memorializing outsteps established 
genres, eludes intent and improvises on both material and symbolic 
resources. …such memorializing is a textual practice; to speak of it at all 
is to put into play an interpretive procedure. However varied those 
procedures, they collectively stress a sense of the text as a site of symbolic 
action, a place of cultural performance, the meaning of which is defined 
by its public and persuasive functions (237).  
In addition, Carol Blair has noted that memory is “a phenomenon of community,” which 
highlights the importance of memory for the study of communication. Memory has 
epistemological value, manifest in public expressions in museums, commemorations, 
history manuals, and other places, thus making it a powerful political instrument, open to 
all kinds of appropriations and misappropriations. And, as Avishai Margalit states: 
“Memory breathes revenge as often as it breathes reconciliation, and the hope of reaching 
catharsis through liberated memories might turn out to be an illusion” (5). In other words, 
as explained in chapter one, memory has many horizons. 
Scholars have investigated the use and abuses of public memory during critical 
national times such as the national policy of collective amnesia in Spain after the death of 
Franco (El Pacto del Olvido), Germany during the Nazi regime, and then again 
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afterwards (the passionate efforts of survivors not to forget what happened in Auschwitz 
and other concentration camps).  The aftermath of dramatic events such as the ones 
mentioned here constitutes a “rhetorical interruption” for communities impacted; it also 
inaugurates civic deliberation about what constitutes a people or a nation.  Blair notes 
that, in addition to being political, public memory is also an “emotionally invested 
phenomenon,” because of the powerful linkages between remembrance, language/culture 
and identity. Surely, for survivors of the Holocaust in Europe, Apartheid in South Africa, 
the Years of Lead in Morocco, and other atrocities, recalling experiences of torture, rape, 
loss of loved ones, and other forms of inhumanity is certainly an emotionally charged 
experience.  Remembrance is necessarily and dynamically affective, not simply 
cognitive.  Happy and peaceful feelings emerge with happy memories. Violent or 
traumatic memories evoke a plethora of disturbing emotions such as sadness, fear, hate, 
shame, horror, and guilt. The events remembered belong to a different time frame but the 
emotions associated with those events are very much present-lived and become enacted 
in the now.  Public memory is a collective embodiment of past events and the motor for 
practices that have implications for the present and the future.  
It should be clear at this point that public memory and history are distinct, despite 
their common theme: past remembrance. History relies heavily on memory, to be sure. In 
History as an Art of Memory, Patrick Hutton explains how history and historical work are 
impossible without memory: 
History is an art of memory because it mediates the encounter between 
two moments of memory: repetition and recollection. Repetition concerns 
the presence of the past. It is the moment of memory through which we 
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bear forward images of the past that continue to shape our present efforts 
to evoke the past. It is the moment of memory with which we consciously 
reconstruct images of the past in the selective way that suits the need of 
our present situation. It is the opening between these two moments that 
makes historical thinking possible (xxi). 
Memory is a performative and dynamic practice, always enacted and re-enacted, resisting 
closure and continuously infusing new meaning into past experiences. History, on the 
other hand, is like a still photo of the past: static and rigid. Despite their affinity for the 
same object, their missions are different and this difference is beautifully captured by 
Pierra Nora: 
Memory is life, always embodied in living societies and as such in 
permanent evolution, subject to the dialectic of remembering and 
forgetting, unconscious of the distortions to which it is subject, vulnerable 
in various ways to appropriation and manipulation, and capable of lying 
dormant for long periods of time only to be suddenly reawakened. History, 
on the hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of 
what is no longer. Memory is always a phenomenon of the present, a bond 
tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the 
past….Memory situates remembrance in a sacred context. History ferrets 
it out; it turns whatever it touches into prose. (3). 
Experiences of transitional justice problematize the praxis of memory precisely 
because the decisions that people make about both remembering and disremembering 
during times of crisis impact the society they are attempting to rebuild and the historical 
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narrative they are writing. Much has been said recently about the role of political amnesia 
and forgetting in the construction of national identity, and interestingly enough, Lane 
Bruner argues that strategic forgetfulness is what rhetoricians call public memory.  He 
explains: “Every articulation necessarily highlights some features at the expense of 
others; it is simply that some articulations tend to repress more potentially significant 
political issues than others (thus some articulations are more ethical than others)” (316).  
In other words, what is (deliberately) forgotten is sometimes more important than what is 
remembered. In addition, Bradford Vivian, who readily concedes that “forgetting has had 
a bad reputation,” notes that “the notion that forgetting need not amount to amnesia, 
erasure, or loss of memory—that it may, as an available trope or public deliberation, 
constitute a principled and judicious response to the past—remains conspicuously 
unorthodox” (91).  Vivian‟s review of recent works in ethics, phenomenology, and 
anthropology suggests that the practice of forgetting needs to be further investigated to 
“affirm its positive contributions to public life, ethics, and decision making” (91)  
Achieving an ethico-political balance between excessive remembrance and amnesia isn‟t 
easy, to be sure. Some nations have fallen prey to the totality of erasure (amnesia), 
hoping to start anew without disturbing shadows from the past, and others have made of 
remembrance their national pastime. For example, after the fall of Nazism in Germany, 
the stigma associated with being part of such brutal events prompted Germans to want to 
quickly forget and turn the page. But, it soon became clear that in the effort to forget one 
cannot help but remember; as Vivian points out: “asking others to forget something 
ironically draws attention to, and brings to mind or memory, that very thing” (102).  
German attempts to delete a very unpleasant period of their history were futile, although 
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German national amnesia lasted twenty years.  But teachers and parents could not lie (by 
omission) to future generations; to do so was to negate that the Holocaust ever happened, 
which would have been adding insult to injury to Jewish people.  When amnesia is 
prescribed as a national policy, like the “pact of oblivion” in Spain after the civil war, it 
might work in the short term but is bound to fail: those who suffered cannot forget; they 
can suppress their memories, but they do not forget, and the past comes back to haunt 
them. As Minow affirms: “Some countries simply forget the past and attempt to induce a 
national amnesia in its people. Of course that is bound to fail—the victims do not, indeed 
cannot, forget.  And their unanswered calls for retribution develop into hate and 
invariably that hate is directed collectively at the group from which the perpetrators 
came” (ix). This is exactly what happened in Spain, as previously noted. 
If some countries have worked hard to expose and publicize the horrors of their 
past and establish responsibilities of perpetrators of the atrocities (South Africa might be 
a good example here), Spain has done just the opposite after the death of Franco in the 
early 1970s.  Spain can be seen either as an anomaly in terms of its policy of national 
amnesia or a model to emulate since over thirty years after the death of Franco, the 
country seems to have joined the club of democratized nations with a vibrant and mostly 
peaceful citizenry. Still, the pact of oblivion appears to have been broken as there are 
growing calls for the re-opening of that page in Spanish history to set the record straight, 
identify and bury the dead, and establish truth about the past. This new development in 
Spanish affairs verifies, as Madeleine Davis notes, the fact: 
that Spaniards [did not] genuinely forgot the past but that a collective 
decision was made, for political purposes, to place a particular 
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construction on that past, to suppress or de-emphasize those memories felt 
to be likely to endanger the stability and consensus, and to foreground 
those likely to promote „reconciliation‟ (867). 
To stress the importance of public memory and remembrance is not to suggest that 
individual memories alone should dictate decisions relating to an entire nation in a time 
of transition; but to emphasize that a society cannot build a meaningful existence without 
a historical collective consciousness, made up of shared narratives about the past.  
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Chapter Three:  The Years of Lead in Morocco: A Rhetorical Account 
No people without a memory 
No future without truth 
No nation without justice 
 
--The Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice
20
 
Like many of the countries discussed in the previous chapter, Morocco is a 
country with a bloody past. The first part of the 20
th
 century brought about colonization 
and foreign oppression while the second half was marked by state violence and 
repression. After colonization by the French and Spanish ended in the mid-1950s, the 
monarchy regained control of the state but it did not realize a just society. Susan Waltz 
notes: “The North African states of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria had all won political 
independence by 1962, but this did not usher in the halcyon days many had dreamed of 
and hoped for” (viii).  For the past fifty years, the kings of Morocco have managed to 
stay in power through a clever dual game of terror/violence and cooptation/corruption 
internally, with a well orchestrated PR campaign internationally. 
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 In fact, the 
ideological polarization of the world during the Cold War era allowed for human rights 
violations to occur in many places without any consequences for those who committed 
them and no recourse for those who suffered them.  Sill, demands for accountability and 
justice for the past have grown stronger around the globe and their echo has reached 
many places, including Morocco. 
As I have elucidated in chapter two, the rhetoric of transitional justice slowly 
gained traction after World War II, as waves of democratization swept across the globe.  
Still, it is only after the end of the Cold War that calls for an end to violence and 
oppression in countries such as South Africa and Morocco have found legitimacy and 
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support nationally and elsewhere (see Huntington).  The end of the Cold War and the 
globalization of the discourses of human rights and democratization have challenged the 
legitimacy and practices of ruthless regimes and slowly contributed to a change in the 
political landscape of many regimes, including Morocco. As a case in point, Patricia 
Campbell shows that: “To the king‟s credit, he appeared to recognize the changing tide of 
the international political scene and understood that his techniques employed to stifle the 
opposition were becoming internationally unacceptable.” (4)  In other words, the Years of 
Lead had to come to an end and the monarchy was faced with the necessity to introduce 
changes in order to survive in its own territory and sustain good political and economic 
relationships with European countries and the United States. These (sometime cosmetic) 
changes began in the mid-1990s and have been framed as “democratization” and “the 
democratic transition.” Lise Strom considers the process of democratization to have 
started much earlier, in the 1960s. While these efforts at democratization first focused on 
some tweaking in the national constitution (amendments, etc.) and political institutions 
(new party laws, change in elections, etc.), it soon became evident that no transition could 
take place without a genuine confrontation with the recent bloody past that was filled 
with innocent victims and perpetrators of atrocious crimes, most of whom were still 
integral parts of the political game.  I seek to chart this segment of Morocco‟s history in 
this chapter, and gain insight into and understanding of how Moroccan citizens have been 
negotiating in the public sphere.  
The examples of Spain, South Africa and Chile, among others, have provided 
citizens in Morocco with guidance and hope for imagining a future free of state 
repression and violence. More specifically, rhetorical practices of truth and 
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reconciliation, reparations, and memorialization that seek to shape the discourse about the 
past (around the theme of justice and accountability) have re-energized political 
engagement within the civic arena and boosted citizens‟ demands and hopes for greater 
liberties and socio-political rights. Ideals of justice and accountability have 
wholeheartedly been adopted by victims groups and human rights activists and helped 
them frame claims for truth and justice in response to the mass violations perpetrated 
against innocent citizens during the Years of Lead.  Waltz insists that human rights‟ 
organizations in North Africa are, as in most places, “essentially political actors. They are 
different from other kinds of political actors, however, in that they neither vie for spoils 
within the political system nor attempt to overthrow that system. Rather, they work from 
within a recognized game of national politics to change its operating rules. Neither saints 
nor revolutionaries, they are political actors with a stake in the system, seeking reform” 
(viii). Given that Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, even if in name only, these 
groups have focused their efforts on constitutional reforms, trying to shift the balance of 
power in favor of the people since, as it currently stands (and has for over fifty years), 
political power lies totally in the hands of the monarch.  In an effort to take charge of the 
national grassroots‟ incursion into the past and the peoples‟ thirst for democracy, the 
Moroccan state (i.e., the monarchy) has adopted the rhetoric of transitional justice to 
frame the changes that were introduced to secure survival and regain legitimacy on the 
international stage. 
This chapter sheds light on Morocco‟s efforts to come to terms with its past as it 
is played out in the public sphere through a rhetorical battle between two primary 
political formations and actors. On one side there are victims‟ groups and human rights‟ 
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advocates who have been waging a campaign to account for the past and secure some 
type of justice while at the same time trying to compel the state to launch reforms that 
can pave the way to a genuine democratic transition.  On the other side, there is the state 
(the monarchy and its political apparatus, the makhzen) which has been focusing its 
efforts on political survival through an official discourse centered on democratization and 
respect for human rights, all-the-while making very little efforts towards consequential 
constitutional reforms. Although a full discussion of democracy and democratization in 
Morocco is beyond the scope of this work, I must agree with Robert Dahl and Susan 
Waltz in their minimalist understanding of democracy as a political system that first and 
foremost protects citizens from oppression. “For Dahl, the noteworthy advantage of 
democracy does not lie in the particular policies it may produce, for in their content 
democratically produced policies may differ little from those arrived at by other political 
means. Democracy‟s major virtue is found, rather, in the protection from massive 
coercion it extends to those who enjoy the franchise” (Waltz  5).  
Clearly, a genuine democracy does more than protect citizens from state violence 
and abuse. Unless the king is only a figure head, a symbol of the country‟s heritage, like 
in Spain or Great Britain, a monarchical system of governance remains at great odds with 
the idea of democracy, even if it is a constitutional monarchy. For instance, a democracy 
presupposes that the government is representative of and subordinate to the people, not 
the opposite as is the case in a monarchy, especially one where power is constitutionally 
centralized within the head of state. For a society like Morocco where citizens are 
constitutionally conceived as subjects who are required to show loyalty and allegiance to 
the king, even an unjust one, to live in a democracy would mean to become citizens who 
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do not live in fear of coercion and violence and equally enjoy the rights and 
responsibilities that are consecrated in the constitution. It is ironic that in many 
transitional countries, including Morocco, democratization is presented as the “good” that 
brings the nation together. Democracy is offered as the reward for reconciliation, but 
while reconciliation presupposes a conciliatory and consensual process, democracy is 
neither conciliatory nor consensual; it is a cacophony of voices that do not always 
resonate. As Ricoeur would have it, dissensus is the backbone of a healthy political 
community, while oblivion and fabricated consensus can create a false sense of harmony 
and thus be dangerous. The reality of Moroccan politics and other semi-authoritarian 
regimes is that, unlike totalitarian states, there is plenty of dissensus and dissonance 
within the public sphere. Daniel Brumberg explains that these regimes, including 
Morocco, “have not tried to impose a single vision of political community, or to 
completely swallow up every vestige of organized pluralism in society. Instead, they have 
put a certain symbolic distance between the state and society in ways that leave room for 
competitive or dissonant politics” (40). 22  In other words, in Morocco (and other similar 
regimes), plurality in the political arena is not synonymous with democracy. It provides a 
misleading index for inside players and to outside observers, one that the state is keen on 
nurturing.
23
 
Waltz argues that “the politics of human rights [in North African countries] are 
essentially a politics of rhetoric. That rhetoric is not to be dismissed for its emptiness, 
insofar as political discourse ultimately shapes political expectation and political 
behavior” (233).  This is true of all societies, of course, not just those of North Africa. 
When violence ceases to be the primary mode of communication and power negotiation 
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for political actors, rhetoric assumes its proper place in the public sphere.  In other words, 
any meaningful change in politics in Morocco is going to be the result of rhetorical 
efforts on the part of political actors. Central to this development are ethical appeals 
grounded in the culture of human rights and the rhetoric of transitional justice. According 
to Thomas Moriarty whose work focuses on South Africa, the rhetoric of political leaders 
in any given country determines the political reality for the audience. He states: 
Political figures construct a past, present and desirable and plausible future 
for their audiences—a political reality—by characterizing or rhetorically 
constructing key elements of the public scene. [. . .] The resulting political 
realities determine the nature of the relationship between groups in a given 
society. The relative proximity of these realities determines whether the 
relationship between the groups is one of rhetorical or violent conflict. 
They will disagree or bicker over issues, but their conflict will be of a 
political, or rhetorical, nature.  But if the groups have dissimilar political 
realities, the relationship between them will be one of violent conflict. (3-
4)  
 As previously mentioned, consensus is not a desirable condition in a democracy because 
consensus can mean that power is not adequately shared among political actors, or that 
some groups are under the control of others and unable to dissent. Still, I want to 
emphasize that dissensus should not be taken to be an adequate index of democratic 
practices. For instance, Moroccan political life is full of dissent and political bickering 
between and among members of political parties and various interests, but Morocco is not 
democratic in that the dissent that characterizes public discourse does not translate into a 
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legitimate share of political power that should be held in common.  The Moroccan people 
are not the authors of the laws that constrain them, and they do not elect the executive 
that leads them.  That said, to gain better insight into Morocco‟s current battle with the 
demons of its past, it is essential to understand the complex historical, cultural and 
political framework, which I provide in the following section.  
The Alaoui
24
 Dynasty’s Rhetoric of the Divine 
Morocco is a country with multiple identities: Arab, Amazigh (the original 
inhabitants of Morocco), Muslim, Jewish, Western and African people who have 
cohabitated for many centuries, at times in conflict, but at relative peace for much of the 
last one hundred years.  The current king, Mohammed VI, belongs to the Alaoui dynasty, 
a monarchy that has ruled the country since the mid-1600s, now an established symbol of 
continuity, religious and political power, and continuity.  Miller and Bourquia point out 
that:  
Compared to other Maghribi (Muslim North African) and Middle Eastern 
States, the Moroccan political system has preserved a remarkable 
constancy over time. Since the early ninth century, Morocco has been 
more or less continuously ruled by a sultan-king who has monopolized the 
levers of government. The present dynasty, the „Alawis, first came to 
power in the seventeenth century and has governed the country ever since 
in an extraordinary unbroken chain of rule. This striking longevity invites 
questions about the institutions and social forms that have given substance 
to monarchial power and the role they play in implanting it so deeply in 
society” (2) 
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This longevity can be explained with the Sharifian principle; that is, the Alaoui family 
claims direct lineage from the Prophet Mohammed, providing them (their male 
descendents) with the title of sharif and the de-facto eligibility to be the khalif or the 
imam, a spiritual as well as political leader of their community.  In Morocco and in other 
Muslim countries, a Sharif is a person who claims to be a descendant of the Prophet and 
this lineage grants the person great respect in society. 
This divine connection has provided the Alaoui dynasty with the rhetorical 
arsenal to hold onto power for so long, as the Sharifian argument cannot be debated nor 
defeated in a Muslim society. Patricia Campbell emphasizes that: “[. . .] the longevity of 
the Al‟awid dynasty, one of the oldest in the world, contributed to Hassan‟s prestige as 
did a series of myths and symbols encouraged and often created by the monarchy to 
promote its own legitimacy” (2). The king, Hassan II, to whom Campbell refers, is the 
father of the current king Mohammed VI, whose rule by most accounts is a continuation 
of Hassan II‟s.  Cleary, the son has benefitted from his father‟s symbolic capital, as the 
concept of power in Morocco is defined by royal authority (Miller and Bourquia).  
Claiming descent from Prophet Mohammed provides the monarchy and its descendants 
with legitimacy they would not have otherwise, ostensibly endowing their persons with 
sanctity.  In other words, the lineage from the Prophet (and thus connection to God) has 
been instrumental in gaining and maintaining power for centuries.  Maghraoui argues that 
Moroccan citizens see in the king the embodiment of “institutional monarchical authority, 
not of personal royal power” (2001: 73). The king‟s person is not only symbolically 
sacred but it is legally so as well as the Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco (CKM) 
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clearly constructs the king as “sacred and inviolable,” and anyone who attempts to violate 
his person, even symbolically, is thus constructed as a criminal.  
Along these lines, Waltz argues that this type of relationship between the ruler 
and the prophet creates a psychological contract. Instead of a social contract that can 
either be affirmed, broken or renewed, a psychological contract is difficult to dissolve or 
break because that would be considered a betrayal of the Prophet himself or even a 
rejection of one‟s father, which in Muslim societies would be the ultimate sin. In 
addition, Campbell argues that the trinity (God, King, Country) created by Hassan II is 
powerful rhetorically because of the mythical (constructed as mystical) link to the 
Prophet and God.  Campbell claims that “by linking himself to God, through the Prophet, 
the monarch ensures that challenges to his divine right to rule are indeed challenges to 
God” (3).  King Hassan II justified his absolute power with religious arguments. To 
explain the legitimacy of Article 19 of the CKM, which de facto makes Morocco a 
monarchy that is not actually constitutional, Hassan II stated that: “Islam forbids me from 
implementing a constitutional monarchy in which I, the king, delegate all my powers and 
reign without governing. […] I can delegate power, but I do not have the right, on my 
own initiative, to abstain from my prerogatives, because they are also spiritual” (3). The 
king‟s religious and spiritual role preceded or overruled his political role, making it easier 
for him to have absolute power in all matters, religious and political.  To challenge this 
connection or the legitimacy of the monarch‟s authority is to risk being accused of heresy 
and treachery.  In fact, “it is this position that enabled the monarchy to retain stature and 
power under French colonialism (1912-1956) and to emerge as the symbol of nationalism 
during the struggle for independence” (3).  As Slyomovics points out in The Performance 
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of Human Rights in Morocco, the only time that the rule of the dynasty to which the 
current king belongs was seriously undermined was during French colonial rule and, 
accordingly, Morocco gained independence in 1956 thanks to a strong local resistance 
and the symbolic role of the king, which at that time was Mohamed V, Hassan II‟s father. 
For the monarchy, the outcome of French colonization was short of miraculous in 
that it boosted the monarchy‟s symbolic power considerably.  Miller and Bourquia 
explain that by the time Morocco fell to French powers, the “sultanate was exhausted and 
close to expiration, torn apart by internecine struggles and successive European 
incursions. Preserved and resuscitated by the French under the Protectorate, the 
monarchy arose from the ashes, stripped of its political power but with its symbolic 
richness intact and even raised to new heights” (11). Ironically, then, French colonization 
did a huge favor to the monarchy as it somehow restored its symbolic capital and 
endowed it with a heroic aura.  In contrast, another byproduct of the French colonization 
is that it created a state of what can be called (for lack of a better term) cultural and 
political schizophrenia in Morocco, as it did in Algeria and other countries that were 
subjected to foreign intervention. Miller and Bourquia state that: “During the period of 
French rule, structures of power inherited from the Maghribi past were overlaid with 
other kinds of authority derived from Western sources. After independence in 1956, 
French and Spanish rule gradually melted away, but the institutions it had imposed on 
Moroccan political culture remained behind” (12). The influence of this mélange of 
cultures explains the variety of references and models that the monarchy and Moroccan 
people resort to in both private and public spheres. As Miller and Bourquia put it:  
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On the surface, the state appears to be rational and coherent; in actuality, it 
is made up of layers of authority derived from many sources that coexist 
and interact but without the benefit of any overriding principle or theme. 
A dual legal system, one respecting Sharia law and another inspired by 
Western legal codes—the two often in conflict—is only one example of 
this disjuncture, but there are others too numerous to recount that permeate 
public and private life (12).  
This duality is also manifest in the mix of both religious and secular references in the 
monarchy‟s official discourse, which combines the image of the king‟s role as the 
commander of the faithful with that of a modern leader seeking to democratize.  In fact, 
the appeal of modernity and democracy has not escaped the people of Morocco who 
quickly became disenchanted with the monarchy‟s iron fisted rule and demanded a share 
of power, both economic and political. This disenchantment became particularly acute 
when the monarchy‟s heroism during French rule was replaced by a rule of bullets and 
iron bars, coupled with a lack of economic opportunities for most Moroccan citizens.   
Like many other post-colonial contexts, independence from French (and Spanish) 
rule did not lead to greater freedom or justice for most Moroccans. On the contrary, in the 
course of the past fifty years, the Moroccan State has arrested, tortured, disappeared, 
exiled, and executed thousands of its own citizens.
25
 The violence has targeted people 
across all ethnic (Arab, Amazigh, Jewish), religious (Muslim, Jewish and non-religious), 
and gender lines as well as political affiliations. Any person or group who has voiced a 
political opinion that runs against the official line is deemed a threat to national security 
and stability, and dealt with violently.  Speech that criticizes the monarch or his family, 
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or is perceived as a potential threat to its legitimacy, is considered unlawful and 
potentially punishable.  During the Years of Lead, those who were targeted with torture, 
imprisonment or disappearance were typically citizens (or dissidents) who had the 
courage to denounce corruption or unjust policies, refused to show allegiance to the king, 
challenged his religious title, or questioned the legitimacy of the king‟s claims over 
Western Sahara.
26
  In other words, the policy of the State from the 1960s through the 
1990s was a zero tolerance for dissent and this policy was made explicit in the acts of 
violence perpetrated by state officials against citizens who dared to cross what came to be 
known as the “red lines”: territorial sovereignty (the nation), the king and the royal 
household (dar al mulk), and Islam as a state religion, all of which are considered 
inviolable and sacred. 
It would be naïve to suggest that violence alone can explain the longevity of the 
Moroccan monarchy or any authoritarian regime, although violence is the defining 
feature of such systems. No regime can sustain power based on violence alone, as 
Hannah Arendt argues, because force alone undermines legitimacy.  The Moroccan 
monarchy‟s rule has been one of savvy rhetorical skill that projects an image of being a 
protector and even a savior from colonialism, militarism, Islamism and territorial 
encroachment from aggressive neighbors such as Algeria.  What this rhetoric has been 
lacking, however, is grounding in a civic ethic of accountability and responsibility, one 
that is in harmony with the king‟s role as the spiritual leader, or Commander of the 
Faithful (Amir al-Mu’minin). 
In an interesting study, Mariana Ottaway offers some explanation for the 
development (and relative longevity) of authoritarianism or non-democratic regimes in 
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recent history.  She suggests that while true authoritarianism and totalitarianism are on 
the decline, they have been replaced by a new political genre, labeled “semi-authoritarian 
regimes” and defined as “ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of 
liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a 
limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian 
traits” (3).  Ottaway insists that this ambiguity is not only deliberate but even nurtured. 
Morocco, according to this political scientist, is a good candidate for this category of 
semi-authoritarian hybrid along with countries such as Algeria and Yemen.  Morocco, 
according to this line of thinking, is attempting to modernize and institutionalize its semi-
authoritarian practices rather that embrace a democratic genre of governance. The status 
quo is maintained through the ambiguity that Ottaway suggests and through the creation 
of paradoxical situations and arbitrary acts and actions (4). In Morocco, this state of 
affairs is secured through “patronage rituals, legal shackles, spiritual rarefactions, 
political constraints, symbolic invocations, and, of course, the tacit threat of force” 
(Smith and Loudiy, “Testing” 1107).  
While different ancestries and cultures make of Morocco a complex tapestry of 
identities, the language and religion that are consecrated in the constitution are Arabic 
and Islam. Morocco is considered an Arab and Muslim country, and, as noted previously, 
the political system is referred to as a constitutional monarchy.  Elaine Combs-Schilling 
emphasizes that “Islam and monarchy have been essential to the Moroccan nation since 
its beginning but have been articulated in different ways” (177).  Only after the country 
gained its independence did it adopt a constitution and become a constitutional 
monarchy.  But Maghraoui warns that one should not to be fooled by the “constitutional” 
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designation:  “Officially, Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, but in practice, ultimate 
authority continues to rest with the king” (78). While Morocco‟s political system allows 
for plurality (in terms of political parties) and does have a bicameral parliament that is 
elected, there is no balance of power in the three branches of government, and, as 
Maghraoui argues with reference to Hassan II‟s rule, “the three branches of the 
government operated more as a rubber stamp for [the king‟s] decisions and policies than 
as autonomous institutions” (78).  In other words, all branches of the government are 
subservient to the king who has the ultimate say in all political and economic affairs—
which was true of King Hassan II‟s rule as it is now of with Mohammed VI.  In his 
explanation of what he calls “the paradox of the popular (but unjust) prince” (which 
became evident during Hassan II‟s funeral in 1999), Maghraoui argues that there is 
actually no paradox and that “while they may consider the king personally unfair or 
unjust, they [the overwhelming majority of Moroccans] nonetheless identify with the 
monarchy as a symbol of national unity and a legitimate form of governance” (“Political 
Authority” 74). Indeed, the conflation (or lack of formal differentiation) of religious and 
political spheres is legitimized by the way in which the person of the monarch is 
constructed constitutionally.  As Smith and Loudiy point out:  
The rationale behind this concentration of power [in the constitution] is 
intimately tied to the relation between religion and state. Because the 
sovereign is sovereign by virtue of his royal sharifian lineage (from the 
Prophet Mohammed), his speech and symbolic acts are necessarily 
virtuous, just, and right; this principle is articulate in Article 23 of the 
CKM [Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco], which states that „[t]he 
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person of the King shall be sacred and inviolable,‟ a proscription against 
discursive as well as physical acts. In fact, not only is the King‟s person 
sacred, but so is anything that is linked to his person, even physical 
structures, as demonstrated by the November 2002 incident in which Ali 
Lmrabet was sentenced to four months in prison for suggesting in his 
weekly magazine that one of the thirteen lavish royal palaces might be for 
sale (1108).  
This analysis coheres with what other scholars have suggested about the 
Moroccan monarchy, that it has managed to keep its power for so long through a mix of a 
carrot and stick approach while also nurturing political segmentation, by fueling conflict 
among political actors so that there is never a potentially serious and viable alternative (or 
threat) to the regime. Of course, fear and violence have also been an important part of this 
strategy. For instance, in his seminal book, The Commander of the Faithful: The 
Moroccan Political Elite—A study in Segmented Politics, John Waterbury states that: 
The administration in a global sense, but particularly the Ministries of 
Interior and Justice, the army and police, the royal cabinet and the press 
are the essential instruments of royal control. They constitute the means or 
channels by which the king can intervene directly in the political process. 
Through the administration the king is able to maintain the inner conflicts 
of the elite and to reaffirm the primacy of the throne in the allocation of 
goods and power. (298) 
Although Waterbury‟s research is nearly four decades old, it is by no means outdated. 
The monarchy continues to fortify its control of economic resources and the king still has 
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absolute political power, despite a few minor changes in the constitution and many 
popular outbursts.  In other words, like most semi-authoritarian regimes, the monarchy 
does not rule with a stick alone. It has managed to stay in power this long because it 
continues to entice or otherwise buy off the allegiance of key actors of society that help it 
stay in control and counteract resistances within the system.  In so doing, the monarchy 
and those it protects, maintain immunity from prosecution or any check or balance in the 
system.  The immunity ensconced in the constitution, that „the person of the king shall be 
sacred and inviolable,‟ is extended to all those who serve him loyally.27 Correlatively, 
Ottaway‟s analysis suggests that political cronyism and hybridity are evident in semi-
authoritarian regimes, which are quite crafty in that they “leave enough political space for 
political parties and organization of civil society to form, for an independent press to 
function to some extent, and for some political debate to take place… [but] they allow 
little real competition for power, thus reducing government accountability” (3).  These 
regimes manage to give the illusion of democracy but never truly allow other political 
players a share of power in the political game. Ottaway argues that: “Semi-authoritarian 
regimes are not failed democracies or democracies in transition; rather, they are carefully 
constructed and maintained alternative systems.  If semi-authoritarian governments had 
their way, the system would never change” (7).  But authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
systems cannot have it their own way for long because to stay afloat and in power they 
ultimately resort to violent means to squelch citizens‟ demands for a share of power in 
the political sphere.  In this day and age where technology makes it relatively easy to 
communicate information about violations and abuses despite all attempts on the part of 
the regime to maintain opacity, individuals and groups are taking more responsibility into 
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their own hands and demanding accountability.  An overview of the Years of Lead is 
necessary to provide some appreciation and understanding of how citizens have 
attempted to deal with the aftermath of these horrific times, and how the State of 
Morocco has responded to their demands. 
The Years of Lead: A Culture of Violence 
The Years of Lead or the “black years” refer to the years of Hassan II‟s reign, 
from 1961 when his father Mohammed V died, to his own death in July 1999. These 
years were marked by sheer violence and utter repression of all those who were 
considered a threat to the legitimacy or survival of the king. Maghraoui describes this 
period of Moroccan history as follows: “From 1961 to 1999, King Hassan II reigned over 
Morocco exactly as if he were running a medieval absolutist state. Suddenly endowed 
with the power of a modern bureaucracy, he was accountable to no one but God and 
commanded total obedience” (“Political Authority” 3). In other words, these years are the 
equivalent of the modern dark ages for Moroccan citizens, especially those who did not 
obey the rules of the game or revolted against the “un-modern” aspect of the times, 
namely the absolutist and repressive trend of the king. Similarly, Slyomovics defines the 
Years of Lead as “an era of grayness and lead bullets” and the black years as evoking 
“the times of fear and repression, and les annees sombres, the gloomy years of forcible 
disappearances, farcical mass political trials, and long prison sentences for large numbers 
of people who from a variety of political positions voiced opposition to the regime and 
became prisoners of conscience” (The Performance 2). This gloomy state of affairs began 
right after independence and the first targets were pre-independence political parties who 
yearned to be part of the political game and have a share of power with the monarchy. 
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The International Commission for Transitional Justice‟s (ICTJ) report argues that “the 
roots of state violence can be traced to the struggle for independence that spawned 
regional revolts and two major political parties” (4). These political parties were the 
Istiqlal party (the party who led the struggle against the colonial powers and whose name 
means independence in Arabic) and the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, which 
was an offshoot of the Istiqlal party and led by Mehdi Ben Barka, a charismatic leader 
who Hassan II perceived as a threat to his power and whose actual fate  remains 
unknown, despite some evidence (by credible witnesses) that he was kidnapped in Paris, 
killed by Moroccan security forces, and his body was dissolved in a vat of acid.
28
  The 
violence of the Years of Lead against Moroccan citizens who had the courage to voice 
their discontent and make the case for a just society did not remain without echo, despite 
the culture of fear and loathing that the monarchy and its security forces developed. 
According to most historical accounts, political violence has been the instrument 
of choice for the Moroccan monarchy before independence and this reality did not 
change after independence. In fact, soon after the country gained independence and even 
before Hassan II came to power, violence was used against political adversaries as a 
means to silence them and scare off potential opponents.
29
  Ironically, as Maghraoui 
points out, it was “with the acquiescence of the nationalist parties” that the king 
“emerged as the symbol of national liberation and, became, constitutionally, the supreme 
arbitrator, legislator and guarantor of political legitimacy” (“Political Authority” 3). This 
alliance did not last long as it became clear, as previously noted, that not only did the 
nationalist parties that fought for independence and supported the legitimacy of the 
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monarchy want a share of the political pie, so did entire regions that had given their blood 
to free the country. The ICTJ‟s report provides details: 
In an effort to eliminate opposition, entire areas that had joined in the 
struggle for independence were subsequently subjected to severe 
crackdowns under Morocco‟s first post independence ruler, King 
Mohammed V. The Northern Rif, for example, found its anticolonial 
struggle turned against it as soon as independence was achieved. The 
region revolted in 1958, only to be brutally crushed by the Royal Armed 
Forces, resulting in thousands of deaths(4).
30
  
The repression of the Northern Rif was conducted under then Prince Hassan II‟s orders 
despite the ICTJ suggestion that when his father Mohammed V died and he took control 
of the country, “he adopted a softer style of repression that blended handsome rewards 
and harsh punishments” (5). 
Hassan II‟s style differed from his father also in that he understood that violence 
alone would not secure his longevity. The ICTJ states that: “His preferred tactic was to 
neutralize potential power contenders through incentives such as generous land grants, 
business deals, and offers of well-paid government positions. Indeed, Hassan II‟s skill lay 
in the fact that he „could co-opt members of various parties, squelch dissent, crush 
enemies, and still be regarded by many as a beloved monarch‟” (5). The squelching of 
dissent and crushing of enemies (real or imagined) included torture, forced 
disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and executions.
31
 Those who were lucky escaped and 
lived in exile in France or other European countries, and worked hard to alert 
international public opinion and human rights organizations to abuses that were taking 
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place in Morocco. Still, Maghraoui argues that: “From 1961 to 1999, King Hassan II 
[was . . .] suddenly endowed with the power of a modern bureaucracy, was accountable 
to no one but God and commanded total obedience” (“Political” 1).  The exact number of 
victims is difficult to pinpoint but estimates according to the ICTJ are around 50,000 
people.  The exact number of citizens who were victims of gratuitous violence will 
remain unknown, but it was substantial. During these years, even foreign nationals, like 
Amnesty International reporters, were not safe in Morocco as they were harassed and 
scared by the police apparatus. 
As public testimonials and published memoirs about the Years of Lead continue 
to demonstrate, the use of torture, physical as well as psychological, was commonplace 
and used indiscriminately, regardless of age or gender. Torture and violence targeted men 
and women, children and old people, sons and daughters, mothers and fathers, husbands 
and wives, sisters and brothers. In her study of women and political violence during the 
Years of Lead in Morocco, Nadia Guessous explains how, like in wars, rape and sexual 
violence were used by Moroccan security forces against women to satisfy their bestial 
desires or simply to humiliate them and the men in their family. Even children and babies 
were not safe from the violence and were used as weapons against their family, especially 
their mothers, in order to extract information or simply to intimidate, to shame and to 
humiliate. She states that “In effect, the state created a culture of impunity, where rape 
and sexual assault were tolerated and potentially encouraged… Mothers were tortured in 
front of their children and children were tortured in front of their mothers” (103). And, in 
most instances and according to many women‟s accounts, despite the woman‟s reference 
to religion (Allah) or any other powerful symbol, the torturers would not stop.
32
 One 
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former female political prisoner, Fatna El Bouih, recounts her experience: “Torture as 
part of a thorough search was permitted because we were hors la loi (outlaws). We were 
condemned before we were even judged, we were considered already guilty. It was not 
for what I did but what I wrote: I threw tracts but I never threw bombs” (In Slyomovics, 
Performance 20).  In the introduction to Fatna El Bouih‟s memoirs, Talk of Darkness, 
Slyomovics and Moustapha  Kamal describe her kidnapping and arrest:  
Fatna El Bouih […] became active in the National Union of High School 
Students, the organization deemed illegal by the regime of King Hassan II 
because it was formed by the underground Marxist movement. By the 
mid-1970s, during El Bouih‟s high school years, Morocco‟s political crisis 
came to a head: there were two failed military coups in 1971 and 1972 
against Hassan II, and in 1973 the brutal suppression of an armed 
insurrection, followed by a wave of mass kidnappings targeting the 
regime‟s opponents that swept the country. Fatna El Bouih was arrested 
briefly for the first time as a leader of the January 24, 1974 high school 
student strike to protest conditions in Morocco‟s secondary education.  
Her second arrest came in 1977 for membership in „March 23,‟ a Marxist 
group named to commemorate the Casablanca uprising of March 23, 1965. 
She was forcibly disappeared with other women activists from May to 
November 1977 into Derb Moulay Cherif, Casablanca‟s notorious secret 
torture center (xi).
33
  
Dissent in all its forms was not tolerated, even among high school students, even if the 
dissent was based entirely on rumors.   
 91 
This repression was possible thanks to the makhzen, the political police apparatus 
that King Hassan II consolidated during his rule.  Maghraoui argues that this system is 
the most difficult to dismantle because it is engrained in the political culture of the 
country and constitutes the most rooted and ominous “institutional and ideological 
component of Hassan II‟s legacy” (“Political Authority” 3). Storm states that “The 
makhzen does not officially exist apart from in a few administrative denominations. In 
popular language, however, the term is often used to describe the State and its agents, 
while the term is used politically to refer to the King and his entourage” (175).  Remy 
Leveau argues that historically, the makhzen referred to the “territory administered by the 
monarch, as opposed to the bled siba, which was territory outside the control of the 
central administration” (in Storm 175).  While it historically refers to the royal 
household, the storehouse of power, the one in charge of law and order, in today‟s 
Morocco, the makhzen refers more to anyone associated with the ruling class and its 
police. The makhzen is also associated with fear and loathing, as citizens who are not 
within the good graces of the king and his entourage, live in fear of its wrath and 
ubiquitous violence.  
As a case in point, Bourqia argues that the omnipotence of the makhzen has 
created a situation whereby citizens feel threatened by the same entity that is supposed to 
provide for their safety and security.  The degree of fear the makhzen provokes in 
Moroccan citizens is captured by the following popular sayings:  
Three things cannot be overcome: fire, flood, and the makhzen; 
Only God and the makhzen can defeat you; 
The makhzen takes care of itself; 
 92 
We cannot match up to the makhzen (244) 
Hence, the role of the makhzen in Morocco‟s Years of Lead is important to 
underscore. The makhzen is the security apparatus that is in charge of keeping the 
monarchy afloat at all costs, actually in everyday life and figuratively in its mythical 
aspect. It is this mission of protecting (and propping) the monarch that has motivated 
makhzen involvement in the thousands of cases of torture, abuse and, sometimes, 
execution.  The makhzen do not wait for a warrant or proof of guilt to take care of the 
situation. It is important here to point out that the military was also part of the makhzen 
during the Years of Lead as the security apparatus includes the police and the military 
and, in many instances the military alliance with the monarchy has served to crack down 
on regional revolts. As Storm puts it: “As the King came to enjoy the support of the 
military, he changed his strategy from interaction with his political opponents to that of 
harsh repression, thereby letting most of the air out of the struggle for power, as the 
parties found themselves in a situation where they were too weak to present a genuine 
challenge to the monarchy-military power alliance” (23).  
The makhzen acts “both as investigator and as judge presuming the crime while 
imagining, indeed foreshadowing, the eventuality of criminal charges and while 
preemptively acting on a punishment that might be meted out” (Slyomovics, 15).  When a 
person is arrested, she or he is presumed guilty from the start—just by virtue of his or her 
arrest—and then the police works hard to prove that they were right in arresting that 
individual, even if that involved forced confessions resulting from torture and other 
violent means.  Typically, the defense in court is not allowed to provide any evidence or 
witnesses to prove the contrary, so the makhzen continue to operate with impunity.  What 
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makes matter worse is that this approach is entrenched in the legal system. Slyomovics 
rightly points out that “The nature of the Moroccan approach to criminal procedure—the 
inquisitorial system—serves to reinforce bureaucratic attitudes that presume the guilt of 
the accused” (19). This inquisitorial system is of course problematical: “According to 
law, non-adversarial pre-trial investigations should have been conducted by judicial 
officers and examining magistrates employing all the resources of the regime to gather 
evidence. The state, supposedly neutral and acting in the best interests of all parties, 
instead actively prosecuted and persecuted detainees who voiced opposition. In the case 
of political detainees, the state broadened the definition of a crime” (20). Abderrahman 
Benameur, a Moroccan former political prisoner, human rights advocate and lawyer, 
offers this explanation of what constitutes a political act (or crime, according to the state): 
“Detention for political and union offences is not a contingent fact in contemporary 
Moroccan history, nor purely a series of provisional measures required by particular 
circumstances, nor a kind of extortion on the part of certain officials exercising the 
authority conferred by their job. On the contrary, detention for crimes of opinion, 
political and union activity is a method constantly used to destroy non-official opinion” 
(2).  
If one was a political dissident during the Years of Lead, the state spared no 
tactics to criminalize that person‟s actions, even if there was no evidence that a crime has 
been committed. But as noted earlier, the simple expression of discontent or denouncing 
of abuse of power was considered a crime. Slyomovics affirms that: “The state, in effect, 
has criminalized all manifestations of political activity and thought that promote 
l’opinion non-officielle: political acts such as writing tracts, holding meetings, and 
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demonstrating” (20).34 Arrests and prosecutions of persons with an opinion that clashed 
with the status quo constituted cases of collusion between all branches of government, 
where the judiciary was subservient to the executive and had no independence in its 
decision-making process, which is typically the case in authoritarian and totalitarian 
systems of governance. As previously suggested, despite the label of constitutional 
monarchy, there are no checks or balances in governance, which makes citizens at the 
mercy of the monarchy‟s whim.  The relentless advocacy efforts of civil society 
organizations, coupled with the shift in the international geo-political order and 
globalization of technology have contributed to some changes. 
Demands for Change 
 The end of the cold war brought with it popular demands for democracy and 
social justice around the globe. In Morocco and other countries where political violence 
was used as a means to control dissent and terrorize citizens, that meant that Western 
powers could no longer sustain a „blind eye and a deaf ear‟ approach to the human rights 
violations occurring in allied (but oppressive) regimes. Mohammed Karam, a Moroccan 
human rights lawyer, explains that in Morocco: 
1989 was a turning point but only after decades of internal and external 
pressures... Demands for respect for human rights coincided with the fall 
of the Soviet Union. Morocco‟s role as a pro-Western ally, as opposed to 
neighboring Algeria‟s alignment with the Soviet Union, became geo-
politically irrelevant. Morocco, no longer shielded from scrutiny about 
domestic violations, was forced to accede to changes, among them the 
practice of human rights. (in Slyomovics, 21) 
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  Within this new geo-political climate, the investigative and advocacy work of 
Amnesty International and other international human rights organizations made it 
difficult for Hassan II to continue to deny the accusations of human rights abuses and 
forced him to modify his public discourse, as “the 1990s was a decade of change in 
Moroccan law and procedure” (Slyomovics 21).  This is not meant to imply that 
Moroccan citizens had no or little impact on the political change in the country; on the 
contrary, it is the efforts and courage of thousands of citizens that other countries and 
organizations took on their struggle.  International organizations exposed the truth about 
human rights violations in Morocco, which forced foreign governments to pressure the 
monarchy into change so that they would not be seen as complicit with the murders and 
disappearances of innocent citizens, but these international organizations were grounded 
in the their research and advocacy efforts by accounts of suffering and atrocity by local 
Moroccan dissents and human rights organizations.  Waltz argues that the development 
of the human rights discourse in Morocco in the 1990s was aided by international 
pressure on the monarchy to favor the human rights movement to the detriment of the 
Islamic movement as well as the development of human capital and resources within the 
human rights movement itself.  One can add that technology itself has been on the side of 
the human rights movement as the internet and other novel means of communication 
have facilitated the work of organizations by providing them with access to information 
as well as allowing them to publicize their work to larger audiences.  In a similar vein, 
the ICTJ notes that the 1990s were the beginning of the end as far as systematic human 
rights violations in Morocco were concerned, and they attribute this development to the 
changing international geo-political climate and to the explosive book (Notre Ami le Roi, 
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or, Our Friend the King) by French author Gilles Perrault, who revealed embarrassingly 
atrocious details about the situation of human rights in Morocco.  Further, Amnesty 
International‟s report on Tazmamart, a secret prison where military officers were being 
held in total isolation from the rest of the world and in conditions comparable to those of 
concentration camps, put Hassan II‟s regime in the spotlight.35 
These circumstances were instrumental in changing the tide of human rights in 
Morocco by empowering local activists and organizations working to put an end to 
political violence and impunity.  In the early 1990s after nearly four decades of iron-
fisted rule, Hassan II introduced some changes, including an acknowledgment of the 
existence of secret prisons (Tazmamart in particular), the release of selected political 
prisoners, and a loosening of constraints on public discourse. In fact, it is uncanny how 
Hassan II had repeatedly and for many years scoffed at and denied accusations by human 
rights organizations such as Amnesty International and others as being smear campaigns 
to taint the image of Morocco, a so-called country of peace and democracy. In one public 
statement, he even said that “if 1% of the human rights violations suggested by Amnesty 
International were true, I would not get a wink of sleep” (in ICTJ’s report: 8). What is 
even more troubling is the fact that in a speech to the nation, King Hassan II said the 
following:“[…]and you should know my dear People, that I told you what my late father 
told me: „Remember this essential point in your political education. Never lie to your 
people, because this is a very intelligent people, who will discover your lies immediately, 
and will not forgive you, and your credibility will be affected."
36
  It is difficult to believe 
that as a ruler with absolute power, King Hassan II did not know of the rampant 
violations taking place in his country and, in fact, many accounts clearly show that he did 
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know but he did nothing.  The story told by Salah Hachad of his daughter who, at ten 
years old, at considerable risk to her own life, is a good example. When Hachad was in 
prison, his daughter appealed to the King while he was playing golf, asking why he 
would not allow her to see her father or improve his jail conditions, since he was 
innocent, never brought to court but left to die a slow death in the gulags of Tazmamart.
37
   
So even though Hassan II first denied any knowledge of abuses or secret prisons 
with inhumane conditions, he later advertised his tolerance of human rights development 
because he wished Morocco to be perceived as a civilized state. However, these 
progressive developments did not signal a democratic revolution or an end to crimes 
against citizens who expressed an opinion that was critical of the monarchy or infringed 
upon the “red lines,” but rather a softening in the magnitude of the oppression, hence 
creating an ambiguous and paradoxical situation where it was not always clear what was 
allowed or tolerated, and what was not. Lise Storm argues that “as much as the King was 
in favor of the democratic element of political contestation when it came to competition 
between the parties, he was entirely opposed to the idea when there was a chance that it 
might eventually result in a diminished role for the monarchy in political life” (13). 
Conversely, while the monarch rhetorically accepted human rights and democracy as 
legitimate and “civilized” frameworks for managing political affairs, the fear of actually 
making these principles an authentic part of public and political life was too great. The 
king has absolute power while in a democracy, that power is shared among different 
players in the political arena. So, if respect for human rights meant to allow citizens to 
express their discontent as well as their consent in the public sphere, then there was a 
 98 
serious problem because that constituted a significant threat to the king‟s tight hold on 
power.  
 This ambiguity regarding legitimate power and the exercise of rights (and 
wrongs!) was evident in the discrepancy between the public discourse of the king and 
actual political practices on the streets. Still, the introduction of the concept of human 
rights into state rhetoric coupled with the 1992 constitution constituted an important 
development; it was a point of no return.  Article 9, for example, provides for freedoms in 
keeping with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, while Article, while Articles --- 
ensures that the sanctity of the monarch, his discourse in all of its manifestations, and his 
household, are consecrated constitutionally as sacred (see Smith and Loudiy).  Due to 
Article 9 and Articles ---, Storm argues that although the constitution “duly followed the 
tradition established by the 1962 constitution and although it was a case of cosmetic 
surgery, this time the changes made bordered on being substantial in that the 1992 
constitution contained new provisions which provided Morocco with a basic framework 
that made further democratization very much a possibility” (61). While the idea of 
democracy was introduced and adopted in official communication in the early 1990s, its 
practice has been extremely slow. Campbell argues that “Hassan‟s flirtation with 
democracy began with the 1962 constitution” but she also clearly states that despite the 
different constitutional amendments (1970, 1972 and 1992), each only served to confirm 
“the preeminence of the monarchy and subordination to it of all other political 
institutions, whether legislative, executive, or judicial” (3). As previously suggested, 
although certain Articles refer to the sanctity of the king, the discourse that grants 
absolute power is found in Article 19 (of the 1996 revised constitution), which states that:  
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The King, „Amir Al-Muminin‟(Commander of the Faithful), shall be the 
Supreme Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof. 
He shall be the guarantor of the perpetuation and the continuity of the 
State. As Defender of the Faith, He shall ensure the respect for the 
Constitution. He shall be the Protector of the rights and liberties of the 
citizens, social groups and organisations. The King shall be the guarantor 
of the independence of the Nation and the territorial integrity of the 
Kingdom within all its rightful boundaries.”38  
 In fact, the introduction of the discourses of human rights and democratization into the 
State‟s rhetoric has had little impact on how citizens who voice an unpopular opinion are 
treated today.  Many national and international watchdog (and human rights) 
organizations continue to report instances of arbitrary arrests, disappearances and other 
violations of physical integrity.
39
  Maghraoui unambiguously states that “Morocco is no 
closer today to a decisive democratic breakthrough than it was four decades ago” (73). 
Still, the state‟s rhetoric of democratization has led to the implementation of new 
practices to remedy the harm that was done to innocent citizens (mostly political 
dissidents) during the Years of Lead.  
Morocco‟s transition is a-typical in the sense that it is a transition within a 
continuation. Waltz argues that: “regime transformation necessarily involves alteration of 
the system itself and entails efforts to reset the operating political parameters. It is the 
nature of a transition to call into question old arrangements” (8). The death of King 
Hassan II and the enthroning of his son, Mohammed VI, gave a boost to the changes 
discussed earlier. The newly enthroned King rushed to make public statements about the 
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country embracing a democratic transition (hinting at the beginning of a new era) and 
gave orders for the creation of an official body to investigate the Years of Lead and 
provide recommendations for dealing with the legacy of his father‟s rule. As Slyomovics 
notes: “Eight days after the death of King Hassan on July 23, 1999, his son and heir 
Mohammed VI affirmed in his first throne speech a commitment to establish the rule of 
law, and to safeguard human rights, individual and collective liberties, a constitutional 
monarchy, a multi-party system, economic liberalism and policies of regionalism and 
decentralization” (2001: 2).   
Ironically, these moves by Mohammed VI were in keeping with Hassan II‟s later 
efforts, after the acknowledgment of secret prisons and detention centers, when he moved 
to establish government agencies to tackle issues of human rights. The first of these steps 
came with the creation of the Advisory Council on Human rights (Conseil Consultatif des 
Droits de l‟Homme, or CCDH), presented as “a national institution for the promotion and 
protection of human rights.”40 The CCDH was created by royal decree in May of 1990, 
and in the speech where he addressed the members of the newly formed agency, Hassan 
II urged the members of the council “to help bring fairness where a wrong has been done 
and for help so that we can together succeed in raising this country to the level of 
civilized countries and states of the rule of law. I finally ask you to judge in all serenity 
whether in such or such case, human rights have been violated. In the affirmative, you 
will cry out the truth. In the negative, you will not hesitate to state that human rights have 
not been violated, that there was a lie, false testimony, or fabrication” (quoted in the 
ICTJ‟s report: 8)41. At the same time, Hassan II cautioned (if not threatened) Moroccans 
that if anyone was foolish enough to believe that this signals a change in how citizens 
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who dared to support or claim that “such and such a region is not part of Moroccan 
territory” they would be considered heretics and would be dealt with outside the 
framework of the law and in such a case, the king made it clear that “neither the status of 
a detainee nor a political prisoner could apply” (quoted in ICTJ‟s report: 8).  The king 
here indirectly invokes Article 19 and his responsibility to protect the borders (even as 
those very borders are being contested) and not be subject to the law he was directing 
CCDH to carry out against wrongdoers.  As the Wrongdoer par excellence, he was 
exempt from the law that he himself creates, just as his people would not be allowed to be 
authors of the laws that constrained them. 
Despite published accounts of extensive human rights violations, the CCDH‟s 
first mission was to focus on legal reforms, which had not much to do with 
acknowledging the situation on the ground or stopping abuses.  The ICTJ‟s report notes: 
“Despite these and other notable advances, the CCDH failed to directly address cases of 
abuse from the Years of Lead” (9). The file on human rights violations was shelved until 
a later date, despite the continuous focus in official rhetoric on the issues of human rights 
and democracy and their importance for the Moroccan state. But in 1993, a Ministry of 
Human Rights was set up to address similar issues that CCDH was already dealing with, 
namely to look into the accusations of human rights violations and promote a culture of 
human rights in the country. But the prerogatives of this new ministry were clearly 
limited so its existence was of little consequence for those who had hoped that the book 
of the past was going to be opened and investigated. This is perhaps not surprising given 
that no authoritarian state creates agencies (even one with human rights as its raison 
d‟etre) to promote greater liberty and accountability; rather they are euphemized fronts to 
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be used to further control citizens‟ efforts. For instance, Ministry of Human Rights was 
created when it became increasingly evident that human rights organizations in Morocco 
were forming transnational alliances and having international reverberations. As Murray 
Edelman argues, the administrative system is nothing more than a mere symbol or as 
Ricoeur would say, this is yet another example of the political paradox where 
bureaucracy (and the violence it produces) is a necessary evil.
42
 
The year of 1996 brought about several new developments, most significant was 
Morocco‟s ratification of an important United Nations convention, a change in the penal 
code, and amendments to the elections system in the new constitution. Storm states that:  
It was the adoption of Morocco‟s sixth constitution in 1996, which slowly 
reignited the flame of the democratization process, as reasonably 
competitive elections, devoid of massive fraud and with broad suffrage, 
were once again provided for in the constitution having been missing since 
the adoption of the 1970 constitution. […]the adoption of the 1996 
constitution and the provision of this core democratic principle was not an 
improvement to the situation under the original constitution of 1962. 
However, compared to the four constitutions immediately preceding it, 
this was a substantial advancement as Morocco went from not having 
provided for this core democratic principle in a period of no less than 26 
years—an era that included the holding of three parliamentary elections—
to providing for reasonably competitive, free and fair elections in the two 
most recent parliamentary elections of 1997 and 2002 (96).  
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In addition, 1997 marked the first time since Morocco gained its independence in 1956 
that the country's legislators were elected directly; however, the impact of this major 
development was limited by continuous corruption and unlawful practices. Storm notes:  
Pledging the country‟s support to democratic values and commitment to 
embark on a democratization process by adopting a new constitution in 
1996 seemed to have a positive effect on the parliamentary elections of 
1997 as these turned out to be the country‟s first reasonably competitive 
elections, devoid of massive fraud, with broad suffrage. As in previous 
elections, however, fraud and manipulation did take place, with the points 
of criticism centering on the issue of direct manipulation by the makhzen 
(79).   
Positive institutional developments (reforms) continue to be overshadowed by rampant 
corruption and nepotism. In other words, even when the law provided citizens with rights, 
these rights were not automatically granted or exercised. The rights that citizens have 
and, as prescribed in the constitution, are, in practice, a privilege that can be taken away 
from one under any arbitrary condition. Morocco‟s ratification of the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture in 1996, followed by a new law enacted in 1998 whereby it 
was required that autopsies to be performed for deaths that occurred during an arrest.
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Whether the law was enforced or not in those cases was a different story but, again, this 
is the main problem in Morocco: even the laws that are in place to protect citizens from 
abuse and violation are often disregarded and not enforced, because of a lack of 
accountability at all levels of government, especially at the highest levels, which sets a 
poor example for those in even lower levels of governance. The same year the autopsy 
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law was enacted, the king summoned the members of the CCDH to inform them that they 
had six-months to investigate all of the human rights cases of disappearance, execution, 
torture, etc., so that the file on human rights issues can be closed for ever.  
These changes were followed by what seemed to be a radical shift in Hassan II‟s 
rule as he invited Abderahman El Youssoufi, one of his most famous long-time political 
opponents, a former exile for almost twenty years and the leader of the main opposition 
party, the Socialist Union for Popular Forces (commonly referred to in Morocco as the 
USFP), to lead the country‟s government as its prime minister within what was referred 
to as “the government of change.”44 Storm argues that this was a sign of the King‟s 
willingness to “open up the political system and move the country further towards 
democracy” since his invitation to El Youssoufi to join the government was “a move he 
was by no means forced to make” (97). In fact, 1998 was a year full of hope for 
Morocco‟s future as it appeared that change was indeed happening, especially with the 
nomination of El Youssoufi. This extraordinary development was only matched by what 
seemed to be “reconciliation” between the king and Amnesty International, an 
organization that he had previously discredited because of its public and continuous 
criticism of the human rights situation in Morocco. So in 1998, the organization was 
given the green light, so to speak, to open up a regional office in the Moroccan capital, 
Rabat, which seemed to be an indicator for better days to come. Perhaps King Hassan II 
was about to cash on his 1994 promise “to turn the page definitely on the abuses of the 
past” with Morocco on its way to becoming a democracy where the rule of law was 
supreme. Or perhaps, these developments were a ploy to persuade Moroccan citizens as 
well as international public opinion that Morocco was indeed becoming a democracy 
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since the country was now governed by a socialist prime minister and Amnesty 
International now had an office on its grounds.
45
 In reality, these positive developments 
were contradicted by a resistance on the part of the king to confront the country‟s recent 
past, a past full of accounts of violence and violations as well as the continuation of the 
practices that caused the past to be called the Years of Lead in the first place.  
It was until a few months before his death, in April of 1999, that there was an 
acknowledgment of the veracity of the allegations of abuse against thousands of innocent 
citizens leveled by human rights organizations inside and outside of Morocco.  So as to 
appease those insisting on unveiling the truth about the past, in a press release, the CCDH 
confirmed that its members had established a list of 112 disappeared people, half of 
whom were declared dead and with the rest suffering an unknown fate.  Slyomovics notes 
that “While these figures were absurdly low, the ACHR memorandum confirmed official 
recognition by the state of the fact of forcible disappearance” (Performance 22). These 
figures were the first acknowledgment of Morocco‟s ugly and traumatic past, but they 
were, of course, not accurate and far from the whole truth. This confession did not 
appease victims and their families, but despite this and the frustrations that they caused 
the human rights community and the victims of the Years of Lead, they provided an 
opening that could be furthered. It signaled the beginning of the digging into Morocco‟s 
past. Slyomovics states that:  
The disappointing early 1998 CCDH bulletin that announced a mere 112 
"disappeared" could still serve as a point of departure for a genuine truth 
commission. A Commission of Verification of the Inquiry (Commission 
de la Verification de l'Enquete) was established within the CCDH in 1998. 
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[…]The commission's original inquiry that identified 112 disappeared 
could be redone, and the commission's mandate and powers be expanded. 
In this way, the new king could preserve an image of continuity with the 
initiatives of Hassan II's regime. Mohammed VI has made no public 
criticism of his father -- in fact Moroccan law prohibits negative 
commentary about members of the royal family, present and past (Truth 
8). 
Another important outcome of the CCDH‟s investigation was that the council‟s members 
recommended that a compensation commission be created to repair the harm incurred to 
the victims, a fact that constituted yet another acknowledgment that damage was done 
and something needed to be done to address it. But the decision to follow up on this 
recommendation was left to Hassan II‟s son, the new king of Morocco, Mohammed VI.  
The Monarchy’s Rhetoric of Financial Compensation  
Early in his reign and only a few weeks after his enthroning, Mohammed VI gave 
the CCDH orders for the activation of the Indemnity commission to start looking into the 
eligibility of victims for reparations, meaning financial compensation.  The mandate of 
the commission, which was set up before Hassan II‟s death in 1998, was clear: to 
financially compensate those people who suffered moral or physical harm due to 
disappearance or arbitrary detention. What was not clear was the time limitation imposed 
on its mission: less than six months to address injustices that took place for close to forty 
years (1961-1999). Still, it appeared, as Storm states: “On 16 August 1999, after years of 
campaigning for truth and justice, the efforts of the country‟s human rights campaigners 
and their international supporters eventually bore fruit, as Mohammed VI announced the 
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creation of the Instance d’Arbitrage Independante (Independent Arbitration Commission, 
IAI), a commission charged with addressing the claims and compensation of victims of 
disappearance and arbitrary detention” (102).  It is interesting to note here that in most 
experiences of transitional justice, the first step taken is the establishment of the truth or, 
in other words, constructing a narrative about the past that identifies the victims, the 
violations and those responsible (either directly or indirectly) for the violations.  The 
purpose, typically, is to gain understanding and appreciation of the causes and 
consequences of these events on individuals and society as a whole. It is after these 
important elements of the past have been settled—who did what to whom, why and 
how—that the next course of action is discussed and, compensations restitutions or 
reparations provided, and prosecutions ensue. This process has been the case, for 
instance, in South Africa, which served as a model for Morocco and other countries 
seeking to deal with a past of rampant political abuse.  As explained in chapter two and 
summarized here: 
Human rights violations evoke several national responses: create a 
governmental organ intended to record the truth about past history; declare 
an amnesty, prosecute those responsible, or do both; arrange indemnities 
for the victims and their dependents by means of official rehabilitation and 
material compensation. (Slyomovics 27) 
In Morocco, the process of transitional justice was inaugurated with talk of money and 
financial reparations, contrary to most, if not all, similar cases.  One major problem with 
this first stage of transitional justice was that no victim was asked to testify in a public 
hearing and no perpetrator was asked to give an account of their actions. In fact, 
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Slyomovics argues that during this phase “there were […] no attempts to provide the 
nation with an account of the past, and blanket amnesties were part of the creation of the 
Indemnity Commission” (Performance 25).  In sum, it was an expedient attempt to turn 
the page on the past without giving history and its victims their proper due. 
The new king‟s impulse to buy off the victims of the past was an old trick for the 
monarchy since it was not the first time money was used to deal with the consequences of 
the regime‟s violent actions against its own citizens. For instance, there have been 
various money-based programs to indemnify victims of state abuse throughout the 1990s 
and these programs included cash payments as well as job re-integration, which have 
been referred to at one point as “reclassifying.” But these programs were secretive and 
did not include official recognition of the harm done; worse, the citizens who were 
included in such programs were not allowed to break the vow of silence about their 
experience, lest they would be punished again. Mr. Chari El Hou, who was part of such a 
program, talked about his experience during a public testimony and stated that for him 
silence was “greater than fear,” and in his case, because he was a teacher, his silence was 
a condition of his job application at the Ministry of Education (in Slyomovics, 2009: 100).  
It is interesting that the figures recently published by the CCDH suggest that at least one-
third of the victims of the Years of Lead were educated intellectuals, which is an 
indicator that “the Moroccan regime targeted most ferociously its own intellectuals.” 
(100).  Be that as it may, initial (unofficial and above the law) financial reparations, 
conducted behind closed doors and in absolute secrecy, were considered a favor 
bestowed by the monarch upon his disloyal subjects, not a legitimate due or an attempt at 
serving some kind of justice. As such, they can be seen to be as arbitrary as the violations 
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that those citizens where harmed—the  same trend, same register but, of course, different 
outcome. Conversely, Slyomovics states that these programs “served to wipe out past 
suffering by redefining restitution in extreme and novel forms in Morocco: Past suffering 
never happened” (100).  
In addition to the fact that this indemnity commission worked on the principle that 
money could buy off the years of suffering that people endured, or even attempt to erase 
them, it wanted to do so expediently and rigidly. With a mandate set to expire less than 
six months after it was set up, it was clear that not all victims, not even the majority of 
victims, would have the opportunity to apply for the indemnities and even, more 
important, gain the state‟s recognition that a wrong was committed on their behalf.46  So 
by the end of its mandate, the commission had received about 6,000 applications, a 
number that was far from a reflection of the reality of the Years of Lead. In the end, the 
indemnification commission‟s intended goal was defeated as it clearly did not succeed in 
closing the accounts on the Years of Lead; on the contrary, the immediate and most 
positive consequence of the commission‟s work was that it opened up public discourse 
about the entire process of a nation confronting its past: the genie (of the past) was out of 
the box. Let the conversation begin.  
The humiliation and frustration that many victims and their families felt as a 
result of the expedient attempt of the state indemnity commission to close the books on 
the past led to an attempt to take ownership of the framing of the conversation about the 
past. The Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice (le Forum Marocain pour la Verite et la 
Justice, or, FMVJ) was created soon after the indemnity commission as a response to the 
inadequacy of such an effort to deal with the past and its victims. It was established by a 
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group of former political prisoners and human rights advocates and its mission was to 
join and guide the conversation about the Years of Lead by stressing the importance of 
the truth, justice and accountability for Morocco‟s attempt to come to terms with its past 
as well as establish a foundation for a democratic future, free of the abuses of the past and 
the culture of impunity that accompanied them. For the FMVJ, if the monarchy was 
serious about engaging the consequences of the culture of violence and fear it had created 
and cultivated for almost forty years, its members would be willing interlocutors in the 
conversation.  
Like Jamal Ameziane, a former political prisoner, members of the FMVJ have 
been working to lift “the veil on the dark years without fear of repression in the future” 
(in ICTJ‟s report, 1). Since its inception, made explicit in its name, the mission of the 
FMVJ has been to unveil and communicate the truth (since they consider it to be known, 
not simply made public) about the Years of Lead, serve justice for those victims who are 
still living, and preserve the memory of those who perished like Saida Menebhi, 
Abdellatif Zeroual and Amine Tahani, among many others. This was evidenced in the 
commemorative activities that the FMVJ‟s members organized in collaboration with 
other local human rights groups. One of their most publicized events is “the truth 
caravan,” where citizens were invited to join members of the Forum in visits to infamous 
places such as the secret prisons of Tazmamart and Ka‟laa M‟gouna, and torture centers 
of Derb Moulay Ch‟rif and Dar Mo‟kri. Slyomovics observes that: “Since its formation 
as a non-governmental association, the Forum has publicly insisted that a more extensive 
national process—one that resembles truth and reconciliation commissions elsewhere—is 
essential” (5). While its members agree that reparations (financial and other) are a 
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necessary part of the Moroccan project of confronting the past, they are not sufficient and 
should be only one aspect of it. In addition to reparations, the FMVJ has been asking for 
a comprehensive approach to the past, one that includes “rehabilitation of the victims, 
restitution of remains of „disappeared‟ persons for reburial and monetary benefits to 
victims and relatives with medical care, education and shelter for all those involved” (5). 
They also demand that the State recognizes its responsibility in the suffering that citizens 
endured and offers an official apology to victims. For the FMVJ, the goal of transitional 
justice should be to establish the truth so that responsibilities are assigned and a culture of 
accountability develops. Like other victims‟ groups in Latin America, the FMVJ‟s slogan 
has been “so that it never happens again.”47 The report of the National Commission on 
the Disappeared in Argentina, entitled Nunca Mas (Never Again), has popularized the 
phrase “never again,” which has become a common motto among truth and reconciliation 
commissions worldwide.
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 For the Years of Lead to never be reproduced, the members of 
the Forum believed that it was necessary to delve into their history and learn from it. 
Otherwise, the past would come back to haunt them or their children, like what is 
currently happening in Spain after it seemed that the country had definitely turned the 
page after the end of the Spanish civil war and Franco‟s death. As explained in chapter 
two, one of the victims‟ main concerns after a past of abuse and violations, like Nazi 
Germany, Franco‟s Spain, or South Africa, is to ensure non-repetition for future 
generations.
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 The state‟s focus on financial compensation as the primary idiom for 
dealing with the legacy of the years of lead has been inadequate and insufficient. So, in a 
response to this rhetoric of accounting, victims and their families have advanced a 
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rhetoric of accountability to reveal responsibilities for the past and establish safeguards of 
non-repetition for the future.  
Truth and Accountability 
The rhetoric of transitional justice suggests that practices of responsibility and 
accountability are important to cultivate during a phase of democratization so that they 
can become an integral part of a nation‟s political culture. The rhetorical negotiation of 
the past that Morocco is undergoing is not unlike that of South Africa and similar 
countries with a traumatic past. Like South Africa, the rhetoric and practices of 
transitional justice that are central to this public deliberation about the past are important 
to underscore. The members of Forum for Truth and Justice have shown leadership by 
inaugurating the conversation about the how, why, who and what of the past that should 
be included in the deliberative process.
50
   
In addition to the FMVJ, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights 
(Association Marocaine des Droits de l‟Homme ou AMDH), the most critical and vocal 
human rights organization in Morocco, was a great catalyst for these efforts. Through 
their advocacy work, the state was forced to recognize that they are a force to be 
reckoned with. For the AMDH, as expressed by its former president, Adbelhamid Amin, 
a former political prisoner who spent twenty years in prison because of his political 
opinions, there are five principles that need to be part of the transitional justice in 
Morocco:  
(1) Exposing the truth (the extent of the violations, their conditions and 
consequences) and establishing responsibilities (state, the institution of the 
monarchy, the army, and different police and security forces). 
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(2) Putting an end to impunity by bringing criminal charges against those found 
guilty  
(3) Achieving equity, which includes reparations (financial as well as moral, 
individual and collective) and the preservation of public memory (memorials for 
victims and a public official apology presented to the victims and society as a 
whole). 
(4) Initiating reform (institutional, educational and other) to ensure the “never 
again” as well as the establishing of the rule of the law.  
(5) Ensuring that the conversation about political crimes includes economic 
crimes as well as these two are intimately linked. 
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When these demands fell on the state‟s deaf ear and in an attempt to consolidate 
efforts, the AMDH and the FJV put together a list with the names of those people (state 
officials) deemed responsible for crimes against Moroccan citizens during the Years of 
Lead and sent it to the Minister of Justice and to the Parliament, asking for a judicial 
investigation into the allegations contained in the document. This move led to an 
invitation in 2001, for all interested parties, to participate in a national symposium on the 
violations that occurred during the Years of Lead and the feasibility of a national truth 
commission in Morocco. Finally, in 2003, the CCDH presented the king with a 
recommendation to set up a truth commission that would contribute to the consolidation 
of “the democratic transition,” as well as close the books on the Years of Lead once and 
for all. The Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance pour l’Equite et la 
Reconciliation, or IER) was the fruit born out of this dialogue. A self-described “national 
commission for truth, equity and reconciliation,” although the word “truth” does not 
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appear in either the Arabic nor French title of the commission and unlike previous 
commissions, the mission of this new body was to listen and record the narratives of 
those who were victimized by the State and, then, provide redress for the harm incurred 
by them.   
The late Driss Benzekri, a political prisoner who spent almost twenty years in 
prison (1974-1991) and former president of the FMVJ, was appointed by royal decree as 
the president of the IER.
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 The mandate of this new commission, which covered a forty-
three years period (1956—1999) and about 9000 cases, was to:  
1) establish the truth (through testimonies and interviews with victims and their 
families); 
2) provide recommendations aimed at preserving public memory and guarantee a 
genuine rupture with the abusive practices of the past, erase the scars of the 
violations and restore and reinforce trust in the State and respect of human rights;  
3) foster reconciliation, defined as “the contribution to the culture of dialogue in 
order to consolidate the democratic transition and a state where the law rules, in 
order to promote civic values and a culture of human rights. 
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During its mandate (which lasted less than two years)  the IER organized and held 
a series of public testimonies where victims and/or surviving members of families have 
been invited to speak about their respective ordeals, tell their story of disappearance, 
torture or arrest but with strict instructions not to assign responsibility. Recent 
information suggests that the king had specifically requested from the IER that two 
conditions be respected: one related to the memory of his father, King Hassan II, that he 
is not named as responsible for any of the violations so that his memory is not sullied.
54
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The second condition is intimately connected to the first and relates to the naming of 
perpetrators during the testimonies. Therefore, witnesses were prohibited from invoking 
individual responsibilities or naming of torturers, even if they knew them by name. In its 
constitution, the IER is referred to as a non-judicial body. Pierre Hazan explains that the 
future leaders of the IER, Driss Benzekri, Salah Ed-Ouadie and Driss el Yazami made a 
deal with the king:  
They accepted the price to be paid: the absence of punishment of those 
who had committed human rights abuses. For these human rights activists, 
renouncing justice was easier to accept because „the conditions for an 
impartial process for the perpetrators and those that gave the orders are not 
feasible due to the lack of a proper judicial system,‟ […] They also 
believed that without an alliance with the palace, no way existed to pursue 
democratization (4).  
Given the reality that the Moroccan judicial system is corrupt, trials of perpetrators would 
have been a farce at best. The deal then was to eschew punishment for perpetrators in 
exchange for providing victims with the opportunity to tell their story publicly. In other 
words, at the same time that victims were recognized as such and acknowledged in their 
suffering, those who were responsible for their grief were shielded not only from 
prosecution but, most importantly, from public scrutiny and shame. What a tragic irony 
given the fact that the focus of the IER seems to be very much on the victims and their 
ordeal, as shown in the time allocated to public testimonies and their broadcasting on 
national television.   
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For many Moroccan citizens whose families had been spared during the Years of 
Lead, broadcasted hearings of victims were their first introduction to a story/history that 
had been hidden from them.  During the Years of Lead, fear was the Moroccan regime‟s 
modus operandi so even talking with or about neighbors or friends involved in politics 
could then be interpreted as a crime and become an excuse of arrest, torture or 
kidnapping.  Fear produces silence and political silence produces historical amnesia, so 
entire generations were growing up in total ignorance of the recent history of their 
country or had partial or distorted knowledge of it. So, the public hearings that the IER 
organized in several cities across the country become the occasion for the nation as a 
whole to come face to face with the horrors of its past and be acquainted with its history. 
For those who testified, it was time for recognition and acknowledgment, it was time to 
break the vow of silence. Many of those who testified spoke of the catharsis that resulted 
from testifying. Catharsis here can be interpreted as relief, fulfillment of a duty, feeling 
free to speak about the Years of Lead.”   
M., the widow of a political prisoner who died because of police torture, was a 
political prisoner herself (arrested due to her marital status) and experienced torture and 
other inhumane treatments during her time in prison.
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 M. took part in the hearings 
organized by the IER and when asked to reflect on her experience, she said: “I felt some 
relief after my testimony, due mostly to the fact that I was finally able to verbalize what I 
had repressed for so many years.”56 M. also stated that her decision to participate in the 
public testimonies was motivated by her desire to ensure that “we don‟t forget and to 
inform our young citizens about the history that our textbooks omit.”  The theme of 
memory is echoed by another female former political prisoner, W., who stated that she 
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accepted the IER‟s invitation to participate in the public testimonies it was “a duty of 
memory,” a duty she felt compelled to fulfill.57 W. stated that wanted “to inform the 
public about what was happening during the Years of Lead, and what dissidents have 
endured because of their opinions.”  In addition, her testimony had a gendered goal in the 
sense that “it was an opportunity to denounce practices of torture in secret detention 
centers and show that women too were victims of arbitrary detention and torture in all its 
forms.”58 During her public testimony, W. explained how “women were not respected in 
terms of their privacy and intimate needs, which made our suffering even worse.”  As 
Guessous‟ study details, no one was spared during the Years of Lead, including children 
and women. In a public hearing, Khadija El Malki told her audience that during her 
kidnapping at age fifteen, the police subjected her to practices that she cannot talk about. 
Mrs. Malki‟s crime was that her father was a political dissident in the mid-1960.59  
For many victims, this was an opportunity to be seized to “reclaim the history of 
Morocco, as B., a former political prisoner insisted. For him, “it was more of a catharsis 
[…] and also the opportunity to raise the questions again so that it can be solved.” In 
other words, B.‟s testimony was “once again an opportunity to question the political 
system.” B. echoed a theme discussed by other victims who testified and mentioned 
earlier in that he too was aware that his testimony was part of collective consciousness 
and a tribute to those who disappeared and died. He wanted to “remain faithful and loyal” 
because “to forget about them would be treason.” Mohammed Bouderdara was arrested, 
kept in isolation and tortured for four months before being brought to justice and then 
acquitted of all charges three years later. Prior to his arrest, Mr. Bouderdara had been 
sentenced in absentia for life because of his involvement with a leftist organization 
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known as the “Anis Balafrej and Co” group. For this victim, testifying was about 
“collective memory of the Moroccan wound,” because he adds: “When one person is the 
subject of repression and the sufferings of detention, it is the whole community that 
becomes violated in its dignity and freedom”.60   
Part of the IER‟s mission (or hope) for these testimonies was that victims would 
be able to reconcile as an outcome of their participation in the public hearings. But for B., 
reconciliation “is part of the demagogy.” Genuine reconciliation depends on a number of 
things such as “moving away from a system of arbitrariness to a political system where 
there is a balance, where law prevails, where the disappeared reappear.” It is also 
interesting that B. linked the idea of reconciliation with the preservation of memory as he 
pointed out that: “To reconcile with society is to avoid the falsification of collective 
memory.”  For many victims, reconciliation is intimately connected with genuine 
political change. W., for instance, noted that “reconciliation cannot happen at an 
individual level, through one simple testimony. On the contrary, a genuine reconciliation 
can only be achieved through access to truth. It is only by pointing to the truth that it is 
possible to guarantee that old practices are never reproduced….Access to truth does not 
always imply establishing tribunals for torturers, but at least riding them from positions 
of authority.” W. is pointing here to what is commonly referred to in the transitional 
justice literature as lustration. This practice was popular in many Eastern European 
countries after the fall of the Soviet Union and consists in what Hayner defines as 
removing “from employment based on their affiliation with the prior regime.” (13)  
But lustration has not yet been considered in Morocco. Not only that, none of 
those responsible for disappearances, torture and murders were asked to participate in the 
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public testimonies, which led many victims and/or their families to question the sincerity 
of the IER. Only a select number of victims were invited to participate in the hearings 
and the selection criteria seemed arbitrary. For instance, A., who when he was a student 
member of a Marxist-Leninist movement and accused of threatening state security and 
condemned for ten years in prison without a fair trial, stated that he was never invited to 
participate in the formal testimonies. Although he said that he would have refused to 
participate had they invited him, A. felt excluded from the process and believes he and 
others were excluded “because they are perceived as having a critical position vis-à-vis 
the IER.”61  For him, the IER is another “PR stunt” by the monarchy to legitimize its 
power and stay in charge without making any substantial reforms. For this process to be 
genuine and fair, the state cannot be both party and judge; otherwise it is yet another case 
of “victors‟ justice.” In addition, A. insisted that the process of accounting for the crimes 
of the years of lead has to include all victims and all perpetrators, otherwise it lacks both 
fairness and thoroughness and does not contribute to the culture of human rights and 
democracy that all citizens are so eager to embrace. 
 Conversely, El Boukili, a member of the AMDH, argues that the main problem 
with the IER is that it was solely focused on the victims, not those responsible for the 
suffering of the victims. Thus because its mandate was restricted in terms of its scope, the 
IER was unable to get to the full truth about the years of lead. In fact, “El Boukili 
maintains that this actually hindered reconciliation because many victims of the grave 
abuses committed during this period could simply not forgive nor forget unless those 
responsible for these atrocities were held criminally responsible” (Storm, 104).  The 
exclusion of perpetrators from the process was not accidental. As previously mentioned, 
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it was part of the deal negotiated between the monarchy and those former political 
prisoners who accepted to be part of the IER.  The mandate of the IER did not allow for 
judicial prosecutions or indictment of those accused of torture, disappearance or murder 
of thousands of innocent citizens. Furthermore, the fact that the IER‟s scope was limited 
to victims is evidence that any truths that the State has been seeking through this process 
are bound to be one-sided and partial.  
Authentic reconciliation, as presented in the previous chapter, involves or should 
involve all parties, in a conjoint effort to seek the truth.  There is truth in the stories that 
are told by victims, but truth also requires acknowledgment.  The truth of the stories that 
present atrocity and grief requires recognition from those who committed those atrocities, 
a public validation of victims‟ experiences, not only compensation.   Victims and their 
families are not interested only in forensic truth, revealing physical marks and seeking 
remains of those tortured and disappeared, since it is not retributive justice that most 
victims seek, because they know that retributive justice is unrealistic for several reasons, 
not the least of which is a corrupt and broken judicial system.  Victims and their families, 
those who participate hopefully in the testimonial process and critics who remain on the 
sidelines, voluntarily or forcibly, want first and foremost acknowledgement and 
recognition of wrongdoing.  
In short, the IER‟s hearings were seen as disingenuous and exclusive by many 
victims and human rights advocates, so the Moroccan Association of Human Rights 
(Association Marocaine des Droits Humains , AMDH) and the FMVJ sponsored 
alternative public hearings.  Hazan notes that “a number of former victims, human rights 
activists, Islamists, and most of the victims from the Western Sahara complained that the 
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IER had granted impunity to the torturers and their superiors. They accused the IER of 
distorting transitional mechanisms to protect those responsible for the repressive 
system—if not whitewashing their past then sparing them any punishment”(6). In these 
alternative hearings held in 2005 (February-July), which the government did not allow to 
be televised or broadcast through media outlets (most of which are state owned or 
controlled), victims were allowed to name their torturers and even implicate those who 
still hold high office in the government. These events, held in several cities across the 
country as well as France, were held under the slogan: “Completely Free Testimonies for 
Truth.” Hazan argues that these hearings were “an unprecedented step in the history of 
transitional justice” (6). The naming of perpetrators is primarily symbolic since the 
AMDH does not have judicial power, but unlike the IER hearings, these had credibility as 
naming sought accountability from those responsible for the death and suffering of 
innocent people. Shielding perpetrators of atrocities provides them with impunity, which 
should not be the case in a society that is democratizing. In effect, the FMVJ and the 
AMDH argue that the State is attempting to construct a future that is free from the ghosts 
of the Years of Lead, without accounting for (explaining, understanding, and 
adjudicating) the actions of the past. The truth theses victims‟ groups attained had little if 
anything to do with the forensic but did indeed involve a validation of their experiences 
of suffering.  In this instance, hidden from public view, public naming of perpetrators 
became part of securing and recognizing that truth, but eluded justice. 
Since the alternative hearings were held in both France and Morocco and were 
open to all victims or family members who wished to participate, witnesses included 
dissidents who had sought political asylum abroad, in France mostly. Abdellah Zniber is 
 122 
a victim who preferred political asylum to life prison (sentenced in absentia) for a crime 
he did not commit. During the AMDH sponsored hearings, he identified himself as part 
of the young generation of the 1970s who dreamed of social justice and paid the price for 
the struggle for dignity in the face of a corrupt regime that does not respect even the most 
basic human rights.
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  As Mr. Zniber escaped arrest and the torture, his family was 
harassed for years. His testimony was an homage to his family and all families of victims, 
especially the brave mothers who were never defeated by the inhumane approach of the 
regime despite the physical and psychological toll of police harassment.
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 Mr. Zniber did 
not name anyone in his testimony but intimated that he holds King Hassan II to be 
responsible for the suffering of thousands of citizens, in Morocco and abroad. Many other 
witnesses mentioned Hassan II as responsible for the grief their families suffered during 
the Years of Lead. 
Sion Assidon, was kidnapped from his house in 1972 and sentenced to fifteen 
years two years later for “planning a regime change and threatening national security.” 
Mr. Assidon spent twelve years in prison, during which he was kidnapped from jail 
twice. He stated that he was testifying for “truth and justice” but he also made it clear that 
he did not conceive of himself as a victim.  During his testimony, Mr. Assidon provided 
detailed information about torture and terror methods used on him during what he called 
the “dark journey.” He also talked about his torturers by name and explained that his 
mentioning “of names is not meant to make these people more responsible than they are, 
since it is clear that political responsibility lies much higher. Still, they are certainly not 
innocent of the crimes of torture and kidnapping that they engaged in during that period.” 
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(118) In other words, Mr. Assidon distinguished between guilt or culpability and political 
responsibility.  
It is interesting to note that despite the fact that these parallel hearings focused on 
naming the perpetrators or those that victims knew to be responsible for their ordeal, few 
victims did actually provide names. But many of those who testified in the talked about 
the fact that the state‟s efforts have not been successful in providing either truth, justice, 
or reconciliation. In other words, the IER‟s efforts and the rhetoric of transitional justice 
has not provided closure to their suffering. Many noted this is compounded by the fact 
that the violent practices there were victims of during the Years of Lead are still being 
used against innocent citizens, in total impunity. Some victims link this aspect to 
reparations. For instance, K., who spent twenty year in prison for his political opinion, 
suggested that the reparations program should not be based on monetary compensation, 
which he has refused despite his eligibility.
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 For him, to accept money from the same 
state that victimized him and thousand others without a genuine change in the system 
would signify “defeat,” that his suffering and that of his family can be put in financial 
terms, which he insisted, it cannot. In addition, to accept the money would also suggest 
that he accepts the status quo (no change), which he does not. For K., genuine reparations 
should focus on effecting political and economic change that is conducive to social 
justice and democracy and “I would feel „repaired‟ then,” he stated.  He added that, in 
any case, “reparations can only be symbolic, not monetary.” This is a contested claim, 
however.   Not all victims of the Years of Lead feel the same way about reparations. For 
instance, the majority of those who were eligible for financial compensation accepted it 
because they felt it was their right, that the damage they suffered because of state‟s 
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violence should be monetarily compensated, at least to cover for lost wages.  Others 
would accept no compensation at all, or if they did, it was by pressure or encouragement 
from other family members.   
Partial Truths          
  A recently published report by Amnesty International evaluating the Moroccan 
state‟s effort to deal with the legacy of the human rights abuses of the Years of Lead 
states:   
A major shortcoming of the IER truth-seeking process is its offer of only partial 
truths: truths as seen and lived by the victims and their families, without including 
in its work the narratives and perspectives of the perpetrators and the forces 
behind such human rights violations. This timidity was perhaps out of fear that 
unveiling the whole truth would lead to unacceptable conclusions, from the 
perspective of the Moroccan authorities, about the monarchy and about 
individuals who continue to hold powerful positions of authority thereby, shaking 
the fundaments of the country‟s political structure (5).  
Morocco‟s official efforts towards transitional justice have been hailed as a novelty in the 
Arab and Muslim world because most leaders in this part of the world have not shown 
particular respect or appreciation for human rights and democratization. So, in 
comparison to countries where violent leaders are still in power and repressive practices 
against innocent citizens continue in total impunity, regardless of creed and ethnicity, 
these developments are positive. In addition, the fact that the commission was headed by 
a former political dissident who had spent fifteen years of his life in the country‟s prisons 
has provided it with much needed legitimacy.  While it is true that this commission and 
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previous commissions have provided monetary compensations for some of the victims 
and have recorded the stories of their suffering, they fell short of providing them with a 
sense of justice being done. In fact, to insist on financial reparations as a major 
accomplishment is insulting to victims. In the aftermath of grave human rights violations 
where people have been raped, maimed, disappeared, murdered, to speak of repairing or 
restoring things to the way they were before, is tantamount to obscenity. Reparations in 
this context have a symbolic meaning and need to be understood as such. 
The official rhetoric of transitional justice in Morocco has been focused on 
counting, to the detriment of accountability, which should be the primary focus of any 
genuine attempt at providing redress and justice for those who were victims of State 
violence.  If Morocco is indeed attempting to “transit” into a democratic system, it is 
important that democracy includes discord and division and any attempt to squelch 
dissensus are usually anti-democratic. In addition, to avoid discord and division 
(regardless of the search for truth), the commission‟ choice of victims who participated in 
the public hearings was anything but transparent and democratic. Unlike most TRCs, in 
Morocco, a handful of witnesses were chosen and the selection criteria never made 
public. It was clear that anyone who was deemed a threat to the peaceful proceeding of 
the hearing or anyone who was expected to challenge the established red lines, was not 
invited. This is to say that the first steps of this commission were in essence anti-
democratic. 
The truth and reconciliation process launched and carried out by the State failed 
to promote the democratic values it set up to cultivate in its mandate and, as such, despite 
some positive outcomes of the commission such as the archival material gathered and the 
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public acknowledgment of the victims as such, the work of the IER did not do much to 
advance democracy. One of the pillars of democracy is accountability. As far as freedom 
of expression is concerned Storm notes that “[…] freedom of speech was actively 
discouraged in the country‟s truth commissions as the mentioning of the names of those 
responsible for committing human rights abuses during the public hearings.” (102) The 
connection between freedom of expression and democratization is not lost on Storm 
either as she insists that even if the example cited above is not the most outrageous. How 
can a society that provides impunity to criminals establish norms and practices that are in 
harmony with the rule of the law?  It is simply not possible to claim that a country is 
democratizing while not only tolerating but encouraging criminal behavior on the part of 
those acting in the name of the state by promoting them to higher positions, as is the case 
in Morocco. Thus, it is important to think about the rhetoric and practice of transitional 
justice as a process, an ongoing experiment, one that requires never ending dialogue, 
negotiation and agony about what it is that the nation is seeking to accomplish, what  
citizens imagine as their future.  
The mandate of the IER states that the commission will seek to determine “the 
responsibility of governmental entities, or others, for the violations, and the facts under 
investigation.” The conducted investigations and testimonies led to the collection of a 
huge amount of information and archival material but all of this information is 
incomplete, highly partial in both senses of the term. While one could argue that some 
aspect of forensic (partial) truth has been achieved, this is not the truth that victimized 
citizens have been seeking. The truth they have been seeking is a validation of their 
experience, a recognition of the injustice they suffered. As observers, we only know what 
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happened to whom, not who did what to whom. Responsibilities have not been assigned 
because the perpetrators of the violations have been provided anonymity and truth has not 
really been sought, nor has any kind of justice been achieved as those responsible have 
been provided with immunity and impunity.  The third goal of the commission has been 
reconciliation, but within the framework of the IER, reconciliation is conceived as a 
monological process since Moroccans are expected to “reconcile with themselves” 
(monological) and “their history” (an abstract entity).  
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Chapter Four:   Paul Ricoeur and the Praxis of Justice 
But more important than punishment—and even 
reparation—remains the word of justice that 
establishes responsibilities of each of the 
protagonists and designates the respective places of 
aggressor and victim in a relation of appropriate 
distance. (475).  
   Paul Ricoeur 
Previous chapters have pointed to the metaphor of justice and its salience for 
societies struggling to achieve some type of closure in the aftermath of political violence. 
Like so many other people, Moroccans have been confronting “crimes that can be neither 
punished nor forgiven.”65  When justice in the form of retribution is difficult to achieve, 
what kind of justice can a community hope for to move beyond the grief caused by a 
violent past and envision a hopeful future? What does the praxis of justice entail in 
situations where a procedural form of seeking the just is neither feasible nor desirable?  
In this discussion, the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur provides guidance in terms of our 
understanding of justice within a rhetorical and communication ethics perspective.
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 As 
described in chapter three, the negotiation of the legacy of the Years of Lead that is 
raging in Morocco features citizens demanding accountability for past actions, and a 
State that refuses to take responsibility for murderous actions against its own citizens. 
The recent history of Morocco is a narrative loaded with implications for the praxis of 
justice in the aftermath of violence and suffering on a national scale that are linked to the 
pursuit of the good, the right and the legal in a historical community.  
Ricoeur‟s work spans over half a century and addresses a wide range of 
philosophical questions and concerns. While the phenomenological tradition constitutes 
the basis of his meditations, he was most recognized for his contribution to the 
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hermeneutic turn of phenomenology as well as his continuous “interpretation of the 
„mediations‟ of meaning through symbol, myth, dream, image, text, narrative and 
ideology” (Kearney 13).  Ricoeur‟s inquiries focused on understanding the human 
condition in both its fallibility and its capability. Bernard Dauenhauer sums it up as 
follows:  
This anthropology, which he came to call an anthropology of the “capable 
person,” aims to give an account of the fundamental capabilities and 
vulnerabilities that human beings display in the activities that make up 
their lives. Though the accent is always on the possibility of understanding 
the self, Ricoeur consistently rejects any Cartesianesque claim for an 
absolute transparency of the self to itself that would render self-knowledge 
independent of any kind of knowledge of the world.
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For Ricoeur, the self cannot be an autonomous or transparent self. The self can cogently 
emerge only in communication with the other or others. 
68
 Very much like his colleague 
Emmanuel Levinas, Ricoeur‟s thought involves alterity as a necessary companion to the 
self.  Although he did not agree with Levinas on all accounts, Ricoeur conceived of the 
other in Levinasian terms, or, as Muldoon puts it in his elucidation of Ricoeur‟s work, 
that “our need of the other is so radical that self-esteem is coeval with solicitude for the 
other; that is, solicitude is not merely altruistic, it is necessary.  This means that our very 
realization of our capacity to act, to initiate, to intend, and to project requires the 
mediation of the other” (90).  As an alternative to the Cartesian transcendental arrogant 
ego, Ricoeur presented the metaphor of oneself-as-another, a communicative metaphor 
where the self emerges through others and through signs, symbols, myths and other 
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communicative forms (Kearney 2). Furthermore, this self-as-another‟s identity is best 
reflected in narrative, a narrative that is necessarily enmeshed in other narratives. In other 
words, the “self-as-another” is revealed in praxis; praxis is always situated in the polis 
and developed in relation to concrete others.  
Ricoeur‟s philosophy of justice owes much to his earlier work on time, narrative 
and ethical theory, and thus a brief review of these themes is helpful. In the three volumes 
of Time and Narrative Ricoeur posits a narrative framework as a potential antidote to the 
aporia of time or the false dilemma of thinking about time either in cosmic (universal) or 
lived (phenomenological) terms.  In addition, Ricoeur situates narration at the core of 
both ethical and political philosophies as it opens up understanding of self and other(s) 
and their relationship within the polis in important ways.
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 The following section 
provides an overview of Ricoeur‟s contribution to narrative understanding that serves as 
the ground for his later philosophy of justice.  
Narrative Identity, History and Memory 
The Years of Lead belong to the past but what Moroccans choose to do with the 
legacy of these violent years belongs to their future. And, thus, the narratives of that 
history provide the ground for any discussion about what Moroccans should now do. 
More generally, narratives about the past are important to consider (describe, evaluate 
and remember) because the identities of individuals as well as communities are 
constituted narratively, and the (historical) present we inhabit is constituted within a 
dialectic of experience (ideology, past) and a horizon of expectation (utopia, future).  To 
recognize the relationship between past and future is important, and to keep this dialectic 
alive is paramount for any healthy political community. For instance, the avalanche of 
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memoirs and autobiographies about the Years of Lead are a great contribution to the 
framing of the public memories of those events and a constant reminder that those who 
suffer from tyranny deserve remembrance. These testimonies are both homage to those 
who perished (a way of doing justice to them and the past they inhabited) and a negative 
example for the future, so that generations to come create a future that is free of violence 
and grief. A healthy community should not forget its past and its legacy, nor does it lose 
sight of its future by dwelling on the former; a healthy community finds balance between 
the legacy of its past (whether a bright or a bleak one) and the opportunities that the 
future brings. It is the complex relationship and tension between past, present and future 
times that Ricoeur sought to untangle in the three-volume treatise on time and narrative.  
Narrative theory is helpful in understanding the rhetorical linkages between time, 
identity, and selfhood. Ricoeur inaugurates his three-volume treatise on time and 
narration as follows: “The world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal 
world. Or, as will often be repeated in the course of this study: time becomes human time 
to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is 
meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience” (Time 1, 1). 
This statement suggests a symbiotic relationship between temporal categories and 
narrative where the latter serves as the answer to the aporia of time: “Narrated time is like 
a bridge set over the breach speculation constantly opens between phenomenological 
time and cosmological time” (Time 3, 244). Ricoeur argues that while Augustine did 
“contribute a lasting solution to the problem Aristotle left in abeyance concerning the 
relation between the soul and time,” he failed to refute Aristotle‟s cosmological 
understanding of time, a tradition “according to which time surrounds us, envelops us, 
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and dominates us, without the soul having the power to produce it” (Time 3, 12).  For 
Ricoeur, the Augustinian theory of time is problematical because it attempts to substitute 
a psychological conception of time for a cosmological one. He states that:  
despite the undeniable progress this psychology represents in relation to 
any cosmology of time, the aporia lies precisely in the fact that while this 
psychology can legitimately be added to the cosmology, it is unable to 
replace cosmology, as well as in the further fact that neither concept, 
considered separately, proposes a satisfying solution to their unresolved 
disagreement (Time 3, 12).  
It should be clear that for Augustine, as Calvin Troup argues, “Time does not create us, 
speech does. Time is a discursive construct” (175).70  While “there is no pure 
phenomenology of time” for Augustine, time is certainly an existential construct (Time 1, 
6).
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 Bridging the gap between phenomenological and cosmological (and psychological) 
conceptions of time is a task that Ricoeur takes up in Time and Narrative because time 
provides a window into the meaning of human existence, an opening that Augustine 
clearly pointed the way to. Through the stories that we weave, time becomes human and 
we can then qualify narrative as the “guardian of time.”  For example, the testimonies 
presented in the previous chapter provide us with a glimpse into The Years of Lead. Or, 
in other words, when one listens to victims recounting their ordeals; history is no longer 
an abstraction because one can imagine it or, in some sense, get close to what happened 
through such listening; the past becomes palpably human.  
This humanized time is a “third-time,” a temporal category that overcomes the 
dichotomy that pits one perspective of time against the other.  Ricoeur explains that “[…] 
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time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and 
narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence” 
(Time 1, 52; emphasis in original,). The “humanization” of time is at work in both 
historical and fictional narratives, and therefore, history and fiction must be considered as 
a dialectic because of “the criss-crossing processes of a fictionalization of history and a 
historization of fiction” (Time 3, 246).  The marriage of these two creative temporal 
categories gives birth to the metaphor of “narrative identity,” which emerges within a 
given story, assigned to a person or a people, and necessarily grounded in a particular 
historical context (Time 3, 246). Such an understanding of identity moves beyond the 
philosophical impasse caused by thinking about personal identity either as a static 
phenomenon, or as an ephemeral one. Indeed, Ricoeur explains: 
Without recourse to narration, the problem of personal identity would in 
fact be condemned to an antimony with no solution. Either we must posit a 
subject identical with itself through the diversity of its different states, or, 
following Hume or Nietzsche, we must hold that this identical subject is 
nothing more than a substantialist illusion, whose elimination merely 
brings to light a pure manifold of cognitions, emotions, and volitions. This 
dilemma disappears if we substitute for identity understood in the sense of 
being the same (idem), identity understood in the sense of oneself as self-
same [soi-meme] (ipse) (Time 3, 246).  
This understanding of narrative identity is three-fold: First, the self understands itself via 
interpretation; second, this interpretation is mediated primarily through narrative, among 
other signs, myths and symbols and; third, narration combines history and fiction for the 
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construction of a life story (Oneself 114ff). One‟s identity is the result of a circular 
relationship (a hermeneutic circle) between one‟s history and the narrative of that history. 
But this hermeneutic circle is an open one, it evolves with time and experience, one‟s 
identity is a dynamic phenomenon, continuously shifting and changing with the story.  
A narrative-based framing of identity sheds light on the identity of societies that 
are in transition and helps in understanding national identity, for example, as a continuum 
or, a continual negotiation and renegotiation. In addition, Ricoeur‟s approach to narrative 
hermeneutics contributes an understanding of transitional justice as a rhetorical metaphor 
and practice, an understanding that textures the legalistic and therapeutic framework 
(healing, catharsis, mourning) that are often implicit, if not explicit, in discussions of a 
community‟s negotiation of its past. While it is important to address the psychological 
toll of violence and terror on individual victims, their family and society at large, as well 
as legal/judicial issues related to the state‟s criminal actions and their consequences on 
citizens, it is just as important to consider other aspects of “working through” in relation 
to the narratives these experiences engender and the ethical and political implications of 
these events for the society in which they take place.  Victims‟ narratives constitute a 
legacy with great lessons and often serve as the foreground for the re-thinking and 
remaking of national ethos and identity.  One can only think of the impact of the civil 
rights movement in the United States, the stories of struggle that it showcased and their 
impact on the American ethos. Or, in Morocco, how the public testimonies of those 
tragically impacted by the Years of Lead have forced even the State to change its rhetoric 
in relation to that history. Tragic events shake the moral core of a nation by the sheer 
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agony and suffering endured by victims and (can) re-awaken citizens‟ sense of what it 
means to be human and be part of a community, that is, to be responsible for each other.  
As previously mentioned, the history of the Years of Lead came as a shock for 
many citizens who either did not know (or did not want to know) the sinister details of 
the recent history of their country, or who did not realize the extent of the abuse and 
violence that the state was engaging in against their fellow citizens. The public 
testimonies about the suffering of victims were an ethical reminder for many Moroccans. 
Those stories and testimonies tell as much about the state officials who committed the 
crimes as they do about them as citizens of the same nation, bystanders, fellow human 
beings, who did nothing to prevent such crimes and who thus have a share of 
responsibility in the fate of those victimized in their “presence.” The grief that victims of 
the Years of Lead endured is not to be forgotten, nor easily forgiven. As Ricoeur tells us: 
Horror attaches to events that must never be forgotten. It constitutes the 
ultimate ethical motivation for the history of victims. (I prefer to say the 
history of victims rather that the history of the vanquished, for the 
vanquished are also, in past, candidates for domination who failed.) The 
victims of Auschwitz are, par excellence, the representatives in our 
memory of all history‟s victims. Victimization is the other side of history 
that no cunning of reason can ever justify and that, instead, reveals the 
scandal of every theodicy of history.” (Time 3, 187) 
The history of victims constitutes the impulse for an ethics of memory.  Such an 
ethics should be grounded in the idea of history as homage (a debt) to the victims as well 
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as an admonishing response and an act of judgment towards those who committed 
atrocious acts towards their fellow human beings.  Kemp explains that: 
[. . .] Ricoeur takes this stance [vis-à-vis the history of victims] as an 
expression of debt to the victims of the past. But it is also an expression of 
anger towards the oppressors, so that historiography is not only a 
commemoration of those who were defeated and crushed, but also a revolt 
against present-day oppression which largely lives on the legacy of past 
oppression (“Ethics” 381).  
An ethics of memory is both a celebration of victims and an admonishing of oppressors 
because historical narratives shape the identity of an entire society, a society that includes 
both victims and oppressors. As the people‟s story or the vernacular form of history, 
public memory is both epideictic (commemorates and celebrate the victims) and forensic 
(provides a judgment about those who committed harm) and is never ethically neutral 
because “there is no ethically neutral narrative” (Oneself 115). It should be clear that the 
epideictic genre is at the heart of public memory as this rhetorical genre is particularly 
attentive to the present and how the past should be projected into the now. 
The ethical implications of narrative identity stem from the interconnectedness of 
identity and action: our actions describe who we are. In addition, as one‟s actions always 
involve others, so does one‟s narrative. For instance, Ricoeur points out that “Life stories 
are so intertwined with one another that the narrative anyone tells or hears of his own life 
becomes a segment of those other stories that are the narratives of others‟ lives” (The Just 
7). One cannot not be transformed by the suffering and injustice that others live through. 
The self is revealed through our relationship to others and through narratives. Narrative 
 137 
identity is both idem identity (self-same) and ipse identity; in other words, our identity is 
both ours (unique and stable) and related to that of others (dynamic and collective).  It is 
only with others, in being-in-the-world (in Heideggerian terms) that we become persons, 
and it is through the unfolding of stories (our story enmeshed in others‟ stories) that our 
identities are revealed. Dauenhauer explains how “Ricoeur holds that the self's idem-
identity is that which gives the self, among other things, its spatio-temporal sameness. Its 
ipse-identity gives it its unique ability to initiate something new and imputable to himself 
or herself” (35). The self's idem-identity gives the self its spatio-temporal sameness or its 
temporal stability; the ipse-identity gives the self its ability for change (Oneself 35). The 
self requires both types of identity and thus a comprehensive account of any action 
should consider the way action is revealed to both levels of identity.   
The Implications of Narrative for Ethical Praxis 
Narration is both descriptive and prescriptive. Stories, whether fictional or 
historical, open up readers to a world of possibilities and, as previously stated, each 
possibility is pregnant with ethical implications.  Ricoeur explains:  
This notion of narrative identity is of the greatest importance in inquiry 
into the identity of peoples and nations, for it bears the same dramatic and 
narrative character we all too often confuse with the identity of a 
substance or a structure, at the level of the history of different peoples, as 
at that of individuals, the contingency of turning points in the story 
contributes to the overall significance of the story that is told as well as of 
the protagonists (The Just 4). 
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For Moroccan citizens then, to engage in interpretation of their past is to be attentive to a 
promise made to their predecessors, it is part of self-understanding and self-identification, 
an exercise in the construction of a new narrative identity that is grounded in an 
understanding (description, evaluation, prescription) of the past. To dismiss the past or 
forget it is to be, in a way, a historical orphan, a people without a beginning, a tradition or 
a trace; in brief, it is tantamount to historical homelessness. Thus, the implications of the 
past for identity are significant because: “[n]arrative identity…is not just a psychological 
construct, but a composite of detailed memory and present re-evaluation. Narrative is 
both testament to the diversity of past human accomplishment and the possible basis for 
further self-determination” (Joy xxii).  
The dialectic of the past and the future is most manifest in the importance that we 
give to history or historical work, which Ricoeur defines as the rediscovery of the 
“dialectic of the past and the future and exchanges in the present” (Memory 343). He also 
argues that the “making” of history is taking place in the present for the present (a present 
pregnant with the past) and certainly for the future. History is a narrative about the 
suffering of our predecessors, as both Ricoeur and Arendt argue. In fact, one of Arendt‟s 
critiques of modern history is that it lost touch with its original raison d‟etre, in that it no 
longer concerned itself with the sufferings of human beings (Between 58). Human 
suffering is a necessary result of action: “it is within the dimension of acting (and 
suffering which is a corollary) that thought about history will bring together its 
perspectives within the horizon of the idea of an imperfect mediation” (Time 3: 208).  It 
is important to point out that suffering is not always a physical experience or, perhaps, 
not solely a physical or even psychological pain. In fact: “Suffering is not defined solely 
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by physical pain, nor even by mental pain, but by the reduction, even the destruction, of 
the capacity for acting, of being-able-to-act, experienced as a violation of self-integrity” 
(Oneself 190).  The power or capability to act is constituted through “power-in-
common”—a power vested and shared proportionally, communally and 
communicatively.  
Following Arendt, Ricoeur distinguishes between power and domination because 
violence often results from the conflation of the two, resulting in the suffering and 
incapacitation of citizenry. It is the role of (just) institutions to ensure that the line 
between power and domination is not crossed.  Just institutions are important, then, in 
ensuring that “power-in-common” triumphs over domination, which is possible through 
the valorization of a bond of common mores rather than constraining rules or laws.
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Institutions refer to “the diverse structures of wanting to live together, which, to this end, 
secure duration, cohesion, and distinction” (Oneself 227). One‟s share of power is 
eviscerated in instances of suffering, and one‟s ability to make public that which has 
forestalled the capacity to act is diminished or destroyed (192). Suffering is a state of 
incapacitation, when one‟s capacity for action is diminished, violated or destroyed. It is to 
be held hostage by another‟s domination and denied the capacity to act and be 
responsible for one‟s actions (190). This is perhaps why Ricoeur insists on the urgency of 
a history of victims. That is why it is important to be attentive to the history of those who 
survived atrocity, like those who took part in public testimonies in Morocco or in the 
South African truth commissions and who shared their stories and the stories of friends or 
family members, in an act of courage, as an ethical call, a moral imperative.  
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Ricoeur‟s own life was one lived in close confrontation with evil, violence and 
grief. Even his personal family life and his intellectual life were not spared from pain and 
suffering.
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  But Ricoeur‟s life, however traumatic or grief-ridden as it certainly was, did 
not turn him into an intellectual cynic nor a cynical intellectual. In fact, unlike many of 
his contemporaries, Ricoeur‟s ethical theory never falls into moral relativism or plain 
cynicism, nor does it provide easy fixes for the complex and brutal world we live in.  As 
many have pointed out, there is no doubt that we live in a time of total debacle and 
confusion in terms of ethics, and those who have the gumption to tackle the murkiness of 
these times are few.
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 Ricoeur was one of the latter. Dallmayr states: “Although 
frequently sidelined by changing „fashion trends‟ in his native France, Ricoeur over the 
decades has proven himself to be one of the most perceptive analysts of contemporary 
social-political dilemmas as well as one of the most sober and clear-minded voices in the 
complex (and often over-heated) controversies of our time.”75 Indeed, much to his credit, 
Ricoeur has confronted the contemporary ethical “malaise” head-on and never hurried to 
provide quick and easy answers for morally challenging questions. The major 
contribution of Ricoeur‟s ethical theory comes from his grounding of ethical action in the 
public sphere and his implication of persons as well as institutions in the ethical practice.  
In addition, he somehow managed to  successfully navigate through many controversies 
in contemporary moral theory by weaving together different moral traditions from 
Aristotle to Levinas. For James Marsh, Ricoeur can be credited with solving the dilemma 
between the right and the good, or providing a solution to “the communicative ethics 
controversy” and “putting this humpty dumpty together again.” 76  
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Ricoeur planted the seed for his treatise on ethics in the conclusion of Time and 
Narrative Volume 3 with the metaphor of narrative identity.  In Oneself as Another, 
Ricoeur digs deeper into selfhood through an investigation of what it means to be a 
capable, responsible and imputable agent by bringing a variety of schools of thought into 
conversation. . Based on Ricoeur‟s 1986 Clifford Lectures at the University of 
Edinburgh, these investigations seek understanding of the different expressions of action 
and selfhood. They are divided into four subsets: the first is rooted in a philosophy of 
language (both semantics and pragmatics), the second in a philosophy of action and the 
last two subsets draw on the implications of these philosophies for ethical and moral 
understanding of praxis-driven selfhood.
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 These subsets or studies are linked by virtue of 
the connection between speech acts and action.
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 Ricoeur explains that “it is in speech 
acts that the agent of action designates himself or herself as the one who is acting. In 
another sense, the second subset annexes the first, inasmuch as speech acts are 
themselves action and, by implication, speakers are themselves actors.” 79 The 
implications of these two approaches are brought full swing in the third subset of the 
book with the discussion of narrative identity. Here, the Aristotelian notion of praxis 
provides much needed content to the concept of action, with the agent being both actor 
and acted-upon.  The ethical dimensions of action are fully explored in the fourth subset 
where “the autonomy of the self will appear then to be tightly bound up with solicitude 
for one‟s neighbor and with justice for each individual.”80  This constitutes the heart of 
Ricoeur‟s argument on ethics.  
Ricoeur‟s main theses in Oneself as Another are: “(1) the primacy of ethics over 
morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm, and 
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(3) the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to 
impasses in practice—impasses recalling at this new stage of our mediation the various 
aporetic situations which our reflection on selfhood has had to face.”81  Ricoeur insists on 
the primacy of ethics, defined as “the aim of an accomplished life,” over morality, 
defined as “the articulation of this aim in norms characterized at once by the claim to 
universality and by an effect of constraint.”82 But he does not sacrifice morality 
altogether and, in fact, subsumes it in ethics.
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 The ethical aim should guide our actions 
as prescribed in Aristotelian ethical theory, norms are important in that they regulate our 
life together as members of the same human community, as Kant professed in his treatise 
on ethics.  But when the two aims or claims clash (the teleological/ethical and the 
deontological/normative), the answer is to be found in the former through phronesis. The 
actualization of ethical practice must take into account particular historical, political, 
social and individual contexts, and the practical wisdom necessary for this actualization 
should be integral to institutional development of persons, purposes, programs.   
Conversely, practical wisdom goes hand in hand with reflection on “the good life 
with and for others in just institutions” and is cultivated through self-esteem on one hand, 
and taking oneself as another, or others. Ethics relate to the good life as a life that is lived 
with and for others, in just institutions (172). Note here the three aspects of the good life; 
it is at once individual, interpersonal and societal.  Ricoeur is clear that the good he is 
referring to is Aristotelian in origin: “In Aristotelian ethics, it can only be a question of 
the good of us. This relativity with respect to us does not prevent the fact that the good is 
not contained in any particular thing. The good is rather that which is lacking in all 
things. This ethics in its entirety presupposes this nonsaturable use of the predicate 
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„good‟” (Ibid).  The good is not predetermined but revealed in praxis, as Aristotle states 
in the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics, that “[e]very craft and every investigation, 
and likewise every action and decision, seems to aim at some good” (1.1. 1094a).  It is 
useful to note that Ricoeur sees a paradox in Aristotle‟s treatment of praxis when he 
(Aristotle) posits it as at once being its own end and aiming at a higher good. This 
paradox “forces us to admit that the ends-means model does not cover the entire field of 
action but only that of tekhne…What is worse, the means-end model seems to lead us 
along the wrong path, inasmuch as it invites us to construct all the relations between 
subordinate ends and an ultimate end on the basis of a relation which seems essentially 
instrumental” (Oneself 174). This paradox is mitigated by resorting to deliberation (about 
means, not ends) and practical wisdom, as “deliberation is the path followed by 
phronesis, practical wisdom (translated in Latin as prudencia), and, more precisely, the 
path that the man of phronesis—the phronimos—follows to guide his life” (Ibid).  
Following MacIntyre, Ricoeur points to the idea of “internal good [that] constitutes the 
teleology immanent to action, as is expressed on the phenomenological plane by the 
notions of interest and satisfaction, which must not be confused with those of pleasure” 
(176-177).
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  This means that one cannot separate the end result of an action and the 
means to get there, the means and the end are one and the same. 
What is at stake for ethics is the good life, which is “for each of us, the nebulus of 
ideals and dreams of achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or less 
fulfilled or unfulfilled” (Oneself 179).  This good life is that towards which one‟s actions 
are aimed, actions that have internal ends, as previously suggested. But, “[t]his finality 
within finality, however, does not destroy the self-sufficiency of practices as long as their 
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end has been posited and continues to be so” (Ibid).  Still, uncertainty or doubt about 
one‟s life plan creates a productive opening or tension within praxis, which prompts one 
to think about “the idea of a higher finality which would never cease to be internal to 
human action” (Ibid).  This higher finality is the individual task of attestation, which can 
be grasped as “the certainty of being the author of one‟s own discourse and of one‟s own 
acts becomes the conviction of judging well and acting well in a momentary and 
provisional approximation of living well” (180).  
Morality, on the other hand, has two functions: “that of designing, on the one 
hand, the region of norms, in other words, of principles about what is permitted and what 
is prohibited, and on the other hand, the feeling of obligation associated with the 
subjective aspect of the relation of a subject to such norms” (Reflections 45).  Norms are 
self-referential in that morality requires (or at least assumes) that “the obliged subject” is 
able to impute his or her actions to himself or herself. Morality, as Kant expressed in his 
categorical imperative, is about the universal while ethics is about particular cases where 
the universal does not hold or fails. In addition, as Ricoeur so eloquently states, “moral 
obligation ensures the transition between a fundamental ethic and regional ethics” 
(Reflections 4). It is important to note here that in his later work on justice, Ricoeur 
provides a corrective to his claim about the primacy of ethics over morality. He readily 
confesses that “One result of this categorization modeled on the history of doctrines was 
the impression of a juxtaposition and of a weakly arbitrated conflict of positions” 
(Reflections 2). He later clarifies this argument by stating that this is not meant to 
privilege teleology over morality but to emphasize the connection between the two. He 
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insists that one approach cannot survive without this other and that morality is necessarily 
included in teleology and vice versa.
85
  He provides the following explanation: 
It seems to me, on the one hand, that the rootedness of moral experience in 
desire, which with Aristotle we can speak of as reasonable or rational, 
does not exhaust itself in the test of a claim to the universal validity of the 
maxims of our action. …On the other hand, on the downstream side of 
morality, I see ethics as being distributed into different domains of 
application, such as medical ethics, judicial ethics, business ethics, and, 
today, environmental ethics.  Everything suggests that the basis of rational 
desire, which makes us aspire to happiness and seek to stabilize ourselves 
in terms of a project of a good life, can only reveal, expose, and unfold 
itself by passing successively through the filter of moral judgment and the 
test of practical application in determinate fields of action. From a basic 
ethic to ethics passing through moral obligation—this seems to me to be 
the new formula of what I called my “little ethics” in Oneself as Another.” 
(Reflections 3)  
This understanding of ethics and morality has great implications for the praxis of justice 
in Morocco in the aftermath of the Years of Lead. The search for the just must 
incorporate ethical and normative dimensions, as the following section explains.  
Seeking “the Just”  
The just is at the heart of both ethical and moral experiences, as Ricoeur puts it:  
The just is at work in each of the way stations of ethical and moral inquiry. 
Better: it designates their circularity. Moral experience, defined by the 
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conjunction of the self and the rule, under the sign of obligation, refers to 
what is just as soon as others find themselves implied in the formulation of 
the rule, others to whom harm, a tort, can be done and therefore who can 
be treated unjustly ( Reflections: 3).  
Ricoeur insisted again in Reflections on the Just that living well or living this good life is 
impossible without others who are both capable of and willing to embark on a similar 
path toward realization of this “good” in just institutions. Thus, the teleological (the 
good) and the deontological (obligatory) demands of justice must be both necessary 
(although not always sufficient) for achieving the just.  Ricoeur sums it up: 
On the teleological plane of the wish to live well, the just is that aspect of 
the good relative to something other. On the deontological plane of 
obligation, the just is identified with the legal. It remains to give a name to 
the just on the plane of practical reason, the one where judgment occurs in 
a situation. I propose that the just then is no longer either the good or the 
legal, but the equitable. The equitable is the figure that clothes the idea of 
the just in institutions of incertitude and of conflict, or, to put it a better 
way, in the ordinary—or extraordinary—realm of the tragic dimension of 
action (The Just xxiv). 
 Ricoeur distinguishes between the idea of justice as a moral law and justice as an 
institution. But above all, justice is a virtue, the most complete of virtues because it is 
about others, a virtue (or a good) that others benefit from.
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  Although justice is similar to 
the virtue of friendship, it concerns the distant other more than the neighbor or the friend. 
Justice is a public virtue, hence the necessity of distance.  Concern for justice arises most 
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acutely in violent situations or in situations that result from tragic action, situations that 
are characterized by conflict, uncertainty and urgency and require practical wisdom 
(Reflections on the Just 8). Ricoeur insists that a philosophy of law, as opposed to 
political philosophy, is mostly concerned with establishing peace. The penultimate goal 
of justice as an institution is to overcome violence, the violence that results from “the 
irrepressible presence of evil in history” and leads to unjust consequences and suffering 
for innocent victims. He states:  
If, in fact, conflict, and therefore, in some sense, violence, remains the 
occasion for judicial intervention, this can be defined by the set of means 
by which the conflict is raised to the rank of a trial process, this latter 
being in turn centered on a debate in words, whose initial incertitude is 
finally decided by a speech act that says what the law is and how it 
applies. Therefore there exists a place within society—however violent 
society may remain owing to its origins or to custom—where words do 
win over violence (The Just ix)  
Justice is the attempt to reduce or eliminate violence from society and replace it with 
words and arguments. A just society is indeed one characterized by reasonable argument. 
When injustice is the norm rather than the exception in a society, distance between 
aggressor and aggressed needs to be established as the first step towards the re-
establishment of the good life and solicitude within the community. The role of justice is 
first and foremost the establishment of distance between aggressors and victims; it is not 
revenge nor necessarily punishment or reparation but a public imputation of actions and 
responsibilities for the consequences of criminal acts. Pellauer states: “From another 
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angle, however, the idea of the just runs through all the three stages of this ethics, from its 
teleological aim through the level of norms to that of practical wisdom and back again. 
For both these readings, the idea of the just as characterizing the idea of a just distance is 
central” (136).  
The failure to establish distance between the perpetrator and victim, as noted 
earlier, contributes to further violence and suffering as this is tantamount to condoning 
violence and failing to recognize victims‟ grief and empathize with them. Vengeance is 
the other end of the spectrum, as it adds grief and violence to the original act. In addition, 
vengeance can be an obstacle to achieving a just distance between the one who 
committed the injustice and the one who suffered it and, in fact, it reduces distance 
between oppressor and victim instead of establish it, which should be the goal of justice. 
Ricoeur explains:  
The great conquest, in this respect, consists in separating vengeance and 
justice. For the short-circuit of vengeance, justice substitutes creating a 
distance between protagonists, where establishing a difference between 
the crime and the punishment is the symbol of penal law. …Just distance, 
the mediation of a third party, and impartiality present themselves as the 
great synonyms of a sense of justice (The Just xi). 
The necessity of a third party emerges because justice does not belong to the 
realm of interpersonal or private relationships, as noted earlier, but to the public realm 
where third-party mediation through institutions is needed. This explains why critics of 
the Moroccan Instance for Equity and Reconciliation (IER) have pointed out that the State 
(in the person of the king) as both party and judge makes the entire enterprise lack 
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sincerity and legitimacy because it is impossible to be both party and impartial judge to a 
conflict (or an accusation of unjust and criminal action). Their critique suggests that 
judgment necessitates impartiality and distance. While friendship belongs to the realm of 
interpersonal dialogical relationship, justice should be conceived within a triad where a 
third is invited to mediate between the two parties in conflict. The philosophical 
understanding of justice has to be considered within two axes—a horizontal axis, which 
refers to the dialogical constitution of the self in relation to narrative identity (idem and 
ipse identity), and the vertical axis, which refers to the morality of human actions.  
The first axis reveals the interpersonal nature of our world, one that includes not 
only our friend or parent, but all human beings to the extent that justice is not limited to 
those we love or have an intimate relationship with; justice concerns all. This second axis 
of justice refers to responsibility, which Ricoeur explains in terms of imputation (or 
imputability) and capacity, the ability to assign an action to its author (The Just xvi).  
Imputability is “our ability to recognize ourselves as accountable (comptable, from the 
latin root putare) for our acts in the sense of being their actual author.  I can hold myself 
accountable, imputable, in the same way that I can speak, can act on the course of things, 
can recount my action through an emplotting of events and characters” (Reflections 2). 
Capacity and imputation are intimately connected in that imputability is the building 
block (or lynchpin as Ricoeurs puts it) of all capacities and “essential to the assignment 
of rights and duties” (The Just 3). A capable person is a person who is “a subject of 
imputation [that] results from the reflexive application to agents of predicates like „good‟ 
or „obligatory‟” (The Just 4). Muldoon points out:  
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This brings us back to Ricoeur‟s claim that the ethical aim must pass 
through the sieve of the norm—that there is a place for duty and 
obligations. It is the place where ethics must give way to morality since 
the aim of the good life invariably runs up against violence in all its forms. 
Where self-esteem and esteem for others belong to the ethical aim, respect 
for self and others belong to the level of morality (90).
87
  
Justice cannot be fulfilled within a dialogic relationship because the interpersonal 
I-Thou relationship is inadequate in ensuring justice amongst strangers.  The fulfillment 
of justice necessitates the presence of a third, a mediating party.  In fact, “however 
wonderful the virtue of friendship may be, it is not capable of fulfilling the task of justice, 
not even of engendering it a distinct virtue” (The Just xiii). Friendship requires closeness 
and intimacy while justice requires a distancing because “the virtue of justice is based on 
a relation of distance from the other, just as originary as the relation of proximity to the 
other person offered through his face and voice. This relation to the other is, if I may so 
put it, immediately mediated by the institution. The other for friendship is the „you‟; the 
other for justice is „anyone,‟ as is indicated by the Latin adage suum cuique tribuere (to 
each his own)” (The Just xiii).  Justice (or equity) necessitates institutions to ensure the 
good life of all citizens. The necessity for the mediation of institutions is born out of the 
truth that friendship and love alone cannot secure justice for all, those one knows and 
loves and those one does not. Therefore, as citizens wishing to live the good life (with 
and for others), it is important to ensure that institutions carry on their mission of being 
just institutions for ourselves and for others (See Muldoon 91; The Just 7). In addition, 
Pellauer explains that: “If we connect the idea of the just that arises here closely to the 
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idea of justice, this leads to placing the emphasis on those cases where many others are 
involved, for Ricoeur agrees with Rawls that justice is a virtue of social institutions and 
relations, not something that applies to isolated individuals” (RGFP 136).  However, 
Ricoeur is well aware of the limitations of Rawls‟ theory of justice and considers it 
insufficient in securing justice because of its procedural approach.  
Ricoeur‟s understanding of justice is content-driven but he also recognizes the 
necessity of institutionalizing the virtue of justice as communicative action in the polis 
because the fulfillment of justice requires a framework that is different than that of 
interpersonal relationships. The role of justice in the polis is primarily rhetorical; justice 
is about forensic (or judicial) rhetoric, as noted in chapter two.  Judicial rhetoric is about 
judgment and establishing guilt or innocence for past actions. The primary role of courts 
(the institution in charge of serving justice) is to pronounce a judgment, a sentence, a 
sanctioning of a violent action that destroys social harmony and causes suffering.  
Ricoeur explains the relationship between judgment and rhetoric in the following terms: 
With the judicial sense, judgment in effect intervenes in social practice, at 
the level of that exchange of discourse Jurgen Habermas links to 
communicative activity, thanks to the central phenomenon of this social 
practice constituted by the trial in a law court. It is within the framework 
of the trial that the act of judging recapitulates all the ordinary senses: 
opine, assess, take as true or false, and finally, take a stand (The Just 128). 
Recall from previous chapters that the argument in favor of retributive justice is that 
trials can provide closure to victims by taking a stand. Judgment restores peace through 
rhetorical means by giving to each his or her own back, if at all possible. Ricoeur states:  
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A given society distributes goods of all kinds, those that can be exchanged 
and those that cannot. Taken in a broad sense, the act of judging consists 
in separating sphere of activity, in delimiting the claims of the one from 
those of the other, and finally in correcting unjust distributions, when the 
activity of one party encroaches on the field of exercise of other parties. In 
this respect, this act of judging certainly consists in separating. (The Just 
130). 
The judge is not necessarily the one who punishes, he or she can also be the one who 
reconciles (66). Judgment can be “the occasion to underscore the therapeutic and 
pedagogical role of civis dissensus raised by controversies animating the public space of 
discussion at the points of interference of history in the arena of collective memory” 
(Ricoeur 2004, 295).   Still, if justice is about restoring civic harmony and exchange 
among citizens, the third is a necessary figure in this exchange.  
The Limits of Justice for Victims of the Years of Lead 
In the Moroccan experience, the process of transitional justice has lacked 
coherence because none of the goals of transitional justice have been achieved: truth has 
not been unveiled, equitability has not been achieved, people have been paid but there are 
no other symbolic or social goods delivered.  The practice of reconciliation is hollow and 
devoid of any meaning in such a context.  No justice as traditionally or symbolically 
conceived has been served.  For many victims, such as those represented by the AMDH 
and the FJV, the State‟s stated goals, approach, and recommendations confuse the moral 
idea of the pursuit of truth and justice with the more practical issue of financial 
reparation.  To add insult to injury, in the case of the IER, victims were given two or 
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three months to apply for reparations claims from the state and if they did not do so 
within that window of opportunity, they did not qualify.  This constraint was criticized 
both locally and internationally, but never reversed.  Further, the state (in the person of 
the King) never officially apologized for its decades of repression and violence against its 
people.  No one in Hassan II‟s regime has ever stepped forward or taken responsibility 
for his murderous acts, let alone asked for forgiveness.  As detailed in the preceding 
pages, the equity and reconciliation process in Morocco (thus far) has produced a truth 
commission for victims to relate their ordeal, with clear instructions not to name any 
perpetrators.  Several Moroccan victims I spoke with have suggested that, for them, 
reconciliation as presented by the State‟s commission is meaningless because no one has 
even acknowledged wrongdoing, which is why many victims and observers question the 
authenticity of the entire process of transitional justice.   
Justice cannot take place in any public sense if the two parties (the victim and the 
accused) are left to manage the conflict, as is happening in Morocco where the State, as 
previously noted, is at once the accused and the party trying to mediate the consequences 
of its horrific actions. Justice for the victims has been reduced to monetary allowances 
while no genuine attempt in securing an avowal of guilt or responsibility for the 
thousands of crimes committed for over forty years has emerged. For the victims, justice 
cannot be handed down by the same party that victimized them; thus they continue to 
conceive of themselves as victims who have no recourse because there is no mediating 
party to listen and adjudicate between them and those who harmed them. Seeing their 
perpetrators still in office, or worse, promoted to higher position is an additional injustice 
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that further exacerbates their suffering and their position of powerlessness and 
incapacitation vis-à-vis the guilty party, the state.  
The rhetoric of transitional justice, as previously noted, also typically pays lip 
service to democratization as an end.  With respect to Morocco, Abdeslam Maghraoui 
wrote in 2003, after the first set of monetary reparations had been made and several years 
before the work of IER, that the country “is no closer today to a decisive democratic 
breakthrough than it was four decades ago” (73).  That statement is arguably true now, 
several years after the work of the IER and a variety of compensatory programs.  So what 
actually constitutes a transition to democracy?  Waltz states that transitions “are more 
than just an old contest with new actors. To a significant degree, they engage energies in 
an effort to create a new political game” (8).  The institutionalization of human rights 
values and civil liberties are part of that political game. So is the establishing and 
nurturing of a vibrant civil society, free and fair elections, and a representative legislature 
that functions independently of coercion from the executive (or judiciary for that matter).  
Democracy presupposes an ethics of recognition whereby justice becomes a public virtue.  
The last chapter provides a workable philosophical framework to engage the rhetoric and 
practice of transitional justice in the aftermath of atrocity at a national level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 155 
Chapter Five: Toward a Rhetoric of Symbolic Justice 
 
I hold that every expectation must be a hope for 
humanity as a whole, that humanity is not one 
species except insofar as it has one history, and, 
reciprocally, that for there to be such a history, 
humanity as a whole must be its subject as a 
collective singular. 
         Paul Ricoeur88 
As I previously mentioned, the Moroccan experience of the Years of Lead and 
engagement in transitional justice is part of my own narrative.  While many members of 
my family were violated by the Hassan II regime during the Years of Lead, the absence 
of my father due to his political imprisonment during the first ten years of my life was 
probably the experience that most impacted me. This inquiry emerged initially from my 
own struggle to come to terms with this experience, which also includes the death of my 
aunt who was a political prisoner at age 25, my uncle‟s disappearance and exile for 
almost 20 years, and my mother‟s struggle with the absence of her husband, 
disappearance of her brother, and loss of her sister.  Although this dissertation is not 
about my family‟s experiences per se, my story is necessarily part of it. What I hope is 
clear is that these experiences are not unique to my family nor to Moroccan citizens, but 
are part of the history of many past and future communities..  
In this concluding chapter, I address the limits of approaching the problem of 
transitional justice in the aftermath of state crimes from either a strictly retributive or an 
exclusively restorative perspective. In such cases, transitional justice should include both 
ethical (teleological) and normative (deontological) perspectives while ultimately relying 
on practical wisdom (phronesis) as the measure of ethical praxis in singular situations.  In 
the case of Morocco, I argue for the rhetoric of symbolic justice, a perspective  that 
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privileges the public dimension of justice, and focuses on victims‟ narratives of suffering 
as the motivation for justice.  Before I discuss symbolic justice in more detail, however, I 
wish to return briefly to the dialectic of the retributive and restorative. 
This inquiry began with a focus on the rhetoric of reconciliation, as it initially 
seemed that the praxis of reconciliation was at the core of  discourses and practices of 
transitional justice. But it is clear that the praxis of justice lies at the heart of discourses 
of transitional justice.  Justice is about actualization of the good life with others in just 
institutions, as Ricoeur insists.  In the aftermath of atrocity, the search for  justice is 
situated in given historical, political, social and individual contexts, and thus requires 
practical wisdom.
89
  The discussion of the different types of justice that are available to 
countries in transition offered in chapter two suggests that there are  different approaches 
to seeking justice, even in tragically complex circumstances that societies face after the 
collapse of a regime of terror. In general, justice pertains to issues of establishing 
responsibility, guilt and appropriate punishment for the perpetrators, and reparation or 
compensation for victims. Justice‟s mission is typically to correct injustices that victims 
incurred and, if possible, contribute to deterrence of future similar instances. In the case 
of mass atrocities, as the aftermath of the Holocaust, Apartheid and Years of Lead reveal, 
these are not easy tasks to embark upon, or questions to address, especially when the 
state‟s bureaucracies are involved and crime has been institutionalized as part of the 
state‟s policy towards its citizens. In these cases, distinguishing between guilt and 
responsibility can become a tedious and morally challenging endeavor. But despite the 
difficulties and challenges associated with these questions, issues of responsibility and 
accountability need to be addressed. Avoiding this is tantamount to condoning criminal 
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acts against innocent victims, providing impunity for those responsible, and encouraging  
similar actions in the future.   
Ricoeur argues that both retributive and restorative justice can be inadequate in 
achieving the just because each of these perspectives runs the risk of reproducing the 
original injustice. Retributive justice focuses excessively on the guilty party and is not 
only coercive and violent but can sometimes lose sight of the victim.  Conversely, 
restorative justice focuses excessively on the other party, the victim.  Ricoeur goes 
further to suggest that the restorative model can succumb to the appeal of victimization, 
and thus contribute to a culture of victimage, one that consists in the triumph of victims‟ 
logic over retributive logic (Justice 65; my translation). The goal then is to find some 
equitability through these different approaches to provide just due to victims, 
perpetrators, and their community. There is perhaps another way of thinking about the 
possibility for equitable treatment while incorporating all three goals of justice for 
victims, the accused and the community—that is, through what Ricoeur conceives as “a 
reduction, if not a complete elimination, of the punishing nature of the punishment” 
(Justice 57; my translation). This approach is the heart of symbolic justice and provides a 
minimal approximation of justice for survivors of tyrannical regimes, given that the state 
(especially one with blood on its hands) will likely not provide any other form of justice.   
Symbolic justice is public, content-driven, teleological and  contingent on the 
ground upon which it is taking place. While focused on restoring past‟s victims within 
society, its penultimate goal should be to guide reforms through various forms of public 
discourse in civil society.  Symbolic justice requires, first and foremost, recognition of 
victims, listening to them and acknowledging their suffering.  Second, symbolic justice 
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requires imputability and accountability. Recognition of victims is impossible without 
imputability of crimes.  Symbolic justice thus involves recognizing the victims as well as 
the authors of criminal action in order to rebuild a responsible and ethical community. 
Third, it is important to that victims regain their capacity or capability as citizens through 
reparation and other such means. All of this contributes to restoring solicitude within the 
community through dialogical practices of apology, forgiveness and reconciliation.  The 
following section elaborates on the three coordinates of symbolic justice.. 
Coordinates of Symbolic Justice 
Recognition and capacity.   Most experiences of transitional justice in recent 
history have focused on truth commissions as a public forum where victims can share and 
make public their narratives of suffering. The purpose for this public inquiry is the 
discovery of truth as well as recognition of victims as human beings worthy of a voice 
and some measure of justice. As discussed in chapter two, there is disagreement among 
scholars on what constitutes the best means to ascertain the truth about the past in cases 
of mass atrocities where the state is a major actor. Some, like Osiel and Mendez whose 
work focuses on Latin America, insist that public trials are the most appropriate mode of 
obtaining truth; because trials involve public indictment of perpetrators and recognition 
of victims as persons worthy of legal justice. Trials can be the occasion for public 
shaming of perpetrators, and provide  society with an opportunity to stand against 
criminality.  In societies that are in the midst of political shuffling with embryonic 
political institutions, retributive justice is for all intents and purposes impossible if it is 
justice that is really sought. In Morocco, for instance, the judicial system is corrupt and 
lacks credibility, so victims of the Years of Lead could not possibly trust its judges to 
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serve justice for them.  Even when institutionally feasible, trials can sometimes end up 
more like show trials than an actual meeting of justice. For example, in the case of 
Holocaust, Arendt has pointed out in Eichmann in Jerusalem that Eichmann‟s trial was 
more of a show to legitimize the newly established state of Israel and Prime Minister 
Ben-Gurion than it was to achieve justice. Others, like legal scholar Martha Minow, who 
advocate a restorative approach tend to dismiss retribution as overly procedural and 
vindictive, and oftentimes difficult for achieving justice without confronting ethical 
dilemmas having to do with differentiating between guilt and responsibility, for instance. 
Minow  favors instead inclusive and dialogical means of addressing mass political crime 
such as forgiveness and reconciliation. But one can only imagine the difficulties 
associated with expectations or demands that victims engage in dialogical encounters 
with those who murdered, raped or maimed their loved ones, especially when there is 
doubt about the authenticity of the perpetrator‟s motives; so this approach can have 
limitations in terms of its practical implications as well.  What is common to both 
approaches, however, is the fact that victims should be center stage in these experiences 
and their narratives recognized as constituting a valid rendering of the truth about the 
past.
90
 This explains why truth commissions have become the platform of choice for 
experiences of transitional justice. 
 Truth commissions constitute the opportunity par excellence for a nation to listen 
to its victims‟ narratives. Recall that Ricoeur‟s understanding of narrative reveals that 
one‟s identity is grounded in one‟s narrative. Victims‟ identities are intimately enmeshed 
with their stories and thus, when victims are provided with the opportunity to recount 
their narratives of suffering, their identities as victims and as citizens are necessarily 
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transformed, and consequently, their societies are transformed as well.. Beyond the 
cathartic aspect of the experience of testifying that many victims report, these previously 
silenced citizens experience recognition as an attestation of their status as persons worthy 
of respect and integrity.  Recognition of victims is an attestation of trust in their narrative 
and an engagement with their experience of suffering. This has great implications for the 
metaphor of capacity introduced in chapter four.  
Capacity adds a dimension of value as it relates to “being-able-to-do, to which 
corresponds on the ethical plane, being-able-to-judge;” despite it being an individual 
value, capacity can only materialize within a societal bond through the “mediating role of 
others” (Oneself 181). Citizenship requires others, and when others fail to recognize one 
as a capable citizen or, even worse, deny one the ability to fulfill such status, one‟s 
capacity to act for oneself and others in the polis is undermined.  In the case of Morocco 
where many of its citizens have been denied their status not only as citizens but as human 
beings, literally incapacitated, justice becomes tantamount to regaining status as a citizen, 
a sense of capability, a power to act that is shared with others. This can take place 
through  active, ongoing public discourse about the past, one that truth forums can indeed 
inaugurate. Writings and testimonials should also be published and widely distributed in 
order to gain knowledge of the past, remember the victims, and preserve the community‟s 
public memory.  In addition to insisting on truth commissions and other public forums as 
means to recognize victims and contribute to their re-capacitation, reparations programs 
can contribute to these goals as well. As discussed in chapter three, beyond their material 
content (which for many victims should not easily be dismissed), reparations programs 
have symbolic content and thus contribute to a great extent to recognition of harm done 
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to victims and also their re-integration of society as members worthy of respect, integrity 
and dignity.  
 Public memory about the past should be expansive, encompassing many narrative 
accounts—those of perpetrators, and those of the victims.  While many victims have 
testified publically in Morocco and many others have written memoirs and other artifacts 
about the Years of Lead, what has been sorely missing is the voice of the other(s): the 
perpetrators.  Actors in civil society should seek means to engage perpetrators so that 
they too can contribute to the recognition of victims, who are their victims after all.  This 
kind of ongoing public discourse, though difficult and potentially cacophonic, might also 
be cathartic.  It most certainly will motivate judgment that can be “the occasion to 
underscore the therapeutic and pedagogical role of civis dissensus raised by controversies 
animating the public space of discussion at the points of interference of history in the 
arena of collective memory” (Ricoeur, 2004, p.295).  In the cacophony of public 
memories that emerge in times of transition, the testimony is a symbol of public 
consciousness, and witnesses do contribute to the praxis of  public memory that seeks to 
rejoin those who have passed away and those still to come. Indeed, testimony 
distinguishes the moral witness as a citizen with a burden or obligation (or a promise) to 
tell the story of his/her and others‟ ordeal. In doing so, the moral witness records this 
struggle in the annals of humanity‟s history, and ultimately reconciles official history and 
memory (the vernacular type of history).  In the aftermath of national violence, the 
narratives of witnesses serve as a powerful opportunity for deliberation not just about 
past actions (responsibility, accountability, and justice) but also about possibilities for the 
future of a people and the inauguration of a new collective identity.   
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To restore justice is to speak but also to be heard and listened to.  I am not 
advocating that the past be finalized or totalized, but that the past be brought into the 
present as an ongoing conversation.  The praxis of justice then entails recognition of 
victims as suffering human beings worthy of esteem and dignity. Recognition also entails 
that victims recover a share in the power to act, with others, towards the common good.  
To regain self-esteem and self-respect (necessary conditions of the good life) is to 
undergo a transformation from “incapacitation” to capacity. It is important to insist that 
actors in civil society negotiate these two interrelated conditions of justice and discuss 
them in the public forums, rather than allowing the state to make decisions behind closed 
doors.   Restorative approaches to transitional justice bring out the symbolic and political 
implications of testimonies, moving trauma and suffering from the private realm to a 
public (and political) sphere.  They do so not only through testimonies, but through 
public acknowledgment and apologies, lustration or vetting (instead of promotion) of 
state officials known to have participated in torture of political dissidents and other 
atrocities, and through a more sustained effort to account for the fate of the disappeared, 
among other actions. As discussed, many victims and their families have refused to 
accept any financial compensation before the state reveals the whole truth about the fate 
of their loved ones who have disappeared or been murdered.  Otherwise, they see it as 
soiling the memory of the deceased.  This refusal marks the need for symbolic justice 
most poignantly. For such a forum to exist in any authentic way, it should not only 
involve narratives of victims, but also public recognition of and testimony of alleged 
victimizers.  When culpable parties do acknowledge their wrongdoing, reparations that 
yield symbolic justice are possible.  
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Imputability.  Implicit in the forgoing ideals of symbolic justice related to 
recognition and capacity is an imperative for some measure of accountability for criminal 
behaviors against innocent victims, especially when these actions are masterminded by 
officials acting (or claiming to act) on behalf of the state. This aspect of justice concerns 
the issue of imputability, which Ricoeur defines as “the idea of being able to bear the 
consequences of one‟s acts, in particular of those taken as faults, wrongs, in which 
another is reputed to have been the victim” (Ricoeur, 2000, p.106).  Imputability refers to 
taking responsibility for or having the capability to be accountable for one‟s actions. This 
idea of imputability is necessary in several ways.   If a criminal act cannot be imputed to 
its author, impunity becomes the rule that undermines the law in a society. Thus, 
imputability is about not only accountability and responsibility, but establishing morality 
as the basis of social and political relations and interactions.  If actions, whether just or 
unjust, cannot be imputed to particular actors within a society, impunity becomes the 
norm rather than the exception and that particular community is then doomed to ethical 
confusion and moral corruption.    
In addition, imputability serves justice by establishing a just distance between the 
author of a crime and his or her victim(s), which is, as noted in chapter four, a necessity 
for serving justice.  When authors of criminal actions are recognized as such, even 
without retribution in the sense of jail time or other types of punishment, they are still 
judged by their fellow citizens and their actions recognized as unlawful.  In other words, 
they are publicly shamed and bear the burden of their harmful actions, as should be the 
case socially and morally if not legally.  Securing accountability contributes to a culture 
of responsibility. Obviously, most perpetrators would try to avoid, or actively resist, 
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being held accountable for their actions, even when institutional retribution is not a 
consequence.  They may go so far as to file defamation suits against any publication or 
civil society organization that accuses them of acts of illegal detention and torture, or 
being complicit in such acts.  The simple fact of social recognition as engaging corrupt 
and evil acts would be retribution in itself, so long as such actions do not instigate further 
acts of repression on the part of the state. Given the likelihood of litigation, and 
intervention by the state, it is important to find means to compel perpetrators to come 
forward and confess, like in the South African experience. When such an option is not 
viable or possible, it is still important to try securing accountability by other means, even 
when it involves considerable risk on the part of investigative journalists, human rights 
organizations, and other civil society groups.  It is indeed impossible to speak of justice 
when authors of criminal actions are not recognized as such.  Their ethos needs to be 
revealed so that any their authority they might still have is effectively destroyed. Even if 
restorative justice is the approach taken, perpetrators must necessarily be part of the 
conversation. 
In Morocco, as noted in chapter two and elaborated in chapter three, the major 
problem with the so-called process of transitional justice is that there has been no 
accountability.  The state has met demands of the victims of the Years of Lead for truth 
and accountability simply with reparation monies, and then closed the books.  While the 
goal of reconciliation is intimately connected to truth and justice, these virtues have not 
been genuinely sought nor fulfilled in the Moroccan context, as noted previously.  Even 
though the state has washed its hands of past atrocities, and many people have received 
compensation, a lacuna remains, manifesting as an unhealed wound that continues to 
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fester.  Without accountability and with continued impunity, the state can and does 
violate the integrity of any person or group that is considered a threat to its legitimacy.  
Solicitude— apology, forgiveness, reconciliation.  Solicitude is important in 
relation to self-esteem but it is not something that is grafted upon it; solicitude and self-
esteem are different sides of the same coin since they “cannot be experienced or reflected 
upon without the other” (180).  Self-esteem does not necessarily refer to oneself.  As 
Ricoeur insists, “the reflexivity from which self-esteem proceeds remains abstract, in the 
sense that it does not mark the difference between me and you” (181). Solicitude vis-à-
vis one another is paramount since one does not live in solitude but with others, suffering 
others, others other than oneself; so similitude is “the fruit of the exchange between 
esteem for oneself and solicitude for others. This exchange authorizes us to say that I 
cannot myself have self-esteem unless I esteem others as myself” (193). One arrives at an 
understanding of solicitude through the detour of suffering and similitude, which “adds 
the dimension of value, whereby each person is irreplaceable in our affection and our 
esteem” (193).91 In other words, justice cannot happen without perpetrators joining in the 
effort, either voluntarily or involuntarily. In South Africa, for example, the gain for 
perpetrators was quite attractive: amnesty in exchange of their confession of guilt.  It was 
an opportunity for perpetrators to take responsibility for their actions and express genuine 
remorse, or obtain one‟s freedom and clear one‟s conscience of guilt and responsibility. 
In either case, perpetrators had the courage to show their faces and accept the shame and 
stigma associated with their actions.  
Suffering and similitude constitute the heart of practices of apology, forgiveness 
and reconciliation, which are indeed conducive to solicitude. These dialogical encounters 
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require at least two parties, without which they are self-serving and monological 
exercises. When one party is missing from the exchange, as in the case in Morocco where 
perpetrators have been absent, solicitude becomes difficult to achieve; hence the 
importance of including perpetrators in the process, as already stated in the discussion of 
imputability. Practices of apology, forgiveness and reconciliation can contribute to 
solicitude; healing wounds,  restoring communal bonds and renewing political trust. But 
it is important to point out here that apology and forgiveness in particular change 
meaning when they become institutionalized. As Ricoeur insists: “If it is true that justice 
must be done, under the threat of sanctioning the impunity of the guilty, forgiveness can 
find refuge only in gestures incapable of being transformed into institutions. These 
gestures, which would constitute the incognito of forgiveness, designate the ineluctable 
space of consideration due to every human being, in particular to the guilty” (2004, 458). 
In addition, if justice requires a just distance between aggressor and victim, these 
dialogical practices entail just the opposite:  bringing both parties closer.  Justice so 
conceived is also about restoring power to all those involved in the act of justice so that 
self-esteem and thus human relationship to the other is somehow salvaged. 
This kind of public discourse is fundamental to the renewal of the community‟s 
ethos.  Such a new way of conceiving justice, as symbolic justice, offers a change in the 
telos embodied in the ideas of restoration and reconstruction that are often invoked in 
resolution of social conflicts (57).  In this approach, “the end is neither the law, nor the 
victim or the accused, but it is rather the organic bond that holds together a human 
community that is ultimately meant by the ideas of restoration and reconstruction” 
(Justice 58; my translation). When harm is done, it is not only the suffering of the victim 
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and her intimate identity that are at stake but more importantly it is the bond of alterity 
that is harmed by the multiple forms that the denial of recognition can take. As Ricoeur 
eloquently states, “the competence of the relationship consists in reviving power in [for] 
all” (Justice 65; my translation).  
Conclusion 
Transitional justice is an ongoing, agonizing process that is continually enacted 
and re-enacted, tested and challenged. The rhetoric of transitional justice provides a 
framework for thinking about how best to address the aftermath of atrocity; the forensic 
categories it recommends allow for judgment to take shape. Transitional justice, then, 
should first and foremost be an occasion for civic deliberation about the ethos of the 
polis.  This should involve conversations that aim at reconfiguring a distant past, 
redefining a people‟s ethical aim, and reinvigorating citizens‟ political capacity to act. In 
Ricoeurian terms, transitional justice is “an indispensable way of giving a future to the 
past” (Kearney 8). When engaged with the goal of making good again and establishing 
trust and friendship in the community, these practices can modestly contribute to serving 
justice, albeit a symbolic justice where victims gain some modicum of justice or, at least, 
recover a sense of self-esteem, capacity and solicitude and experience some real 
restoration of participation in the symbolic life of the community/society.   
Without focus on justice, humanity loses its moral compass.  As Soyinka puts it:  
“Justice assigns responsibility, and few will deny that justice is an essential ingredient of 
social cohesion—indeed, I have asserted elsewhere that justice constitutes „the first 
condition of humanity‟ And even as justice is not served by punishing the accused before 
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the establishment of guilt, neither is it served by discharging the guilty without evidence 
of mitigation—or remorse” (31).   
That said, the rhetoric of transitional justice has become commonplace, 
sometimes as an authentic framework for negotiating the dramatic consequences of a 
horrific past and other times as a travesty of justice that stifles democratization. As 
elaborated in chapter three especially, the rhetoric of transitional justice can become a 
rhetoric of deceit, an unethical practice that seeks to pay off victims‟ suffering in return 
for their silence or cooptation. In Morocco, the rhetoric of transitional justice means 
different things for different actors.  For the state, it is an expedient and politically safe 
practice meant to close the book on the Years of Lead and, in effect, forget the past.  For 
victims and their families, transitional justice should be about understanding the past, 
assigning responsibilities, recognizing victims, and gleaning lessons so that such a 
traumatic experience does not happen again, to anybody, no matter his or her political 
affiliation or allegiance.  
After thousands of citizens experience violence and injustice through arbitrary 
arrests, physical and psychological torture, disappearances and murder for many decades, 
there is no closure; only continuous efforts to negotiate the grief and anger associated 
with the wounds of the past and nurture the hope for a better tomorrow. No process of 
political transition or reconciliation is perfect. There is also no recipe for such an 
undertaking, which is why comparative studies are sometimes problematical. In fact, not 
all experiences of transitional justice are created equal. Be that as it may, all recognize 
that transitions from one kind of regime to another represents an important moment in the 
history of a nation, a rhetorical opportunity for rethinking the ethos of that society.  
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In Morocco, the state‟s efforts to remedy the harm incurred by victims of the 
Years of Lead have procured some positive gains, but they have been insufficient in 
securing accountability, justice and reconciliation for victims and citizens generally.  The 
focus on monetary reparations means that little attention has been given to listening to 
victims‟ suffering. In addition, the lack of political will in instituting reforms to safeguard 
against a repetition of the Years of Lead has made victims wary and cynical about the 
authenticity of the state‟s motives in addressing that legacy.   In short, the state‟s efforts 
fall short of paving the way for the democratic transition that has been hailed as the 
ultimate consecration of justice for all victims. Given the importance of accountability in 
democratization processes, the Moroccan so-called transitional justice plan is lacking the 
fundamental tenets of an authentic truth and reconciliation process, and, so far, is failing 
to provide the nation with renewed ethos, one based on a sense of justice conceived in the 
narrative and symbolic sense. It is a missed opportunity. As previously noted, transitions 
constitute rhetorical interruptions that shape a community‟s ethos and provide its 
members with a renewed  sense of belonging.  The rhetoric of symbolic justice 
contributes greatly to such an ethical transformation and has pragmatic implications in 
terms of political reforms.  
Symbolic justice may be counterfactual, and some may argue never attainable.  
Some may argue that even if attained, it would not be good.  Still, it should be the 
horizon that guides the types of societal transformation discussed here. When engaged 
within a genuine desire to recognize victims and make amends, and work through the 
suffering that a past of political violence produces, the rhetoric of symbolic justice can be 
a rhetoric of possibility. But for this to happen, the negotiation of the past needs to focus 
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first on redeeming and restoring victims symbolically. Paying close attention to victims‟ 
voices and narratives is essential if society is keen on working through its inglorious past 
and morally redeem itself.  But all voices need to be heard, victims and perpetrators, even 
those who may argue in the face of public indictment that they bear no responsibility and 
have nothing to say. 
Paul Ricoeur was invited to testify in the scandal of the HIV-tainted blood in 
France in 1999. In the closing of his testimony, he asked: 
Why should we listen to the victims? Because when they come to court, 
what we hear is not a naked complaint. It is already a cry of indignation: it 
is unjust! And this cry involves several requests. First, we are asked to 
understand and welcome an intelligible and acceptable narration of what 
happened. Second, the victims request that acts be qualified so that a just 
distance between all protagonists is established. And perhaps we should 
also hear, in the acknowledgment of their suffering, the victims‟ call for an 
apology from politicians. Their call for indemnification comes in last (Le 
Juste 2, 297; my translation).  
Although the context is different, the suffering of the victims of the Years of Lead and 
those of the scandal of the tainted blood in France is comparable. Ricoeur‟s answer points 
to an important aspect of justice: it should be about the victims, and the rest of society 
should lend a listening ear to their stories of suffering. As Ricoeur notes, the monetary 
aspect of justice is last. First should come the public transformation of the society and 
political culture in which atrocities have taken place, which portends a collective 
transformation that has potential to enhance the ethical sensibilities of humanity 
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generally. Symbolic justice does not simply put a restorative veneer on the past, it brings 
it vibrantly into a meaningful present. 
It is important to point out that human rights frameworks, although making 
inroads, have been largely inadequate in dealing with these larger issues of symbolic 
justice.  The problem is that they frame the problem in terms of rights instead of symbolic 
justice.  We should perhaps emphasize solicitude and the power-in-common instead of 
domination, which might lead more readily to equitability for citizens.   Human rights 
institutions with influence might do well to highlight the importance of this Ricoeurian 
middle way to justice, a narrative symbolic justice, where reparations focus not on money 
but  on recognition of wrongs and suffering, repentance and apology.  Even if genuine 
forgiveness cannot be institutionalized as Ricoeur suggests, then at least seeking apology 
and recognition might evoke new practices and further aims of transitional justice.   
Martha Minow warns us that there “are no tidy endings following mass atrocity” 
(102), because no response to the consequences of genocide and other violations of life is 
ever adequate.  There are, in fact, no endings. Coupled with trauma and grief, injustice 
leaves indelible wounds on individuals and the communities who were victimized by the 
state.  Despite the inadequacy of any kind of justice in securing closure for these wounds, 
citizens must engage the past and respond to evil. As emphasized throughout this work, it 
is paramount for nations to read and understand their past and pay tribute to its heroes 
and its victims. In the case of a past of grief and suffering, where people and families 
have been destroyed, it is even more important. To do nothing is not only to provide 
impunity for those who are responsible for the injustices, it is also to fail to recognize the 
pain and suffering of those who were victimized, it is to fail to recognize others as 
 172 
persons worthy of respect and dignity. In a way, to do nothing is to fail to recognize the 
just distance between the torturers and the victims of history, a distance that is crucial for 
the ethical and moral health and sanity of any political and human community. In 
addition, failure to establish distance is also a failure of recognition toboth torturers and 
victims.  
The rhetoric of transitional justice initiates a difficult but necessary conversation 
about the past and future of particular communities and humanity at large. The potential 
that symbolic justice offers for public discourse and democracy is immense. As citizens 
of the world, and scholars of communication, ethics and rhetoric, we would do well to be 
attentive to these phenomena and the modes of communication they engender to further 
contribute rhetorical accounts and interpretations of such lived experiences. Ronald C. 
Arnett argues that communication does not always originate with us but, often, with 
history: “…the historical moment speaks. It is our response that furthers the conversation.  
History is marked by public points of memory…calling us from the routine of everyday 
life into response” (5). The historical moment that emerges after mass atrocity compels 
all of us and must be engaged. It is not always clear what such engagement would entail, 
or what the end product would look like. But certainty is not a feature of life generally 
and that is why the focus on rhetoric is so important. The rhetorical practices of 
restorative justice, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, reparations, 
memorialization, and other symbolic forms mark a transformation of the society and 
political culture in which they take place, a collective transformation that has potential to 
enhance the ethical sensibilities of humanity generally. As this chapter‟s opening quote 
suggests, while there is a multiplicity of histories, the story of mankind is one because 
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our stories are necessarily interconnected, we are part of a single humanity.  Whether 
proud or shameful, the legacy of the past weighs on the present humanity inhabits in so 
many ways and thus atrocious pasts in particular need to be relentlessly engaged. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Davis and Aguilar. 
 
2
 It may be helpful for the reader to have some indication as where the author of this  
work is situated in relation to the proposed project. My personal history in enmeshed in 
the Moroccan experience of transitional justice, which provided me with incentive for 
pursuing this inquiry. But this work is not an auto-ethnography but an invitation to think 
about a nation‟s experience of making sense of its past. It is my hope that this project will 
provide an accurate account of Moroccans‟ attempt to come to terms with their past, and 
suggest potential avenues for thinking philosophically about the rhetoric of transitional 
justice in other national contexts. 
3
 See http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region5/591.html#resources   
4
 See www.ier.ma 
5
 See Nora. 
6
 See Matsuda, 15.  
 
7
 This quotation comes from This Blinding Absence of Light, a historical novel based on 
one man‟s disappearance and imprisonment in Tazmamart, the infamous secret prison in 
Morocco where military officers were left to die a slow death for their alleged role in the 
attempted coup d‟etat against the king, Hassan II, in 1972. Many of these officers 
claimed their innocence but they were not allowed legal representation in the military 
court, presumed guilty and sent to jail. The majority of these young men died due to the 
inhumane conditions they were subjected to, living in rat, cock-roach and scorpion 
infested dungeons where they could not stand up; those who survived, like the man 
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quoted, lived with the fear that he would die and his family would never know what 
happened to them.  
8
  See Huntington. 
9
  For more on this, see Barkan. 
10
 See Hayner; Elster. 
11
 The term used to describe people who have been victimized by a criminal state has 
been problematized because many so-called victims have rejected the label of victim, 
preferring to be referred to as “survivor.” Hence, I will be using the two terms 
interchangeably to refer to citizens who have been at the receiving end of political 
violence and repression during the Years of Lead in Morocco. 
12
  For an in-depth discussion of the Spanish experience, see Aguilar. 
13
 According to Huntington , about thirty countries have “shifted from authoritarianism to 
democracy, and at least a score of other countries were affected by the democratic wave” 
(5). 
14
 For additional information about the history of transitional justice, see Elster. 
15
 See Hayner. 
16
 See Thompson. 
17
 See Minow. 
 
18
 http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/.. 
19
 See White 1975; Ricoeur 1984; Phillips 2004 
20
 This is the slogan of the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice; my translation. 
21
 See Kausch. 
22
 See Ricoeur, Memory. 
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23
 See Kausch. 
24
 There are different spellings of the name of the dynasty that rules Morocco: Alaoui, 
Alaouite, Alawi and Alawid.  I will be spelling it “Alaoui” in keeping with the standard 
Moroccan practice. 
25
  The disappeared or disappearance refers to citizens who have been kidnapped and 
typically murdered by state officials, without leaving a trace. In other words, the fate of 
the disappeared remains unknown and their body has not been recovered by their family. 
This is exactly what the opening quote in chapter 2 points to.  
26
 See Smith and Loudiy; Maghraoui. 
 
27
 See  Slyomovics, Performance. 
 
28
 There is a wealth of articles, memoirs, books and movies that deal with the death of 
Ben Barka, who became a symbol of resistance in Morocco and other neighboring 
countries. His death still remains a mystery, partly because his kidnapping and murder 
were supposedly a collaboration of Moroccan, French and US agencies. While some 
people have come forth with stories of what happened to him, the official version of his 
disappearance continues to be sought by his family and friends. There is an ongoing 
investigation to unveil the truth about his remains. 
29
 Arendt makes a beautiful distinction between power and strength when she argues that 
violence: “can destroy power more easily than it can destroy strength, and while a 
tyranny is always characterized by the impotence of its subjects, who have lost their 
human capacity to act and speak together, it is not necessarily characterized by weakness 
and sterility…Strength, on the other hand, nature‟s gift to the individual which cannot be 
shared with others, can cope with violence more successfully than with power—either 
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heroically, by consenting to fight and die, or stoically, by accepting suffering and 
challenging all affliction through self-sufficiency and withdrawal from the world” (203).  
30
 For additional details, see Vermeren and Perrault. Perrault‟s book was banned in 
Morocco when it was published in 1990 and a major campaign was launched against it. 
The book was based on information gathered by Perrault from correspondence with a 
political prisoner and depicted Hassan II as a ruthless dictator who may have even 
participated in his own father‟s death in order to be the only one in charge of political 
matters in Morocco.  
31
 The report published by the ICTJ provides details of these events. 
32
 For a discussion of women and political violence during the Years of Lead in Morocco, 
see the study conducted by anthropologist Nadia Guessous for the Moroccan Council on 
Human Rights, available at: http://www.ccdh.org.ma/IMG/pdf/GUIDang.pdf. 
33
 See also http://www.merip.org/mer/mer218/218_bouih.html. 
 
34
 The ICTJ reports that “The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the worst abuse against 
perceived or potential enemies. Trade unionists, Marxists, intellectuals, farmers, 
Islamists—anyone suspected of being critical of the monarchy—could potentially be 
subject to a wide range of punishments, often just for the „crime‟ of a rumored political 
affiliation” (5). 
35
 After the failed coups of 1971 and 1972, fifty-eight military officers (air force pilots 
mostly) were taken to Tazmamart for their supposed involvement in the coups. They 
were kept in abject conditions and less than half of these men survived after eighteen 
years of captivity. Their superiors, including those who masterminded the coups, were 
executed without trial or opportunity to talk about planning and accomplices so these 
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officers were detained in this prison without any proof of wrongdoing and, as it turns out, 
most were innocent and had nothing to do with the coups. 
36
 This was a speech given after the first visit by an Israeli prime minister to an Arab 
state, given to explain his actions to the people of Morocco.  
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20
since%201947/1984-
1988/178%20Address%20to%20the%20Moroccan%20people%20by%20King%20Hassa
n 
37
 See KABAZAL: Les Emmurés de Tazmamart, Mémoires de Salah et Aida Hachad 
(Kabazal: The Walled up People of Tazmamart: Memoirs of Salah and Aida Hachad). 
These memoirs tell about the inhumane conditions that Hachad and his colleagues 
endured for twenty years in total isolation in a secret prison because of their presumed 
guilt in the 1973 failed military coup against Hassan II. Hachad was innocent but the state 
never provided with the opportunity to either state his innocence nor prove it. Most 
inmates in the Tazmamart prison died within a few years; those who survived lived in 
those conditions for almost twenty years. 
38
 See http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm.  
39
 The Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) has documented hundreds of 
human rights abuse cases; the target this time is the Islamists. For details: 
http://www.amdh.org.ma/ . 
40
 For information about this Moroccan state organization, see: 
http://www.ccdh.org.ma/?lang=en. 
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41
 This commission was established by a Royal Dahir (a royal decree) and chaired by 
Driss Dahak, the president of the Supreme Court. The commission‟s members included 
ministers and members of political parties represented in the existing parliament. 
42
 See Ideology and Utopia, and Critique and Conviction, in particular 147. 
 
43
 See Slyomovics, Performance 21. 
44
 El Youssoufi is considered to be one of the founding fathers of the socialist left in 
Morocco, even before the country‟s independence.  
45
 There were rumors that El Youssoufi and the king had made a pact (a secret pact) and 
no one knows for sure what the details of the agreement was exactly. But there are 
suggestions that the pact involved El Youssoufi‟s assurance (he supposedly swore on the 
Koran, which means that he gave his word to never tell anyone) that the monarchy will 
be “saved” and that the name of Hassan II will not be sullied in the investigations of the 
Years of Lead.  
46
 Slyomovics notes here the distinction between indemnity and compensation as they 
belong to different registers. She states: “Indemnity gives evidence of acknowledging an 
official policy of illegal state practices; compensation means that something compensable 
occurred” (2009, 106).  
47
 The report of the National Commission on the Disappeared in Argentina, entitled 
Nunca Mas (Never Again), made this idea of “never again” one of the goals of most truth 
and reconciliation commissions that come afterwards.  For more information about this 
commission and other commissions, see Priscilla Hayner. 
48
 For more information about this commission and other commissions, see Priscilla 
Hayner. 
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49
 There are many instances of transitional justice throughout the world, primarily in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union and Africa. The 
examples are numerous and too many to cite, so those that are mentioned are for 
illustration purposes only and do not pretend to cover the whole range of national 
experiences.   
50
 This information is based on meetings and interviews conducted with members of the 
Forum during summers 2006 and 2007. These members have been direct victims of the 
Years of Lead and suffered imprisonment, torture, kidnapping and other forms of torture. 
For instance, one victim spent ten years in prison and was released in the early 1980s. He 
was tortured on several occasions during his arrest and although he was unjustly detained, 
which resulted in his family‟s suffering and struggle during those ten years, he believes 
that their struggle was a necessity. Two other members of his family were victimized 
during the Years of Lead: his brother-in-law, who was tortured and kept in secret 
detention (disappeared because his family was not informed of his whereabouts) for 
several months and then fled to France to get treatment for a blood disease that was a 
consequence of the torture sessions he endured for months, and his sister-in law, a young 
woman in her mid-twenties who died in prison after a forty-day hunger strike to protest 
her and her prison mates status and failed to receive adequate medical care to save her 
life.  
51
 Amin provided this information in an unpublished document in 2006. Campbell also 
makes the connection between political and economic liberalization, although the 
argument typically advanced against democratization is that because they are poor and 
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uneducated, citizens are not ready for democracy and, therefore, democratization has to 
be postponed until citizens are adequately prepared for it. 
52
  While the IER had seventeen commissioners, the commission‟s leadership was made 
up of former political prisoners, mostly from the left, in particular the Marxist-Leninist 
movement.  Pierre Hazan comments that “These activists have abandoned their 
revolutionary ideologies and invested themselves in human rights organizations” (5).   
53
 See http://www.ier.ma/_fr_article.php?id_article=147, my translation 
54
 Hazan notes that “As a result of the strict limitations of its mandate, the IER‟s position 
during the hearings was delicate. Its goal was to signify the beginning of a new era with 
the opening of the democracy desired by Mohammed VI. But the break with the past had 
to be made with great care. The reign of King Hassan II, under which almost all the 
human rights violations had taken place, could not be criticized” (6).  
55
 The initials refer to individuals I have interviewed.  
56
 Personal interview conducted in Summer 2006 
57
 Personal interview conducted in Summer 2006 
58
 There are five infamous secret detention centers in connection with the torture and 
secret detentions of the “Years of Lead:” Tazmamart, Agdaz, Qal‟ar M‟gouna, Dar-al-
mokri and Derb Moulay Cherif. The first three were reserved for military officers and 
armed revolutionaries and the second two were reserved for political prisoners. For 
additional information, see the ICTJ report and Slyomovics, Performance.  
59
  See http:///www.ier.ma/article.php3?id_article=805, my translation 
60
 Ibid. 
61
  Personal interview conducted in Summer 2006 
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62
 See “Completely Free Testimonies for Truth.”  
63
 See “Completely Free Testimonies for Truth” 2006. 
64
  Personal interview conducted in Summer 2006. 
65
 See Garapon :  
66
 Ricoeur‟s work contributes a great deal to the study of rhetoric and communication 
ethics. But, as Andreea Deciu Ritivoi points out: “Ricoeur‟s endeavors in moral and 
political philosophy, or more recently in memory studies have received little attention 
from rhetorical scholars, although they elaborate and clarify his work in hermeneutics 
and in the philosophy of language” (3). The work that is perhaps most familiar to 
rhetoricians is the three volumes of Time and Narrative, where Ricoeur posits a narrative 
framework as a potential antidote to the aporia of time or the false dilemma of thinking 
about time either in cosmic (universal) or lived (phenomenological) terms.   
67
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ricoeur/ retrieved 02/20/10. It is helpful to note here 
that for Ricoeur, knowledge, especially knowledge of oneself, is also mediated. Ricoeur 
defines hermeneutics as “the site of three interrelated problematics:  
1. The indirect approach of reflection through the detour of analysis; 
2. The first determination of selfhood by way of its contrast with sameness; 
3. The second determination of selfhood by way of its dialectic with otherness.” 
(Time 3: 297 
68
 See Lenore Langsdorf‟s discussion of subjectivity in light of Ricoeur‟s discussion of 
identity and selfhood. In “The doubleness of subjectivity:  Regenerating the 
phenomenology of intentionality,” Langsdorf advances a notion of “mediated self (in 
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contrast to a Cartesian self) that …is multiple, mutable, and permeable; loosely woven to 
the extent that it is fragmented in creatively powerful ways” (34). 
69
 Kearney explains the relationship between Ricoeur‟s critical hermeneutics and 
narrative, as he states that the former offers, we believe, a compelling response to such 
questions by outlining four central tasks of narrative: (i) to realize our debt to the 
historical past; (ii) to respect the rival claims of memory and forgetfulness; (iii) to 
cultivate a notion of self-identity; and (iv) to persuade and evaluate action. (Owl of M., 
99).  
70
 Troup notes: “What Ricoeur misses in Augustine is the argument that in Aristotle, 
cosmos is eternal, not co-temporal. In Augustine, eternity surrounds us, envelops us, and 
dominates us, without the human soul having the power to produce it. Therefore, both 
cosmos and human being are derivative and co-temporal because created.” Personal 
communication, 10/11/10. 
71
   See Troup. 
72
  See OA, 194.   
73
 See Dosse, Les Sens d’Une Vie, for details about Ricoeur‟s life.  
74
 F. Dallmayr, Achieving Our World: Toward a Global and Plural Democracy, 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 172. 
75
 Ibid, 172. 
76
 “The Right and the Good: A Solution to the Communicative Ethics Controversy,‟ in 
Ricoeur as Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity, Ricoeur as Another: The Ethics of 
Subjectivity, edited by R.A. Cohen and J.L. Marsh, (New York: SUNY Press, 2002) 223. 
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77
 OAA, 16-17. It is worth mentioning here that Ricoeur takes his philosophy of action 
here “in the limited sense that this term has acquired principally in analytic philosophy” 
p. 17. 
78
  Ricoeur‟s task in this first part of his treatise is to show, through these different 
approaches to action, how human action can be approached in three modes of language, 
what Ricoeur calls the polysemy of action: description, narration, and prescription. See 
OAA 152 
79
 Ibid.  
80
 OAA 18, emphasis in original.  
81
 OAA 170. It is perhaps worth noting here that before this statement, Ricoeur 
acknowledges his indebtedness to Aristotle for the teleological orientation and his equal 
indebtedness to Kant‟s deontological orientation. Still, he is clear that what he proposes 
in terms of ethical practice is not too concerned “about Aristotelian or Kantian orthodoxy, 
although not without paying close attention to the founding texts of these two traditions.” 
This statement is important in light of his later work on justice. In his Reflections on the 
Just, he corrects the thesis he advances in OAA about the primacy of ethics over morality 
and in doing so, tries to show the labels applied to both Aristotle and Kant can be 
intellectually constraining and are perhaps missing the inherent connections between 
these two approaches to ethics. I explain this later in this chapter, but for a direct 
reference, see Reflections 2-3. 
82
 OAA, 170. Emphasis in original text. 
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83
 Ricoeur explains: “[…] morality is held to constitute only a limited, although legitimate 
and even indispensable, actualization of the ethical aim, and ethics in this sense would 
then encompass morality.” OAA 170, my emphasis.  
84
 See also Gadamer‟s discussion of phronesis in Truth and Method (Chap. 2). 
85
 Marsh reminds us that, for Ricoeur, “the former [ethics] takes its bearing from 
Aristotle, whose ethics is teleological; the latter [the normative] is influenced by Kant, for 
whom morality is defined by teleological norm” (224).  But when the two aims or claims 
clash (the ethical and the normative), the answer is to be found in the ethical through 
phronesis, which leads Marsh to state that Ricoeur can be granted with solving the 
dilemma between the right and the good, or providing a solution to “the communicative 
ethics controversy” (223).   The communicative ethics controversy that Marsh refers to is 
about different perspectives in ethical theories that have pitted the right and the good 
against each other. Marsh defines it as “this general set of antinomies, even though 
specific thinkers may understand it to refer to more specific issues such as that of 
particular context versus universal norms.” (223) See Benhabib and Dallmayr, The 
Communication Ethics Controversy. 
86
 See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 117. 
87
 Ricoeur argues that morality and ethics cannot be conceived without one another. He 
states: “Just as moral philosophy cannot do without some reference to the good, to the 
wish for a good life, except at the price of ignoring the rootedness of moral philosophy in 
life, in desire, in what is lacking, and in what we wish for, so the transition from the wish 
to the imperative, from desire to interdiction appears to be inevitable. … For the 
fundamental reason that action implies a capacity to do something that gets carried out on 
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the interactive plane as the power exercised by an agent on another agent who is the 
recipient of this power. ... In short, it is owing to the wrong that one person inflicts on 
another that the moral judgment given an action has to add the predicate of the obligatory 
to that of the good, usually under the negative figure of what is prohibited. In this respect, 
an investigation that deliberately aims at the idea of the just must not allow itself to be 
caught off guard here” (The Just x).  
88
 Time 3: 204 
 
89
 Let us recall here Ricoeur‟s discussion of phronesis is based on Aristotle‟s 
understanding of phronesis as both a moral and intellectual virtue. In The Rhetoric, 
Aristotle defines practical widsom as “the quality of mind concerned with things just and 
noble and good for man, but these are the things which it is the mark of a good man to do, 
and we are none the more able to act for knowing them if the virtues are states of 
character, just as we are none the better able to act for knowing the things that are healthy 
and sound, in the sense of producing but of issuing from the state of health; for we are 
none the more able to act for having the art of medicine or of gymnastics. But if we are to 
say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake of knowing moral truths but 
for the sake of becoming good, practical wisdom will be of no use to those who are good; 
but again it is of no use to those who have not virtue; for it will make no difference 
whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey others who have it, and it would 
be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health; though we wish to become 
healthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine. (Bk. VI: CH. 12, 1143b-20) 
90
 These victims‟ narratives are testimonies, which Ricoeur states are very similar to 
promises in that they rely on confidence and trust and because they both fortify the 
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“institution of language, whose customary practice encompasses a tacit clause of sincerity 
and, if we may put it this way, of charity: I want to believe that you mean what you say” 
(131). 
91
 A full discussion of solicitude is beyond the scope of this work; the Seventh Study (The 
Self and the Ethical Aim, 190-194) provides a good explanation of the metaphor, an 
important one for discussions of ethics in general and friendship in particular.  
